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John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory has been
subject
to criticism- by philosophers,

partly because of its alleged

inability to account for intuitively compelling
principles
of justice.

It is argued that Mill has been seriously mis-

interpreted and that a careful analysis of (primarily)
On
L iberty and U_ci_l t a r i an i s results in an interpretation
;

of

.

his theory which avoids these objections.

A utilitarian

theory is developed which is based on this interpretation
and which,

it is argued, Mill could have accented.

After an account of familiar objections to utilitarianism concerning distributive justice, it is demonstrated
that Mill's argument in Util it arianism for a "qualitative

pleasure distinction" is plagued with difficulty and that,
even if successful, appeal

~co

qualitative distinctions among

pleasures for determining the morality of actions would result in additional problems for utilitarian theory concerning distributive justice.

These additional problems are

avoided by demonstrating that Mill did not regard his
IV

argument for a qualitative pleasure distinction
as an argument for a necessary consideration--in addition
to quantity
--for determining the morality of actions; rather,

that he is

more plausibly interpreted as having considered
qualitative

pleasure distinctions only in a prudential context--for
appeal to in determining the prudential rightness and
wrongness of actions.

Consequently, contrary to what has often

been supposed, Mill's argument for a qualitative pleasure

distinction cannot be regarded, as a major departure from a

utilitarian theory like Bentham's.
Next, it is demonstrated that Mill, as an empiricist,
ma.de a

distinction between what is called "metaphysical” and

"non-metaphysical" rightness; recognition of this distinction,

along with additional considerations, makes it obvious that

Mill’s utilitarian theory is committed to a theory of intrinsic value which holds that "happiness" has intrinsic value,

where the substantive content of happiness is to be regarded
as unknown.

Consequently, Mill (unlike Bentham) does not re-

gard 'pleasure' as equivalent to 'happiness,' and so subscribes to a eudaemonistic
theory.

,

not a hedonistic, utilitarian

A principle of utility is developed which corres-

ponds to each kind of rightness; it is then aruged that justice can plausibly be associated only with the principle based
on non-metaphysical rightness; that the theory should be re-

jected or accepted only by considering justice in accordance
v

with this nrinciDle

and that Mill's theory has
erroneously

bean rejected because only the other
principle of utilitybased on metaphysical rightness— has
been considered.
!o explicate this new (non-metaphysical)
principle of

utility, it is argued that Mill regarded
'unjust actions' as
violations of rights' and associated our moral
obligation to
be just with the two necessary
conditions for

happiness—the

righ

u

bo

life and the right to liberty.

With the principle of utility fully explained,
it is
shovrn how the utilitarian theory which
has been develoned
can account for intuitively acceptable principles
of dis-

tributive justice.

A non-utilitarian theory of social jus-

tice propounded by William K. Frankena is shown to
be deriv-

able from the utilitarian theory v/hich has been developed,
and attention is focused on the objections and
"Canons of

Diotributive Justice" in Nicholas Reseller'
J ustice

.

s

Distributive

Finally, it is argued that David Lyons' concept of

"fair procedures" (from his Forms and Limits of Utilitarian i_sm)

is

contrary to his claim

—a

principle of distributive

justice that can be derived from our utilitarian theory, and

employed to resolve additional problems concerned with dis-

tributive justice.
A brief addendum explains how the theory can function

as either an act- or a rule-utilitarian theory.
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CHAPTER

I

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS A PROBLEM FOR UTILITARIANISM

Section

I

Some Traditional Problems and Their Cause

Historically, most critics of utilitarianism have
alleged that one of its major defects is an inability to

account for intuitively acceptable principles of justice.

Among the various kinds of justice, the principles of distributive justice have been central to this claim.

As it

will be maintained that the source of any difficulty re-

garding distributive justice is inherent in "classical**

formulations of the principle of utility, it is desirable
to begin by explaining what is meant by categorizing a

formulation of the principle of utility in this way.
A principle of utility is "classical” if it is formu-

lated as either a hedonistic or an ideal principle.

Thus,

the formulation of the principle is such that the utility

of an action is determined by its production of some in-

trinsic good(s), where the latter is something substantive

which always serves as the criterion for determining whether
an action is right, wrong, or obligatory.

As a hedonistic

principle, only pleasure (happiness) is regarded as intrin-

sically good? as an ideal principle, there is more than one
intrinsic good (perhaps including pleasure).

In the former,

then, pleasure is always appealed to for determining the

2

utility of any action; in the latter, whatever
intrinsic
goods are appealed to are determined by the particular

ideal

theory employed and are the same for each case of
determining the utility of any action.
A "classical " formulation of the principle of utility

may be an act- or rule-utilitarian principle.

Thus, for ex-

ample, as an act-utilitarian principle of obligation, it

might be formulated as follows;

"An action ought to be done

if and only if (among all alternative actions which the agent
is capable of choosing) it maximizes the total amount of in-

trinsic good of those persons affected by the action, counting each person as one and no person as more than one (i.e.,

insofar as it maximizes 'the greatest good of the greatest

number*)."

And as a rule-utilitarian principle:

"An action

ought to be done if and only if prescribed by a utilitarian
rule, a rule being a utilitarian rule if and only if acting

in accordance with it in all those situations in which it

applies tends to maximize the overall good of those to whom
it applies, counting each person as one and no person as

more than one (again,

number®)."

*the greatest good of the greatest

Discounting difficulties which, for instance,

might be thought to stem from a consideration of the distinction between an act being a prima facie or an absolute
obligation, in addition to neglecting numerous variations
of both formulations of the principle, this somewhat general characterization will suffice.

3

It is because utilitarians have maintained
that jus-

tice is encompassed by principles of obligation
similar to
these which has caused much of the criticism of the
theory.
Thus, distributive justice has been held to be a
problem for

both act- and rule-utilitarianism.
says of act-utilitarianism,

M

Brandt, for example,

The act-utilitarian thesis is

in conflict with the fact that we have certain obligations

connected with social and economic justice ... .On this question, however, the act-utilitarian must say that any dis-

tribution is equally satisfactory, as long as the total

^ee John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism,” The Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill Vol. X, Essays On Ethics. Reli gion and Society Ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of
Totonto Press, 1969 ), Chapter V, pp. 240-259. Also, Richard
B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. 395-6. For example, it is
clear that Mill thought that, because of their long-term
effects, just actions must be regarded as obligatory. In
distinguishing "justice” from "the other obligations of
morality," he speaks of the former as those "duties of perfact obligations ... in virtue of which a correlative right
resides in some person or persons" (p. 247, "Utilitarianism”).
Rights, of course, are justified in terms of their
utility see, for example, p, 10 of On Liberty (ed. Alburey
Castell,'New York: Apple ton-Century-Crofts, 1947) and p. 250
of "Utilitarianism" and so we would have something like
this:
"Something is established by utilitarian theory as
a right if, and only if, establishing it as a right is more
productive of the general happiness than not doing so."
Consequently, Mill might say, roughly, that "an action is
just if, and only if, it is in accordance with the rights
of those affected by the action." The relationship between
rights and justice is actually more complicated than this.
It is the purpose of Chapter II in what follows to formulate a principle of utility which can account for justice,
of Chapter III to explicate a part of Mill's theory of
rights, and of Chapter IV to demonstrate how his utilitarian
theory can account for distributive justice.
.

,

—

—

4

2

amount of joy is undiminished .

And with regard to rule-

utilitarianism, he states, "The point
of primary difficulty
for the rule-utilitarian appears
to be the implications of
his theory for the distribution
of welfare. The rule-utilitarian, we recall, approves of any
rule for distributing
welfare so long as it does not bring about
less welfare
than some alternative rule."-^

Stating the problem somewhat more concisely,
John
Hospers asserts:
...a possible conflict arises between the
utilitarian ideal-even that of rule-utilitarianism—
ana the requirements of justice. For the acts
ilitarianism and the rules in rule—
utilitarianism have one end in mind: the production^of the largest possible amount (quantity )
S®od_.
But does not justice require
sometning additional that is not taken into account thus far at all, namely an equal distribution of that intrinsic good?^

Hospers later turns to the question as to whether there are
occasions on which equality is not enough to guarantee justice, and goes on to consider what he regards as "the most

important strand in the concept of justice," the question of
justice and deserts (rewards and punishments).

He emphasizes

that there are times when a distribution is to be regarded as
2

Brandt, p. 389
^Brandt, p. 403.
4
John Hospers, Human Conduct: An Introduction to the
Problems of Ethics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
Inc., 1961), pp. 424-25
.

5

unjust

not because there are unequal allotments
but because
they are not given in accordance
with what is deserved .-5
,

Hospers* reference to deserts calls attention
to an
important point-- viz. that distributive
justice conceived
as narrowly egalitarian is insufficient—
that legitimate
,

claims must be accounted for by any theory of
distributive
justice which purports to be satisfactory.
Thus, the claim
made by many defendants of the principle of utility

(includ-

ing Mill) that it does provide for the distribution
of good

insofar as it is always to be understood as formulated
in
terms of "the greatest good for the greatest number*'
is
thought to be inadequate as a defense, even if successful;

for the only principle of distributive justice that could
be accounted for by such a qualification would be egali-

tarian.

As it turns out, however, even on this latter point

it has been asserted that the principle is ambiguous.

Thus, in regard to "the greatest number" part of the

phrase, Bentham's insistence that each person was to count

for one and only for one might be thought to insure utili-

tarian theory as egalitarian.

But, although it seems clear

that we are to consider everyone's happiness in determining
the total quantity of intrinsic good for a given action, it
is not at all apparent what we are to do when faced with a

choice between two actions, one of which will result in a

5Hospers,

p.

429.

6

greater total quantity of happiness
via an unequal distribution and another which, though
it will result in an
equal distribution, will produce a
lesser quantity of total
happiness. As it is claimed that neither
Bentham nor Mill
provided explicit directions as to which
action we are to
choose
such a situation, it seems reasonable
to conclude
that their qualification, ’’for the greatest
number,” was
merely meant to insure that every person
affected by the

m

prospective action be included in calculations of
the final
quantity of happiness. 6

Rescher attempts to elucidate the problem by insisting that

terion.

the principle of utility is a two-factor cri-

”

Suppose that some three particular persons,
Messrs. A, B, and C, can be given the utility
shares (a), (b), and (c) resnectivelv, in accordance with either Scheme I or Scheme II:
Share
Scheme I
Scheme II
(a r~
3 units
2 units
(t>)

(c)

2
6

3
3

Which scheme represents the superior mode of
distribution? Scheme II yields "the greatest
good”:
it distributes ten units as compared
with nine of its rival. Scheme I yields a
greater advantage in goods for M the greatest
number”:
two persons gain by its adoption and
only one loses. The example brings out the
fact that the principle of utility is a two factor criterion ("greater good,” "greater
number”), and that these two factors can in
given cases work against one another. There
is thus nothing in the principle of utility
to help us in making let alone in dictating

—

6

Hospers

pp. 425-26.

7

a particular outcome of--a choice between Scheme I
and Scheme II. The principle unqualified is patently incomplete as an effective means for deciding
between alternative distributions of a good.

Although Rescher's general point is merely that the principle
of utility is unable to choose between alternative distribu-

tions in at least some cases, if we assume (as

I

think

Rescher does) g that only one of the schemes in the example
is just, this point

— if

justified

— must

be regarded as a

serious criticism of the theory.
At this point, then, the underlying problem is that
there may be conflicts between the principle of utility

formulated (as it traditionally has been) in terns of some

particular conception of happiness as the only intrinsically
good end and those principles of distribution which we re-

gard as intuitively acceptable.

As evidenced above,

o

this

conflict apparently arises in spite of any claims that

Bentham and Mill meant to insure that the principle pro-

vided for distribution in at least the egalitarian sense;

"^Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice (New York;
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 25
.

o

I presume that Rescher' s preference is Scheme I,
though he" is not explicit about it. However, even if we
assume that both distribution schemes in the example. are
equally just, given the supposed difficulty Rescher is
concerned to point out here, it would not be difficult to
imagine just and unjust distribution schemes. which the
principle of utility would be unable to distinguish.

^pp. 5

r

6*

& 7

.

8

and although it has been suggested that something like

Brandt's theory of "universalistic impersonal pluralism"^

might guarantee

tfiis

aspect of justice for utilitarian

theory by counting "equality of welfare" as an intrinsic
good, tnis proposal (and others like it) must be rejected as

unsatisfactory, for reasons to be advanced below.

Further,

if along with Hospers it is admitted that there are other

acceptable principles of distributive justice which attempt
to take into account legitimate claims (based on merit, need,

productivity, etc,), it seems even more obvious (though it

won't be argued for here) that classical formulations of the
principle of utility cannot be made to square with them in
all those instances in which it seems intuitively evident

that it should.

It has not, then, been unfairly alleged that

the principle of utility, as classically formulated, is com-

patible with any distribution so long as the quantity of intrinsic good which results is at a maximum.

It is time to

consider the cause of this conflict and eventually to consider a way of avoiding it.

11

J- u

Brandt, pp. 355. 356, 395-6. 500.
There are, of course, many other significant objections raised against utilitarianism which are based on claims
of conflict with principles of distributive justice, e.g,,
the objections found in numerous articles by John Rawls and
his book A Theory of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard
However, the purpose of this secUniversity Press, 1971)
tion required that we consider only a f ew in order to point
out that utilitarian theory is subject to these difficulties
because they are inherent in classical formulations of the
principle of utility. In point of fact, these few can be
11

•

.

9

As previously noted, the general cause of
the conflict
is evident;

it must be admitted that so long as the
principle

of utility is formulated in terms of "absolute
intrinsic

value," in the manner in which it traditionally has been,
the
conflict between it and the principle(s) of distributive

jus-

tice is unavoidable and inevitable.

Therefore, so long as

is agreed that incompatibility with intuitively accept-

able principles provides sufficient reason for rejecting an

ethical theory (there are, of course, many other conflicts

between utilitarian theory and other intuitively acceptable
notions which are not concerned with distributive justice),
it appears that the rejection of utilitarianism is necessiI

tated for the reasons advanced above.

O

regarded as sufficient grounds for rejection of classical
formulations of the theory. Other objections (e.g., Rawls'),
as well as some of the above, v/ill be dealt with in more
detail in a subsequent chapter.
12

It is to be noted that reference to "intuitively
acceptable principles" here and elsewhere is not to be construed as evidence of a commitment to a particular epistemological theory as to ho w we come to know or regard certain
ethical propositions as true. On the contrary, it is merely
used as a convenient expression for the purpose of recognizing that there are some ethical propositions among them
principles of distributive justice with which many philosophers have maintained that any acceptable moral theory
should not be incompatible. As the latter claims are merely
assumed to be reasonable requirements of acceptable moral
theories, for the purpose of eventually demonstrating the acceptability of a version of utilitarianism in this regard,
any epistemological issues are to be regarded as superfluous
to the major concern of the dissertation.

—

—

10

Section II
The Qualitative Pleasure DistinctionSource of a New Problem
There are, in addition, other problems which have
P-^-^oaed

classical formulations of the theory which bear di-

rectly or indirectly on the problem of distributive justice.
One of the historically more important and most discussed

merits consideration
among pleasures.

— the

problem of qualitative differences

With respect to this problem it will be

demonstrated in Sub-section II-A that a qualitative ranking
of pleasures is an unlikely possibility.

In Sub-section II-B

the much more significant point will be established that, con-

trary to what seems generally to have been supposed by philosophers, even if a qualitative hierarchy were possible, its

use would not only not represent an improvement of the theory
but would, instead, result in additional theoretical diffi-

culties regarding distributive justice.

Sub-section II-A: Mill's problematic argument for the
qualitative pleasure distinction

.

sures as qualitatively indistinct.

Bentham regarded all pleaThus, in saying,

By utility is meant that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the
present case comes to the same thing) or (what
again comes to the same thing) to prevent the
happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered,

^

to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation," Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham ,
University of
ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London:
London, The Athlone Press, 1970), p. 12.

^Jeremy Bentham, "An Introduction

11

he had in mind a concept of utility
that was susceptible to

quantitative determination by way of his
"hedonistic calculus

"
.

In addition to all the familiar objections
raised con-

cerning the practical (perhaps theoretical)
difficulties involved in attempting to subject pleasures and
pains to quantitative measurement, it was this severe limitation
on the con-

cept of utility which resulted in one of the presumably
more

damaging criticisms to be leveled against utilitarianism.

It

was the assertion that utilitarianism was a "pig philosophy"
(and all this involves) which prompted Mill to respond early
in the second chapter of "Utilitarianism" with the assurance

that "qualitative differences" must also be considered in any

consideration of utilities:
It is quite compatible with the principle of
utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds
of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that,
while, in estimating all other things, quality
is considered as v/ell as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend
on quantity alone. ^
2

Though it seems apparent that a merely quantitative
approach to pleasures and pains is insufficient, the insistence that qualitative distinctions are to be accommodated
as well is also riddled with seemingly unresolvable diffi-

culties.

On the one hand, there is the problem of the method

for deciding which pleasures are of the highest quality.
^M.ill, "Utilitarianism," p. 211.

If

12

solved, it would be possible to list pleasures
in a descending order of quality, such that those higher on
the list are

qualitatively superior to those which are lower.

Such a rank-

ing can oe referred to as a ’’qualitative hierarchy*' of
plea-

sures.

Mill's proposal for setting up such a "hierarchy" is
set forth in 'Utilitarianism:

Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or
almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more
desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those
who are completely acquainted with both, placed so
far above the other that they prefer it, even though
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of°
discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is
capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the
preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so
far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. 15

Based on this passage and the context in which it ap-

pears in "Utilitarianism," Mill's reasoning can be made ex-

plicit by the following deductive argument

~^Mill

:

"Utilitarianism," p. 211.
What follows in the discussion of this passage is
only what I regard as a plausible account of how Mill would
have argued had he intended to establish a qualitative hierarchy of pleasures , and an account of the serious difficulties encountered in doing so.
As I later argue, in Section I
of the next chapter, to suppose that setting up such a hierarchy is what Mill had in mind is to accept a false interpretation of his work. My position in this regard was discussed with and corroborated by Professor Ann Brentlinger,
a member of the philosophy department of the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst.
^

,

13
(1)

If all or almost all competent judges give a
decided

preference to a pleasure, then it is more desirable
(i*e.» of greater intrinsic worth) than one to
which

they do not give a decided preference.
(2)

Given any range of kinds of pleasures, all or most all
competent judges will agree upon a qualitative hierarchy
in which, generally, intellectual pleasures are decidedly

preferred to sensual pleasures.
(3) Therefore,

on the basis of (1) and (2), the general cate-

gory of intellectual pleasures is intrinsically better
than that of sensual pleasures.
If we interpret the passage in this way, both premisses
are objectionable.

It is plausible to interpret Mill as in-

tending that the consequent of premise (1) is to be read,
"then it is certain that it is more desirable ...

M

If so,

then, if Mill did not regard competent judges as infallible

authorities (there is good reason to believe this, as seen
below)

it is clearly possible on at least some occasions

for the antecedent of (1) to be true and the consequent false.
In this case, the argument, although valid, is unsound.

To

state this somewhat differently, premise (1) is not known to
be true on the general ground that it constitutes an appeal
to authority.

Although this would not be a justifiable

17

The reference is to what follows in the rest of this
paragraph, and to the discussion of infallibility in this
work, pp. 17»and 93 - 96
.

14

objection if Mill held that every competent
judge was an infallible authority, it seems clear that
he did not subscribe
to the position since he conceded
that it may be
the case

that only

’’most' 1

of those who qualify as competent
judges

may be in agreement, in which case some
competent judges are
1 Q
mistaken.
However, even if (1) is true, 19 premise
(2) is regarded by Mill either as a necessary analytic
truth or as em-

pirically true.
is circular;

If held as a necessary truth, the argument

if held as empirically true, there is no good

reason for asserting that (2) is known to be true and
the
argument, although valid, is unsound.
18

This implies that Mill was not subscribing to an
ideal observer" theory, in which part of what it means to
be an "ideal observer" is to have infallible knowledge.
It
might also be noted though it won’t be argued that Mill
may have allowed premise (1) to be replaced by a definition,
mus, where X and Y are variables which range over pleasures
and the predicate is the relational predicate, "has more intrinsic worth than," *X has more intrinsic worth than Y'=df
*X is preferred to Y by a majority of competent judges.
Again, it can be objected that an appeal to authority (in
the above sense) is unacceptable as a method for defining
predicates of this kind. One might also regard this as a
paradigm. instance of what G. E. Moore would have called a
"naturalistic fallacy," bearing in mind that this has been
subjected to a great deal of criticism, and should not be
appealed to without further argument. It is only to be
noted that, if Moore’s point is defensible, this constitutes
an additional reason for rejecting the definition.
•^Premise (1) has a greater chance of being true if
its consequent is weakened to read, "then it is probable
that it is more desirable." As an empiricist who held that
general empirical propositions cannot be completely confirmed, it is perhaps more fair to attribute this reading
to Mill.

—

.

—
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It seems most reasonable to
interpret Mill as intending (2) as empirically true.
If so, he may have meant by

•competent judge' something like
(definition Dp 'anyone
having experienced both sensual
and intellectual pleasures
who is equally capable of
appreciating and enjoying both.'
Yet, there is some reason to
believe that he must have intended (2) to be regarded as
analytically true, in which case
by 'competent judge,' he was operating
with something
like

(definition D

2)

'anyone having experienced both sensual
and

intellectual pleasures who is equally capable
of appreciating
and enjoying both, and who gives decided
preference to the
latter.
Evidence that (2) is to be regarded as analytically
true is found in "Utilitarianism.

"

For example, anyone who

has experienced both sensual and intellectual
pleasures, but
who chooses sensual over intellectual pleasures,
can always
be accounted for by Mill as no longer being
capable of appreciating and enjoying both, because of having lost
the 'bapaci-

ty for the nobler feelings."

•

It may be further objected, that many who begin
with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as
they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness.
But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the
lower description of pleasures in preference to the
higher.
I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already
become incapable^ of the other. Capacity for the
nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender
.
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plant, easily killed, not only
by hostile in-fine nces, but by mere
want of sustenance .... 20

There is evidence, then, to
suggest that Mill has developed a theory such that no
evidence will be allowed to
count against it. Such a theory
is held as a necessary truth;
i f 30

Mil1 iS P resu PP° s ing what he is
trying to prove and so
has no need for an appeal to
majority decision. Consideration
of another passage from "Utilitarianism”
renders the point
more convincing. Here, regarding the
general qualitative
distinction between sensual and intellectual
'

pleasures, he

clearly seems to be explaining away any
dissidents (among
tnose satisfying D ) as men who are not
"equally acquainted
1
with' or not "equally capable of appreciating
and
enjoying"

both.

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who
are equally acquainted with, and equally capable
of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a
most
marked preference to the manner of existence which
employs their higher faculties, .no intelligent
human^ being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person
of feeling and conscience would be selfish and
case, even though they should be persuaded that
the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satislied with his lot than they are with theirs. 21
.

This passage clearly indicates that, for Mill, any

competent judge must satisfy the two conditions, "equally

acquainted with' and "equally capable of appreciating and
1

20
21

Mill, "Utilitarianism," pp. 212-13.
Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 211.
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enjoying" both intellectual and
sensual pleasures,
in addition, "it is an unquestionable
fact" that those who satisfy
both these conditions "do give
a most marked preference
to
the manner of existence which
employs their higher faculties"
6
(
t0 intellectual plesures)
and so satisfy a third condition.
The "unquestionable fact" that
those who satisfy the
first two conditions also satisfy
the third looks suspiciously
like the assertion of a necessary
relation.
This, in addition
to his readiness to explain
away (as an incompetent
*

*

judge)

anyone who apparently satisfies the
first two conditions but
not the xhird (as noted previously),
lends much support to the

hypothesis that Mill was operating with
definition D and so
£
considered premise (2) as analytically true.
In any event, the acceptance of D

2

would represent a

question-begging procedure and must be rejected.

Instead,

premise (2) can only plausibly be regarded as
an empirical
proposition.

In this case, however, it is not known to be

true, so the argument is unsound.

Without substantial em-

pirical data, Mill's position is mere conjecture.

Without

this kind of evidence, it is not at all obvious
that those
who have experienced both sensual and intellectual
pleasures

(competent judges by

would, in fact, generally prefer the

laxter; i.e., it is not at all obvious, contrary to Mill's
claim, that premise (2) would not turn out to be empirically
false.

There is, in addition,

a further difficulty.

18

It is always possible that, for some
reason, the judgment of competent judges (D.^ may become
impaired.
To engage the imagination for a moment, it is
always possible (for
example) for a mad scientist or planetary
aliens to affect un-

suspecting minds through drugs or the sinister
employment of
psychic laws.
In possible cases such as these, that which
is
by hypothesis presently preferred by all or
most competent
judges may change from the general category of
intellectual

pleasures to the general category of sensual pleasures.
sequently, if (2) is to be read
i

.‘i_lj

r
'

3-ys

agree,

gument is unsound.

.

.

”
,

’’all

Con-

or most competent judges

it is not known to be true and the ar-

It is most plausible to suppose that this

is the reading Mill had in mind.

If (2) is read "all or most

competent judges -presently agree...,” then the argument is uninteresting (even if (2) is true), given that which Mill was
trying to prove, and that he was attempting to construct a

qualitative hierarchy of pleasures.
premise (1),“

Assuming the truth of

we would have to conclude that the intrinsic

worth of pleasures may change from time to time? that is, we
would have to allow that any presumed present superiority of
intellectual over sensual pleasures may change at some time
in the future.

However, it appears that the most damaging blow to
22

In fact, given the previous supposition that Mill's
competent judges are not infallible, it is possible that they
are presently deluded; this, then, constitutes an additional
reason for rejecting premise (1).

19

will

argument results from the fact that he appeals
to
a majority decision among competent judges
as an accepts

able means for setting up his qualitative hierarchy:
On a question which is the best worth having of
two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence
is the most grateful to the feelings, apart
from
its moral attributes and from its consequences,
the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the
majority among them, must be admitted as final. 2 3

This means that what Mill really seems to have in mind is

not premise (2), which refers to all or most competent
judges, but a much weaker premise, which we can refer to
as (2*) and which can now be substituted for (2) in the

argument above:
2
(

'

Given any range of kinds of pleasures, the ma -

jority of competent judges will agree upon a quali-

tative hierarchy in which, generally, intellectual

pleasures are decidedly preferred to sensual pleasures

2b

This latter decision procedure, which Mill himself

resorted to (after realizing the unlikelihood of unanimity
or near unanimity of preference, no doubt) is unacceptable

for one compelling reason

— it

is too weak to support the con'

elusion that "the general category of intellectual pleasures
is intrinsically better than that of sensual pleasures."

^Mill, "Utilitarianism,"
2b

p.

213.

Premise (1) should also be replaced by premise (I
which reads "If the majority of competent judges...."

1

),

20

Appeal to majority decision
means that one is obliged to
accept decisions made by one or
very few more than half of
the
competent judges consulted. In
cases like this, in which the
majority is small, this represents

inductive evidence too weak

for confirming final judgments
about the intrinsic worth of
pleasures. For example, it is
theoretically possible that the

majority of competent judges could
be sensualists in a
4 9?5 VOte on a 'borderline case
regarding

5155

to

a sensual and a non-

sensual pleasure.

This does not seem at all to be a
sufficient reason why anyone should consider
the one as better
than

the other. 25

sion wi

oh

Mill would probably not abide by such a
deciregard to particular pleasures either.
However,

if one rejects the evidence as too weak
for supporting judg-

ments about the quality of particular pleasures,
there appears to be no additional reason for accepting

evidence like

this as sufficient for confirming a more general
conclusion

with respect to the quality of the general categories
of intellectual and sensual pleasures.
It now appears that the conclusion that "the
general

category of intellectual pleasures is intrinsically better
than that of sensual pleasures" should not be accepted
on
the basis of (2

6

).

Of course, as indicated in the example

in the previous paragraph, the same conclusion is applicable
25 The

*

—

—

rejection of premise (1*) follows for the same
reason.
In addition, previous arguments for rejecting premise (1) are also applicable to (1').

21

to any decisions made by a majority
of competent judges with
respect to particular pleasures in either
of the general

ca'cegories of intellectual or sensual
pleasures.

It has previously been argued that an
appeal to au-

thority is unacceptable as a method for making
judgments
about the intrinsic worth of pleasures. However,

even if it

were acceptable, without unanimous or near
unanimous agreement concerning the position of pleasures on a
qualitative

hierarchy, it would seem to be much more reasonable
either
to suspend judgment or to devise some other
method for decid-

ing.

And if Mill would not have accepted decisions made by

small majorities, it should be noted that to suspend judg-

ment would be to maintain that those pleasures being considered are to be regarded as qualitatively indistinct.

Con-

sequently, agreeing to a suspension of judgment in those

cases in which there is not unanimous or near unanimous agree-

ment could possibly result in the conclusion that even a general qualitative difference between intellectual and sensual

pleasures cannot be established, thereby rendering impossible
the attempt to establish a qualitative hierarchy of even gen-

eral dimensions.
If, as has been argued,

subscribing to Mill’s posi-

tion-appeal to majority decision--is unacceptable;

if,

that

is, mere majority decisions should be regarded as insubstan-

tial grounds for accepting conclusions regarding differences
in intrinsic value; and if other methods for establishing

22

these differences are unknown,
we are left with the conclusion that the problem of setting
up a qualitative hierarchy
appears to be insurmountable
Before concluding this subsection,
one more problem
in this area warrants some
attention.
It is not clear
whether Mill wanted to set up a qualitative
hierarchy for
particular pleasures or whether he merely
meant to distinguish between the general categories
of intellectual
and sensual pleasures. 26 However, if he
did intend to as-

sign a qualitative ranking to particular
pleasures and if
the notion of competent judges is defined
by D rather than
1
D 2' Mill's insistence that we consult competent
judges

could result in something like the following
possible situation.
pe uen

With respect to a certain pleasure, 25 of the com%
judges agree that it should occupy a certain place

o

high in the qualitative hierarchy, 25 °% agree on a lower
ranking somewhere above the middle, 25% agree on the middle
and 25%, on a place somewhere below the middle.
25

Suspension

I think, however, there is reason to suppose
that
Mill was interested in ranking particular pleasures and not
ju^t dis tinguishing between the general categories of intellectual and sensual pleasures. For example, he clearly
seems to be. ref erring. to particular pleasures when he says,
"On a question which is the best worth having of two oleasures
the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority
among them must be admitted as final." Also in the same
paragraph, when arguing that the same method must be used
for quantitative determinations, he speaks of particular
pleasures and pains.
"What means are there of determining
which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two
pleasurable sensations e except the general suffrage of those
who are familiar with both?" (Utilitarianism," p. 213).
#

.

.

.
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of judgment in this case would
not result in any decision
as to where the pleasure should be
placed, and the serious

problem that results in a situation
like this is one of conflicting qualitative hierarchies 27
This is most undesirable, for v/e are left with an
intolerable situation in which
the only recourse (enabling us to
decide among alternative
,

hierarchies) would seem to be an appeal to
the principle of
utility. Here, however, we are left with the
problem with
which we began viz
how to decide which kinds
.

,

of plea-

sures are intrinsically better than others, so
that we have
a principle that can be appealed to for determining
the mo-

rality Oi actions.

Clearly, if one were to argue that one

ranking is to be preferred to another on the basis of what
the various pleasures in the list lead to (e.g., to argue

tha c the qualitatively superior pleasures are those associ-

ated with what is better, such as the intellect or beneficient feelings toward one's fellow man), this would be to

suggest abandonment of utilitarianism in its hedonistic
(monistic) form and to urge, instead, the adoption of a

variety of idealism.

Before turning to a brief considera-

tion of the latter, however, we must note the theoretical
2?

This problem would arise every time there was not a
majority agreement as to where a particular pleasure should
be ranked.
However, it would also arise when only a small
majority was in agreement; if (as has been argued) appeal to
mere majority decision is unacceptable as a method for establishing qualitative pleasure distinctions. Consequently, as
noted above, even the attempt to establish a general qualitative distinction between intellectual and sensual pleasures could result in conflicting qualitative hierarchies if
50 % or only a small majority preferred one to the other.

24

problems incurred if a qualitative
hierarchy were plausible
and something appealed to when
determining the morality of
actions
.

Su p section II-Bt the oretical
objections to the ana/H tat ive plea sure^is ^ction fr om
the standpoint of
~f Ve
Although it has been shown that the
proposal
to establish a qualitative
hierarchy of pleasures is, for the
most part, untenable, if it were
successfully established,
~

Bef

completely abandoning this topic, however,
°r®
it
en
OI}ln
he S01 ewh
enigmatic objection made by
^
?
?
lnZ
r
G.
E. k°ore Ji
(Prin cipia Ethic a /Cambridge: The Universitv
Press, 19687, p. 78) "that Mill's admissions
as to quality of
pleasure are either inconsistent with his
hedonism, or else
afford ^no other ground for it than would be
given by mere
° f pl a
re ‘"
But rather than consider this in any
? ?^
~° r a Simi ar charge of inconsistency
by Henry Sidgwick
th G
of E^bics T^oston: Beacon Press, 19607
t
1S onl y necessary to note in passing that
p
objection were spelled out and carefully examined, it if this
might
constitute another problem for the move from "quantity" to
quality, and one which, even if found to be unwarranted,
would still leave us with the problems noted above. It is,
however worth noting a recent and interesting article bv
Ernest Sosa. ( "Mill s Utilitarianism," Mill's Utilitarianism
Text and Criticism, ed. James M. Smith and Ernest Sosa /Be 1mont, .Calif
V/adsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 196^7 pp. 154172) in which he claims to have successfully defended" Mill
against ^this objection. He claims that Mill never really
left. off talking about quantity when he turned to a consideration of supposed qualitative differences between pleasures
but merely meant by the latter distinction that differences
of degree (degrees of quantity) become real differences in
kind.^ "...the passage under scrutiny is quite in harmony
with tne interpretation of qualitative pleasure differences
as basically differences in degree" (Sosa, p. 162),
This is
an interesting and quite possibly a plausible argument, but
it seems apparent that, granting Sosa’s interpretation, we
are once again left with the problem of attempting to determine how to decide v/hen "differences in degree" are to be
taken as constituting "qualitative pleasure differences."
.

T
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the most serious problem would be the
theoretical difficulties

which would result from appealing to it as part
of the process of determining the morality of actions. 2 °

As a result.

Mill's alleged insistence on an appeal to a qualitative
dimension of pleasures, in addition to quantity, cannot be

re-

garded as constituting a desirable amendment to a theory
like
Bentham's or as a necessary condition for its acceptability.

Theoretical difficulties become apparent when we consider something like the following possibility*

One is

faced with a choice between Acts A and B, both of which (let
us suppose) would result in the same quantity of pleasure

produced, but where the consequence of choosing A will be
tha*u

100 people will have some kind of intellectual pleasure

whereas the consequence of effecting B will be that a different group of 100 people will have the same amount of
sensual pleasure.

Consulting a qualitative hierarchy which

differentiates, at least generally, between intellectual
and sensual pleasures and which ranks the former as intrin-

sically superior to the latter, one would be compelled by
an act-utilitarian theory to choose A.^°
29y

The "morality of actions" referred to is the morality
of other-regarding, non-prudential actions.
30

The theory employed here is an act-utilitarian theory of the kind that can be attributed to Mill.
I am purposely avoiding becoming involved at this point with the
claim made by J. 0. Urmson ("The Interpretation of the Moral
Philosophy of J. S. Mill," Philosophical Quarterl y, 3*/l9 52%
pp. 33—39 ) that Mill was, in actuality, a rule-utilitarian.
As implied in Section I of this chapter, I am confident that

26

The outcome could be the same if
the group affected
by A consisted of only a few while
the total number of those
tne other group was a good deal
higher, so long as

m

the

quantity of total pleasure produced by
either action re31
mained the same
The example can be changed
.

somewhat if

we remember that Mill can perhaps
plausibly be interpreted
as saying that qualitative considerations
may sometimes

override quantitative considerations 32 consequently,
that
consulting a qualitative hierarchy may sometimes require
5

that one choose that act among the alternatives which
pro-

duces the least (or not the greatest) amount of pleasure.
Thus, in the same example, if B produced 1000 units of

pleasure and A produced only 900, it might still turn out
to be the case that A should be chosen (especially so, we

the same problems regarding distributive justice arise for
classical rule-utilitarian formulations as well.
31

The outcome could be the same, that is, if it's possible that on some occasions the superior quality of a pleasure produced by an action can override an action affecting
a larger number of people which produces the same quantity
of overall pleasure but pleasure of an inferior qualitv.
Adhering rigidly to a qualitative hierarchy when the quantity of overall pleasure produced is the same, in this case
would seem to have the undesirable result that the number of
those affected by alternative actions is not a significant
consideration. This, however, is a major difficulty which
I do not wish to consider further at this time.
It is only
important to note that it does seem to pose a serious difficulty for appeal to a qualitative hierarchy under these
conditions
32 Mill,

"Utilitarianism,
particular) 214.

"

pp.

210,

211, 213

,

and (in
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might imagine

,

if the kind of sensual pleasure
B produced

could be categorized as one of a
sadistic nature),
in any
of these cases, the result of
consulting the qualitative
Hierarchy is that the act which produces
the intellectual
pleasure is the one that must be chosen.
It is not at all difficult to realize
that the require-

ment that one consult a qualitative hierarchy
sometimes necessitates decisions (like those above) which
involve a

seri-

ous kind of injustice to those whose
pleasure preferences
are rejected.
This is particularly evident if we remember

that the qualitative hierarchy was developed after
consulting, as competent judges, those "who are equally
acquainted

with and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying
both”
sensual and intellectual pleasures.

Because it is a safe

assumption that there are few capable of qualifying, the
final decision as to what kinds of pleasures are to be given

decided preference in the hierarchy is up to only a few, with
ohe result that the desires of the great majority of
people

are passed over in deference to the preferences of a minority.

Even those who qualify as competent judges but are not part
of the majority decision with regard to a particular pleasure

must have their preferences rejected in situations similar
to those described above.

In the example in which A and B produce the same quan-

tity of pleasure or in which B produces only slightly more

pleasure than A, A is selected as the right action on the

28

ground that A's consequences would
have been the preference
of competent judges. The pleasure
preferences of those who
would have experienced pleasure if
B had been chosen were
neglected in establishing the qualitative
hierarchy

that was

appealed to in this situation and are
consequently neglected
This instance of its application.
As will become more
apparent in that which follows, this constitutes
a serious
kind of injustice.

m

It should be noted that it is not being
claimed that

qualitative considerations always override
quantitative considerations.
Thus, in the above example, if A will
produce

900 units of pleasure, but B will produce

obvious that, ce teris paribus

,

5 ,000,

it seems

B should be the action chosen,

even though it produces the qualitatively inferior
pleasure.
It is only important to note that there are situations
(like

those constructed above) in which A is chosen only because
it ranks qualitatively higher than B, and that these pos-

sibilities are sufficient to demonstrate the problem.
In order to appreciate the problem involved in these

examples

„

it must oe noted that Mill correctly acknowledged

that some people, for one reason or another, are not capable
of enjoying or appreciating the higher kinds of (intellectual)

pleasures

Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures
a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by
hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance;
and in the majority of young persons it speedily
dies away if the occupations to v/hich their

29

position

m

life has devoted them, are not favorJ®P} n S. that higher capacity in exercise.
Moi
i
Ln
los
^heir intellectual tastes, because
f
have notf time or opportunity for indulging they
them;
and xhey addict themselves to inferior
pleasures,
not oecause they deliberately prefer them,
but
because they are either the only ones to
which
they have access, or the only ones which
they are
any longer capable of enjoying. 33
e

t0 k

If one also recognizes something that Mill
did not acknowl-

edge explicitly

— that

there are many who have little or no

capacity for the higher kinds of pleasures, and so cannot
be categorized as having had their capacity for them
stifled
it is evident that there are very many for whom it
could

not be right to force on them something which they are in-

capable of using in any way for their own benefit and which
may, in fact, make them miserable

-^Mill, "Utilitarian!! 3in
34

,

"

p

213.

A1 though there is nothing in ’Utilitarianism" to suggest^ explicit adherence by Mill to the position that there'
are innate differences in capacity for pleasures and that
there are many who have little or no capacity for the higher
kinds of pleasures, there is a passage in Mill's On Liberty
(p. 63) which constitutes sufficient evidence for confuting
anyone's contention that he did not accept it; "If it were
only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason
enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model
.The same things which are helps to one person towards
the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to
another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to
one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in
their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are
the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on
them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless
there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life,
they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow
to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their
.

.

.

nature is capable."
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Yet this is what we must do,
on occasion, if we are required as moral agents to consult
a qualitative hierarchy
for
determining the rightness or
wrongness of other-regarding
actions.
One might imagine, for example,
acquiring control
of television broadcasting
and contemplating a choice
between
a kind of programming which
appealed to the so-called higher
faculties and another which left it
pretty much as
it is, al-

though either choice would produce
the same overall quantity
of pleasure.
As a utilitarian, who had a
qualitative as
well as quantitative dimension of
pleasures to consider, one
would be required to choose that which
would produce the

qualitatively superior pleasures, to the great
dismay of
those who (through no fault of their own,
perhaps) would

now find Television viewing completely beyond
their capacity
for enjoyment
That those who have little or
no potential

.

for enjoying the higher pleasures should be
passed over, in
preference to those v/ho do, constitutes an obvious
kind of

distrioutive injustice 36 and, insofar as any ethical
theory
sanctions such actions, it is objectionable 36
;

.

35 No

onl y is i’t not egalitarian, but it takes no recognition ^01j merit desert and other non-egalitarian principles oi distributive justice. The example can be made
even
more problematic if we suppose that the group which has
its
pleasure preferences neglected is much larger than the other.
The term 'pleasure preference' has been frequently
employed in this subsection and will be subsequently. At
this point it is desirable to explain what is meant by it.
By. 'pleasure preference
is meant 'a desire for a pleasure
which is such that no substitute would result in any satisfaction or aoatement of that desire or is such that any substitute would result in a greater degree of dissatisfaction
.

.

,

6
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Without arguing the point further,
it appears evident
that the kinds of injustices
which are perpetrated through
considering quantities of pleasures
only, are multiplied
v;hen the requirement is
added that a qualitative hierarchy
be appealed to also, that adding
this results in an even
greater affront to our moral sense
regarding distributive
justice.
Thus, a principle of utility which
demands appeal
to a qualitative hierarchy is an
ethical principle which has
built into it even greater distributive
injustices than one
like Bentham's which requires quantitative
consideration of

pleasures only.

For, on occasions of choice like the
above,

those who (for whatever reason) do not desire
and/or are
not capable of enjoying the intrinsically superior

(intel-

lectual) pleasures are passed over in decisions
regarding

pleasure distributions or their sources.
To conclude this discussion, if the views Mill ex-

pressed in "Utilitarianism*' on the qualitative differences
than that of merely. having the unfulfilled desire
The first
disjunct of the definition could be satisfied under at least
t/,Yo
conditions:
(a) The individual having the pleasure preference does not have and could not acquire the capacity for
the enjoyment of substitute pleasures, or (b) is of such
a
slaoe oi mind that, even though he ordinarily has the caP*.cit^ for enjoyment of substitute pleasures, he does not in
this case.
The second disjunct could be satisfied if either
(aj or (b) above is satisfied and the individual's state
of
mind is also such that any substitute would serve to engender a greater state of dissatisfaction than that resulting
from the unfulfilled desire.
(The latter would occur, for
example, if the individual becomes piqued at having his desire overlooked in favor of someone else's for no justifiable reason he is able to discern.
9

.
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among pleasures were intended to
encourage the development
of a qualitative hierarchy
which was to be consulted when
determining the morality of actions,
and so taken as representing an amendment to Bentham’s
principle of
utility, it

is now obvious that it would
be an amendment which would

only make the principle more
theoretically objectionable
from the standpoint of distributive
justice.
So that even
if Mill’s previously considered
argument concerning a qualitative hierarchy is sound, there are
good theoretical reasons
for not acting on its conclusion, that
"the general category
of intellectual pleasures is intrinsically
better than that
of sensual pleasures ”37
.

Section III
Ideal Utilitarian Theories
--implausible Alternatives

Mention was previously made that an ideal or nluralistic form of utilitarianism, which allows that there
are

more intrinsic goods than pleasure to consider in calcu-

lating the effects
v/i

th

jus

u

respec

fc

*>o

considered.

Brandt

f

s

01

actions, might fare somewhat better

these difficulties than the monistic type

Tnere is, for example, something like

suggestion that the utilitarian would be all right

if only... he could count just one or two impersonal states

37 There

—

is much evidence
some already noted--which
shows that Mill was not advocating an amendment to Bentham's
theory.
This will be discussed later.
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of affairs as having intrinsic
worth-say, for one thing,
an equal distribution of welfare.” 38
Referred to above as
"universalis tic impersonal pluralism,”
and later developed
by Brandt into what he calls
"extended-rule-utilitarianism,
this represents one approach for
resolving the conflict between the principle of utility and at
least the egalitarian
aspect of distributive justice. However,
there are several

••

reasons for disregarding this kind of
approach as an acceptable possibility. A brief enumeration
will suffice:
Presumably, one who advocates an ideal form
of
utilitarianism has in mind a limit to the kinds of
things
that are to be regarded as intrinsically good,
and so must
have available some criteria for deciding what
should be
(1)

so classified and what not.

However, once the door is

opened in the manner suggested by Brandt, one is faced

vith precisely ^his problem-deciding upon criteria to employ in deciding what is to quality as an intrinsic good.

Brando himself is aware of the difficulty.

Thus, he says,

"Some philosophers will probably think that we must 'extend*

extended rule-utilitarianism much more if it is to be plausible,

They will say that otherwise we would be committed to

many more exceptions to the rule of keeping promises and so
forth, than are in fact justified
38
3

Brandt, p. 404,
^Brandt, p. 405.

— and

this is possible," 3 ^
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The problem, then, is that if
something like "equal
distribution of welfare" can qualify as
an intrinsic good,
why not "promise-keeping" as well;
and, if these, why not
and eventually it becomes difficult
to imagine what
sorts of restrictions might be devised
in order to insure
the elimination of many things which
could only very hesitatingly be regarded as intrinsically good
(if
.

.

.

;

at all).

There is, therefore, the danger (contrary to
the wishes of
uhe ideal-utilitarian) of ending up,
so to speak, with
a

quite bloated world of intrinsic goods.
However, if intrinsic goods other than pleasure
are

limited to only equal distribution of welfare (as
seems to
have been Brandt's intention), then although this
avoids the

problem utilitarian theory has with reference to the
require-

ment distributive justice poses for egalitarianism, we seem
to De left with the more difficult problems unresolved

squaring the principle of utility with those principles

which require distribution with reference to legitimate
claims or merit.
(2)

If both quantitative and qualitative differences

are to be considered with regard to pleasure, the problems

already noted are immeasurably increased if we are required
to apply these distinctions to other intrinsic goods as well.

This would be especially true of something like knowledge
and promise-keeping (if, indeed, one can speak sensibly

about qualitative differences among acts of promise-keeping),
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though perhaps not much less so for Brandt's
suggestion,
equal distribution of welfare.
In brief,

all of the prob-

lems already noted above, with pleasure
as the only intrinsic good remain; in addition, we would
now have innumerable
others
,

(

3

)

It is possible to imagine situations in
which

conflicts might arise among intrinsic goods.

For example,

one might oe forced to choose between two actions,
one which

will produce 100 units of intrinsic good

'A

but none of B

and another which will result in the opposite.

If, then,

the actions are not both right (i.e., one of the two
acts
is a duty),

it is apparent that,

in order to determine which

should be chosen, something like an intrinsic good hierarchy

would have to be appealed to.

As it appears inevitable that

determination of the latter would be at least as problematic
as that already noted with respect to Mill's desire to for-

mulate a "qualitative hierarchy" of pleasures, this constitutes a further reason for searching for a better solution

than that offered by the ideal utilitarian approach.
(

4)

Finally, as will later be argued, it is not at

all apparent that utilitarianism must entail a theory of in-

trinsic value at all

— at

least, not the kind which, during

most of the history of the theory, has been thought to be
essential.

It is this discovery which will eventually pro-

vide the key to solving the problems distributive justice
ha.s

been thought to pose for utilitarianism.
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Having completed a brief
review of the problems that
utilitarianism is supposedly
susceptible to with respect to
distributive justice (as well as
some others), the general
approach for resolution of these
difficulties
in the next

chapter will be to demonstrate that
classical formulations
of the principle of utility
have been the
result of some

serious misconceptions.

A convenient historical vehicle

for discussing and correcting these
misconceptions is found
the work of John Stuart Mill.
With reference particularly to "Utilitarianism" and On
Liberty it will ha pointed
out that he has been seriously
misinterpreted with regard to
many aspects of the utilitarian theory
that has been attributed to him; in addition, it will become
evident that the
corrected theory provides the theoretical
framework for a

m

,

new formulation of the principle of utility
which results
in no serious inconsistencies with intuitively
acceptable
principles of justice.

CHAPTER

II

MISCONCEPTIONS OF MILL'S UTILITARIAN THEORY
Section

I

The Quantitative and Qualitative Hierarchy
Misconception

Bentham s follower, John Stuart Mill, was so
cerned that certain kinds of pleasure should concome
out as better than others that he supplemented
Benuham s list of criteria with another one, that
of quality.
John Stuart Mill, partly in reaction, sought to
introduce quality as well as quantity into the
evaluation of pleasures; but, if one does this,
it is hard to see how the utilitarian standard
is
to be stated and Mill never did make this clear. 2
It is true that Mill's ethical theory is superior to

Ben sham's, though not in the way that has often been supposed to count, as its greatest advantage; i.e., not because

Mill was urging the establishment and use of a qualitative

hierarchy as a necessary condition for determining the morality

oj.

actions.

Consequently, those who have subscribed

to something like the above positions, and have meant there-

by to interpret Mill as intending that the qualitative di-

mension of pleasures was something to be considered in addition (supplemental) to the quantitative dimension, must be
Hospers,
2

p.

58

.

.

William K. Frankena, Ethics (New York:
Inc., 1963), pp. 29-30.
3?

Prentice-Hall,
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judged as having failed to give Mill's
work an accurate and
careful reading.
As can be determined by a brief
consideration of "Utili-

tarianism" and On, Liberty, Mill's theory
is not susceptible
to either the practical difficulties
or the theoretical objections previously noted as arising with
respect to such
a hierarchy, for his discussion of
qualitative pleasure dif-

ferences in Chapter II of "Utilitarianism" has
been seriously
misinterpreted in this regard.
It is really rather astonishing that this
problematic

position has seriously been attributed to Mill, for there
seems to be sufficient evidence in "Utilitarianism"
alone
to cause a substantial degree of doubt,

completely.

if not to dispel it

One is compelled to sympathize with Urmson's

observations
...the theories of some great philosophers of the
past are studied with the most patient and accurate
scholarship, while those of others are so burlesqued
and travestied by critics and commentators that it
is hard to believe that their works are ever seriously read with a sympathetic interest, or even that
they are read at all. Amongst those who suffer most
in this way John Stuart Mill is an outstanding example. 3
.

In brief, the assumption that the discussion of a quali-

tative dimension of pleasures in Chapter II of "Utilitarianism" was intended by Mill as a desirable emendation to Ben-

tham's principle of utility represents a serious misconception
3

Urmson, P- 33

.
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of Mill's theory, and,- as already
pointed out, gives rise
to additional problems.
In the attempt to clarify Mill's

position in this regard, it will be the
purpose of this
section to demonstrate three points in the

subsequent sub-

sections I-A, I-B, and I-C

,

respectively:

There is evidence to support the hypothesis
that
Mill regarded the hierarchies that would
result from quantitative and qualitative considerations as
extensionally
(A)

equivalent.

In point of fact, there is evidence sufficient

to conclude that he meant to show, from the
standpoint of

qualitative considerations, that Bentham's principle is
not susceptible to objection.

Thus, Mill intended his dis-

cussion of quality as an explanation and not as an amendment to Bentham's principle of utility, with the consequence that Mill's theory is not burdened with the additional theoretical objections resulting from the require-

ment to consult a qualitative hierarchy.
(B)

If a quantitative hierarchy is extensionally

equivalent to a qualitative hierarchy, those theoretical

difficulties which necessitate the rejection of an appeal
to the latter for determining the morality of actions must

also necessitate the rejection of an appeal to the former.

Moreover, even if a quantitative hierarchy of pleasures is

assumed (or would turn out) to be not extensionally equivalent to a qualitative hierarchy, there remain theoretical

difficulties which provide sufficient grounds for also
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rejecting an appeal to it.
There is some evidence in "Utilitarianism”
and
overwhelming evidence in On Liberty to support
the conclusion that a significant difference between
Bentham's theory
and Mill's is that whereas Benthamites thought
it necessary
(C)

to

consult something like a quantitative hierarchy,
Mill did

not regard an appeal to either a qualitative or a
quantitative hierarchy as a necessary or sufficient condition
for de

termining the morality of actions.

As a consequence, Mill's

utilitarian theory can eventually be shown to avoid all of
the theoretical difficulties each hierarchy is subject to.

Moreover, it is evident that his discussion of qualitative

pleasure differences, in Chapter II of "Utilitarianism,”
was not intended to refer to moral rightness at all, but

rather to prudential rightness.

Sub-section I-A: The extensional equivalence of quan titative and qualitative hierarchies

.

There is good evidenc

in "Utilitarianism" and overwhelming evidence in On Liberty
to support the hypothesis that it was not a part of Mill’s

intentions that a qualitative hierarchy of pleasures was to
be consulted as something in addition to quantitative con-

siderations when determining the morality of actions. Rather
from the passage in which he begins the substance of his dis

cussion of quality, it is apparent that what he is maintaining is that reference to either quantitative or qualitative

considerations will result in identical listings; i.e., in

conxemporary terminology, a quantitative
or a qualitative
hierarchy of pleasures will turn out
to be extensionally

equivalent.

If so, one contemplating the
morality of actions

can choose between judging the
consequences of alternatives
from tne standpoint of the overall
quantity of pleasures
produced or from the standpoint of their
quality, in either
case, the results will be the same
(i.e., the same action
will be chosen as right and, where there
is a
choice be-

tween a "higher" and a

"

lower" pleasure, if appeal to quality

results in the former's being our duty, so will
an appeal to
quantity.
As Mill says, in the passage referred to,
It must be admitted. .that utilitarian writers
in
general have placedthe superiority of mental over
bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency,
safety, uncostliness, etc,, of the former--that
is,
in their circumstantial advantages rather than
in
their intrinsic nature. And on' all these points
utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they
might nave taken the other, and, as it may be called,
higher ground with entire consistency. It is quite
compatible with the principle of utility to recognize
the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be
absurd that, while in estimating all other things
quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to deoend on
quantity alone.
.

.

,

suffice it to say that the most plausible interpretation of this passage results in only one conclusion.

With

reference to quantitative criteria only, "Utilitarians have
4

Mill,

"Utilitarianism,

p.

211.
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fully proved their case" concerning
"the superiority of
mental over bodily pleasures" but
that they might also have
arrived at the same conclusions
had they "taken the other
and, as it may be called, higher
ground"
(since "it is

quite compatible with the principle
of utility...") mus t be
taken as rather good evidence for
dispensing with the interpretation which has too long been
attributed to Mill. Consequently, the last sentence of the
passage, although
seem-

ing to suggest that quality of
pleasures must be considered

m
m

addition to their quantity, is most plausibly
interpreted
une context of that which precedes
it as meaning
that

either approach could be used to arrive at
the same result;
i.e., whether the resulting hierarchies are
regarded as in-

dicating only a general distinction between intellectual
and sensual pleasures or more specific rankings
between par-

ticular pleasures

,

both quantitative and qualitative hier-

archies would turn out to be identical.
This interpretation of the passage might be objected
to on the grounds that the reference in the early
part of

the passage to "permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc."
is not to be interpreted as a reference to quantitative

aspects

oo.

pleasures; that it is far from obvious that Mill

meant these to be simply quantitative considerations.-^
5

To

Presumably, if this is so, the objection regards this
as constituting evidence that the passage is not to be interpreted as asserting that utilitarians can prove their case
equally well with quantitative considerations alone.
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tms

objection there are two replies.

First, it is clear

that Mill is contrasting the use
of these criteria with other
criteria and, if what he is contrasting
them with are not
qualitative criteria, it is difficult
to imagine what the
contrast might plausibly be; in this
case, then, the references to ‘'permanency
etc " must be quantitative.
Moreover,
permanency,' 'safety' and 'uncostliness'
are clearly
analogous to three of the "circumstances"
Bentham thought it
.

.

.

.

necessary to consider in calculating quantities
of pleasures;
vi_z.

'duration,'

,

'fecundity,' and

'purity,' respectively

^
.

It seems likely that Mill had these quantitative
criteria

of Bentham 's in mind when employing the terms
"permanency
.

.

.

etc

.

There is good reason, then, to believe that Mill cannot justly be accused of having complicated utilitarian

theory by insisting on the problematic addition of a sup-

plementary qualitative hierarchy; for once again it seems
clear that his only intention here was to argue that the

employment of either a quantitative or a qualitative hier-

archy for judging the consequences of actions will result
in identical decisions regarding the morality of actions.

Thus, it is much more plausible to suppose that he

v/as

merely trying to demonstrate that what has been referred to
6

For definitions of these terms see Bentham, "An introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,"
Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham pp. 38-39*
,
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by some as "long-term hedonism"
is going to turn out to be
superior to "short-term hedonism"
from either a quantitative
or a qualitative standpoint;
i.e., that something like Bentham's principle of utility does
not at all commit
one to

maintaining (what its critics have
erroneously supposed) that
so-called "lower pleasures" must be
given preference

to "high

er pleasures,” but that, in fact, the
opposite is the case.
If this new interpretation is the correct
one, we now
have an adequate response in hand for
something like the fol-

lowing critical summary:
To say that the "higher” pleasures, in addition
to
being more long-lived, more certain, more pure,
were
by a qualitative principle seemed to
Benthamites like so much excess baggage--a way of
unnecessarily complicating and obscuring the original
hedonistic position. For if the first barrel of°cri~
tena. (Bent ham's) already hit the mark by showing
certain sources of pleasure to be preferable to
others, why the need to employ the second barrel,
Mill's qualitative principle ?
.

^

We can interpret Mill's response at this point as be-

ing xhat there is no "need to employ the second barrel" if
the first has already been used because appealing to either

one is a sufficient condition for determining the morality

of actions.

The difference between Bentham and Mill high-

lighted in the above is based on the erroneous supposition
that both were regarded by Mill as necessary but neither as

sufficient by itself to arrive at correct moral judgments
about actions.
7

'Hospers, p. 59.
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Sup^ section I-Bi Th eor etical
objections to
t axiv e hierarc hy.
At the beginning of

a

this discussion it

was pointed out that the use
of a qualitative hierarchy,
once established, would result
in some serious violations
of our intuitions regarding
distributive justice; and so
it was thought desirable to
rid ourselves, if possible, of
the supposed necessity to use
it.
In having presumably
done so, however, it is evident at
this point that we are
in precisely the same position
of theoretical difficulty

with which we began.

For now, according to the present

position, we have a choice between appealing
to one or the
other of extensionally equivalent
quantitative and qualitative hierarchies, both of which (by
hypothesis) rank ’’intellectual pleasures” as superior to ’’sensual
pleasures.”
Consequently, from the standpoint of quantitative
considerations also, if "intellectual pleasures” are
ranked as su-

perior to "sensual pleasures,” independently
of any additional considerations as to (for example) the
preferences
of those who will be subjected to them (and
there is no known

qualification concerning the latter in Bertram's theory),
exactly the same theoretical difficulties will present
them-

selves.

That the same situation obtains can be readily observed if one imagines a quantitative hierarchy of kinds of

pleasures which is arranged so that pleasures are listed in
a descending order of desirability, such that those higher

46
the list are judged
quantitatively superior to those
which
are lower and
which the arrangement of
pleasures exactly

m

duplicates that of the aforementioned
qualitative hierarchy,
as in the latter, intellectual
pleasures, as a general category, are higher on the list
than sensual pleasures. I n accordance with the alleged requirement
to consult such a hierarchy in all instances in which
one is attempting to decide
the morality of actions, this
quantitative hierarchy
is di-

rectly appealed to and serves as the
only basis upon which
such decisions are made.
To cake an obvious example, if one has
a choice between two other-regarding actions, A and
B, each of which

will affect the same person or group of
people and such that
A will produce, say, three intellectual
pleasures but no
sensual pleasures; whereas B will produce
three sensual but
no intellectual pleasures; A must be chosen
as the right
action if one appeals to the quantitative hierarchy.
That
ohe decision to choose A would give rise
to an injustice

becomes evident if one supposes that the pleasure
preferences oi those affected are directed toward the sensual

pleasures.
8T

,

8

.

The problem arises because, once again, we are

It is important to realize that if there is to be a
consideration of the pleasure preferences of those affected
by actions undergoing moral scrutiny, we are no longer
restricted to qualitative or quantitative hierarchies°established by competent judges; rather, we are dealing with a
different Kind of utilitarian theory from any that has been
considered up to this point and one which does, in fact, come
close to what I shall later argue is the one that Mill was
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placed in the position of being
required by the theory to
ignore pleasure preferences;
once again, then, situations
can arise which constitute
an affront to our moral
intuitions
with re- ard oo justice. In
addition, given what is meant
by pleasure preferences,
another absurd result from consulting a quantitative hierarchy
in this case
is that we do

not even maximize the quantity
of pleasure produced.
It is apparent that an appeal to
an established quantitative hierarchy of pleasures
is, for the same reasons,
as absurd as an appeal to a
qualitative hierarchy,

in fact,

if the purpose of such a hierarchy
is to maximize the quantity of pleasure, it is even more absurd.
Moreover, in addi-

tion to the difficulty evidenced in the
example, the quantitative hierarchy is subject to the same
problems
(previ-

ously noted) regarding an appeal to
competent judges; for
Mill required that one consult competent
judges here as well:
And there needs be the less hesitation
to accept
this judgment respecting the quality of
pleasures,
since uhere is no. other tribunal to be
referred to
even on^the question of quantity. What
means
there oi determining which is the acutest of a^e
two
pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable

committed to.

However, it is also worth noting that in order
u Sln g a hedonic calculus, as Bentham supposed
we should, it seems necessary that there be
a quantitative
hierarcny of the kind described to appeal to. As is now
obvious, such a requirement must lead to the conclusion
that
Ben main s theory is unacceptable; but, without such a
hierarchy, to appeal to, it seems reasonable to conclude
that a
hedonic calculus is, from a practical standpoint, useless.
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sensations, except the general
suffrage
of those
nose
°
wno are familiar with both?9
In summary,

if the qualitative hierarchy
Mill had in

mind was intended to he extensionally
equivalent to the
quantitative hierarchy which he thought
the application of
Bentham' s theory would have resulted
in (as has been shown,
there is good reason to suppose this
to be the

case), we are

lext, substantially, with Bentham'

s

theory.

However, the

latter is unacceptable for it is susceptible
to all the
original objections concerning distributive
justice in

addition to the others we have demonstrated that
the theory
would also incur. 10 Since these original objections
can be

raised against Bentham 's theory independently of
any hierarchy of pleasures (quantitative or qualitative) they
constitute sufficient reason for its rejection.

If in addi-

tion, however, a quantitative hierarchy is set up and
ap-

pealed to, Bentham 's theory becomes subject to the
additional
o

lly
,?i
dm iculties

"Utilitarianism," p. 213
The account of these
regarding competent judges is found on pp. 12.

See, for example, Rescher's objection, p. 6.
it
should be noted that even if Benthamites did not intend that
a quantitative hierarchy be set up and appealed to, as we
have supposed to have been what they had in mind, but that
the moral worth of actions was to be calculated differently any quantitative calculation of consequences still would
supposedly^ be susceptible to the kinds of objections regard's distrioutive justice which Reseller and others have
raided.
Thus, we are still left v/ith the original theoretical objections to the theory which, also, can only be resolved by the kind of utilitarian theory which as will soon
be argued Mill had in mind.
,

—

—
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theoretical objections noted above; and
this would be the
result whether or not it were extensionally
equivalent to
a qualitative hierarchy; in
either case, it is obvious that
the same kind of injustices could
result.

Only by turning to a consideration of the
difference
between Mill's theory and Bentham's can these
objectionable
features be resolved. Once made clear, it
is this difference which results in the theoretical
framework which will
enaole utilitarianism to account for principles
of justice.

Sub-secti on I-C:
hi e r archie

.

Mill's -position with respect to

Simply stated, the basic difference between

Mill and Bentham is this:

whereas Bentham may have thought

that it was necessary to consult a quantitative hierarchy,

Mill did not think that an appeal to either a qualitative
or a quantitative hierarchy was a sufficient or even a nec-

essary condition for determining the morality of actions.
In point of fact, the sections of '’Utilitarianism’' previ-

ously discussed were intended by Mill, not with reference
to moral rightness at all but rather to prudential right-

ness.

They had to do only with recommendations as to how

we should live that part of our lives which significantly

affects only ourselves (self-regarding actions) and had

nothing to do with that part of our conduct v/hich does
"^Whether Bentham actually did require this is not certain and has not been argued for. However, the practical
efficacy of his hedonic calculus seems to require that he
should have even if he didn't (as pointed out in the footnote on pp. 46-47).
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significantly affect others (other-regarding
actions). 12
Though there is some evidence for
this interpretation in
Utilitarianism,” the primary source is
On Liberty
Tne examination of On Liberty to
which we will now
tum* will be used to demonstrate two points:
(1) Regressing a bit, it will be pointed out that
there is conclusive
evidence in On^Liberty for the hypothesis,
already consid.

,

ered, that Mill could not have intended,
in determining the

morality of actions, that one construct and
appeal to a
qualitative hierarchy which was not extensionally

equivalent

to a quantitative hierarchy of pleasures.

(2) The hypothe-

sis will be confirmed regarding the difference
between Benthain

and Mill, that, assuming the extensional equivalence
of

a qualitative and quantitative hierarchy, Mill
could not have

intended that an appeal to either was a necessary and/or
suf-

ficient condition for determining the morality of actions.

1 -^

That is, it had nothing to do with other— regarding
actions other than to point out and emphasize that the selfregarding sphere oi actions is in no way to be dealt with as
TT it were part of the other; i.e,, we are not to impose our
will on others regarding how they should conduct themselves
prudentially
.

13

This is, of course, contrary to what was stated previously, that given the extensional equivalence of a qualitative and quantitative hierarchy, an appeal to either would
be a sufficient condition for determining the morality of actions ( p. 43 )
It is not contradictory, however, since in the
past instance we were operating with the presupposition that
appeal to some kind of a pleasure hierarchy was being urged
by Mill, whereas it is the purpose of the present discussion
to dispose of this as a faulty presupposition to attribute
.

to him.
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It was pointed out previously
that if one is required
to consult a qualitative
hierarchy which
is not extension-

ally equivalent to the results of
quantitative calculations, 14
something like the following could
occur: Given
two actions,

A and B,

each affecting different groups of
people, if the
group affected by A prefers intellectual
pleasures and the
group affected by B prefers sensual
pleasures;
and if we

suppose that A and B do, in fact, produce
the same quantity
of intellectual and sensual pleasures,
respectively, consulting the qualitative hierarchy would require
that one choose
action A. Similarly, if one is dealing with just
one person
or group of people and has a choice between two
actions, A

and B, each of which produces the same quantity of
pleasure,
but A will result in the production of a pleasure
higher on
the qualitative hierarchy than B, A is the action
that must
be chosen,

even though the person or all the members of the

The reference here is to the examples on pp. 25-2
7,
where no mention is made of a quantitative hierarchy.
For
present purposes, however, since the references in
(1) and
(2) of the previous paragraph are to a quantitative hierarchy (because we have recently supposed that the results
0i quantitative calculations could be a quantitative hierarchy) we can unproblematically replace "the results of
quantitative calculations" with "a quantitative hierarchy."
For the present example, this means that the pleasures produced by A and B have the same ranking on the quantitative
hierarchy, though a different ranking on the qualitative
hierarchy (since, by hypothesis, the two hierarchies are
not extensionally equivalent). Also note that in (1) and
(2) above, "a quantitative hierarchy" can be read "the results of quantitative calculations" in order to encompass
those previous examples (Sub-section II-B, pp. 24-32) in
which no mention was made of a quantitative hierarchy.
,
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group affected prefer

B.

15

It is important to note that in both
cases the plea-

sure preferences of others are imposed,
for in both cases
the qualitative hierarchy (the
preference schema of competent judges) is used to decide which
kind of pleasure is
go be produced.
In the first case, they are imposed by
discriminating against one group's preferences
in favor of

another's; in the second case, by ignoring
those of everyone affected.

However, where satisfaction of the pleasure

preferences would be self-regarding, 1 ^ the decisions
exemplified in these examples could not have been sanctioned
by
Hill.

That tnis is the case can readily be demonstrated by

a brief reference to the position defended in On Liberty.

15

This last example does not conform to the notion of
pleasure preferences previously defined, in that strict adherence to it would preclude an individual or all the members of one group from having pleasure preferences which
could be satisfied equally well (quantitatively) by a substixute.
However, the example is included because it will
shortly be used to argue that it could also be unjust in a
situation like this to consult a qualitative hierarchy; i.e.,
when the alternative actions Dsing considered each produce
the same quantity of pleasure.
16
By 'self-regarding' is meant merely what Mill had in
mind when he used the term: viz
whatever actions men choose
which are such that they directly affect only the agent or,
if they affect others, do so with their free, voluntary, and
undeceived consent. Such actions should be able to be performed ^"without hindrance, either physical or moral, from
their fellow. men, so long as it is at their own risk and
peril” ( On Liberty p. 55 )* All other actions are otherregarding.
.

,

,
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Before doing so, however, it is
necessary to elaborate on the
examples in an attempt to explain
specifically why they are

tneorexically objectionable from the
standpoint of Mill's
utilitarian theory; i.e., to show why
Mill would have rejected
consulting a qualitative hierarchy in
situations like these.
That the examples are theoretically
objectionable in
light of Mill's utilitarian theory can be
brought
out as

follows:

As choices for a moral agent, both A and
B are

clearly other-regarding actions.

But the resulting actions

of those affected by his choosing either A
or B will by

hypothesis turn out to be self -regarding actions

— that

is,

snould A be chosen, the actions by those affected
to obtain
and enjoy the intellectual pleasures produced by
effecting
A

(

one actions chosen to satisfy their pleasure
preferences)

v/ould be

chosen,

self-regarding actions; similarly, should B be
^he actions by those affected to obtain and enjoy

the sensual pleasures produced by effecting B would also
be

"Regarding actions.

The moral agent must choose either

A or B because choosing neither--an act of omission
a viable option for him as a utilitarian,

— is

not

since not to act

v/ould result in no one's pleasure preferences being satis-

fied, with the result that happiness v/ould not be maximized.

In the first example, the injustice arises in the fol-

lowing manner:

Although A and B are other-regarding actions

for the agent, his choosing either A or B will affect an

area of self-regarding actions for those who will be affected
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by his choice.

According to Mill (as will be
demonstrated
shortly), one should not interfere
with self-regarding
ac-

tions since, from the standpoint
of moral rightness and

wrongness— as opposed
° ne

to prudential rightness and
wrongness

^

regarding action is as good as another
and, if
possible, should not be interfered with.
However, the moral
agent »s appeal to a qualitative hierarchy
and his choosing
and effecting A is an action which
will unjustifiably interfere with the pleasure preferences of
those who would prefer
the eifects produced by B.
This is objectionable,
°e

for if

both A and B are identical choices quantitatively,
and the
actions of those affected to obtain whatever results
from

the agent's choosing either A or B will be
self-regarding,
it is apparent

given Mill's position—that A and B are

equally right actions.

Therefore, one would be acting un-

justly if, in such a situation, he did not act impartially
but regarded the action which will produce the intellectual

pleasures as nis duty after appealing to a qualitative hierarchy of pleasures.
The problem is somewhat different, though no less probj-emaoic

,

in the second example.

A and B are again actions

which would, by hypothesis, result in only self-regarding
actions by those affected by the agent's choice and would
result in the same quantity of pleasure produced; only in this
case the same person or group of persons is affected by the

agent's choosing either A or B.

Assuming that B is preferred
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by those affected hut that
A is executed by the agent
after
appealing to a qualitative hierarchy,
on the assumption that
whenever possible, self-regard
ing actions are not to be interfered with, the execution of
A is a morally wrong action. 17
It remains now to explicate
Mill's position and to show that
he would have rejected an appeal
to a qualitative hierarchy
for determining the morality of
actions, on the ground that
doing so would often interfere unjustly
with self-regarding
actions.
It is absolutely clear,

in the first chapter of On

Liberty, that the satisfaction of
self-regarding pleasure
preferences should not be interfered with; thus
one, with
the power and opportunity to do so, could
never be justified
in (and in fact could be held morally
blameworthy for) mak-

ing decisions like those exemplified in the
situations de-

scribed above.

Though the requirement that one appeal to a

qualitative hierarchy when the alternatives for the
agent
are other-regarding actions would require, at
times, that

such decisions be made, the supposition that Mill
insisted

that we consult such a hierarchy in determining the
morality
of actions is seriously inconsistent with the principle
17

That the execution of A is unjust, as well as morally
wrong, is_ not so clear. However, as it will later be demon-'
strated that Mill regarded the satisfaction of self-regarding pleasure preferences as rights justified by the principle
of utility and that violations of rights were regarded by
him as unjust, the execution of A is also an unjust action
according to Mill.
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stated in the first part of
On Liberty and which it is
the
purpose of the rest of that essay
to defend:

LO

-

A n 4-U

uu

P-revenx narm to others.

•

-»

His own good,

io justify that
the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must he calculated
to produce
evil to someone else.
The only part of the conduct of anyone, for v/hich he is amenable
to society, is that which concerns others.
In the part
wmch merely concerns himself, this independence
lo
tight, absolute.
Over himself, over his
o./n body and mind, the individual
is sovereign,
_

»

A few pages further on, in speaking about what
com

prises the "appropriate region of human liberty,"
Mill
says

Secondly the principle requires liberty of tastes
an u.P ursu it s of framing the plan of our life to
suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without
impediment j.rom our fellow creatures, so long as
v/hat we do does not harm them, even though
they
should tnink our conduct foolish, perverse, or
wrong
»

-

And later, on the same page, he adds, "Each is the proner
1

Mill, On Liberty

,

pp.

9-10.
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guardian of his own health,
whether bodily, or mental
and
spiritual. Mankind are greater
gainers by suffering each
other to live as seems good
to themselves, than by
compelling each to live as seems
good to the rest." 1 ^
Numerous similar statements can
be found throughout
the essay (particularly in
the third chapter), but these
are
sufficient to establish the conclusion
that Mill could not
have sanctioned decisions like
those in the above examples;
on moral grounds, he could not
have regarded it as at all

objectionable that some would prefer
sensual to intellectual
pleasures, so long as obtaining them
would involve only selfregarding actions (or non-harmful other-regarding
actions).

As

m

the examples illustrated above, this
means that one

m

tne position of making decisions concerning
public policy
(e.g., a legislator) could be held
blameworthy for making

decisions affecting the self-regarding sphere
of those
affected by appealing to a qualitative hierarchy.
All of this further substantiates the
conclusion, pre-

viously stated, that Mill could not have been
urging the establishment and use of a qualitative hierarchy
in
the way

that has previously been supposed, as something
that must
be appealed to for determining the moral
rightness or wrong-

ness of actions; for to do so could often result
in wrongly

interfering in the area of self-regarding actions, something clearly rejected by Mill in On Liberty
19

.

Mill, On Liberty

,

pp.

12-13.

.

If this
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interpretation is correct, he was
not arguing for the establishment and use of such a
hierarchy which he viewed as an
amendment to Bentham's theory.
Rather, it seems clear that
his purpose was merely one of
explication, to point out that
preferring the so-called higher
pleasures was compatibl
with a theory like Bentham's and,
like sensual pleasures,
could not be objected to as long
as the actions which satisfied them could be categorized as
self-regarding or otherregarding but non-harmful.

Although Mill would allow that one can
justifiably
level prudential objections against
self-regarding actions
meant to satisfy particular pleasure preferences,
the only
justifiable moral objections one can raise
concerning
any-

one's pleasure preferences must be on the
grounds that the
actions engaged in to satisfy them are other-regarding
and
harmful.
In other words, the only kind of legitimate objection, according to Mill, must be based on the
source

of pleasures (be they sensual or intellectual).

The satis-

faction of sadistic desires by causing pain to others,
the
punishing of an innocent man to appease the public (the
old scapegoat problem) and certain instances of voluntary

and involuntary euthanasia (standard examples employed by

critics as objectionable kinds of action sometimes judged

right by utilitarian theory) are all examples of objectionable sources and, consequently, of objectionable pleasure

preferences
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It is to be noted, however,
that cases of harming
people for the sole purpose
of satisfying pleasure
prefer-

ence^ (as

m

situations like these) are really
to be categorized as instances of injustice 20
But since it is the
purpose of another chapter to
demonstrate why utilitarian
theory does not allow this and how
it is able to avoid
objections stemming from considerations
of
.

justice, it

need only be realized that this
constitutes the only moral
objection to particular pleasure
preferences and that it
comprises a wholly different area of
consideration.
To

complete this section, it only remains
to explain briefly
why the position found in On Liberty
also commits Mill to
the rejection of an appeal to a
quantitative hierarchy.
If the qualitative hierarchy Mill had
in mind is (as
he seems to have thought) extensionally
equivalent to the
kind of quantitative hierarchy Benthamites
claim to have

been urging, it can readily be demonstrated
that Mill would
hold that an appeal to the latter must be
rejected for the
same reasons which we saw necessitated the
rejection of an
appeal to a qualitative hierarchy to which a
quantitative

hierarchy is not extensionally equivalent; i.e.,
consulting
a quantitative hierarchy which ranks intellectual
pleasures
as quantitatively superior to sensual pleasures
will also

result in decisions which would
20

unjustifiably infringe in

That these exemplify instances of injustice seems
clear; should there be any doubt, however, this is explained
in a subsequent chapter.
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the area of self-regarding
acti ons.

A single example will

suffice

Consider the following:

A governor of a state has

a decision to make regarding
money which has been given by

the federal government for
the state's use with "no
strings
attached.
For various reasons, the choices
for the use of
The money turn out to be two:
using the money to create
a symphony orchestra in a
culturally deprived area of the
state, or using it to establish
the first radio station in
tne same area which would be
broadcasting mostly rock and

other popular music.

The governor’s choices are other-re-

garding? an act of omission is not an
alternative open to
him as a utilitarian in this case; the
people whose pleasure preferences will be affected are
different for each
alternative, though the numbers affected are
the same for
each; the actions of those who utilize
whatever results

from either of the governor’s choices will be
self-regarding, and their pleasure preferences are such
that the radio

station would produce slightly more pleasure than
the symphony
orchestra.
If the governor does not know that the radio
station would produce more pleasure than the symphony
or-

chestra and believes that consulting the quantitative hier-

archy (which is extensionally equivalent to the qualitative

hierarchy previously referred to) is what he ought to do in
order to arrive at a decision, he is bound to choose to

appropriate the money for the orchestra.

Yet it is obvious
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that, according to Mill, he
would be using his power and
opportunity to interfere unjustifiably
with self -regarding actions.
ror if, as noted previously,
when the quantity of
pleasure produced by either action
would be the same, it would
be unjust to choose as one's
obligation that which would result in intellectual self-regard
ing actions rather than

sensual self-regarding actions
for those affected (since
both present an equal claim), it
would obviously be unjust

m

a similar situation to choose
the intellectual over the

sensual when the quantity of pleasure
resulting from the
former would be less than that resulting
from choosing the
latter.
In addition, of course, the fact that
the quantity
of pleasure would not be maximized in
this case constitutes
a further utilitarian objection
against this decision, assuming that maximizing the amount of pleasure
is required
of a utilitarian.
Because of the latter, consulting an ex-

tensionally equivalent quantitative hierarchy in
a situation such as this is and can be even more
objectionable
tnan consulting a qualitative hierarchy in the
examples

—

—

previously considered 21
.

21 _

Professor Robert Ackermann of the philosophy
ment of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst hasdepartsuggested, regarding this example, that the governor, by
interfering with self-regarding actions, must commit an injustice
no matter how he chooses to spend the money.
Moreover, this
seems to him to support the more general claim that there
are unsolvable ethical problems for utilitarianism; specifically, that Mill's utilitarian account ("as only a 'consumer account,
in that it suggests that we can be privately
'
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H2.lLs
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satisfy a desire
for something else, Y.
^/ith respect to the example,
my reolv is thp+ -Ha
cause the actions of those
affected by either of
1
whatever°is chos=n° will^e^l?" 307 "!?** is P rodu oed by
i

’

cho^
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?M?r Sfi^fo^

s-ar*

Till TToTiriZT,

c ° nsultln S a quantitative
hierarchy
As has been men tioned
(pp. 2-3) and is made
r.i Q ?
Iu
Xt chapter, injustices can only
arise, according
?dkftto Mill,
MUl wnen rights are violated.
In
a
case like
1
*^ eri, to re Sfrd the one action as an obligation, when
fi
is no more an obligation than the
alternative,
eights v/hich the others have equally to is' to vithe disX
S
Consequently if (as has been supposed)
hese cwo actions are the only alternatives,
what the p-ov1
* Y* ir :P rocedure " (see pp. 243-61
cially pp. 243-61)? which,
esp^ciall^DD^Ih-?^!
this case, would probably
p
a random-selection procedure (such
°
and so, by acknowledging the equal rights as coin-flipping
of all involved
Pr
affected by the governor’s choices
n n 6qUal
?
°PP° rt unity for acquiring the distributed
items
’

of fleasures^
le SU
S
^

^

*

._

T

-

,

m

.

^one.

th
other hand, what is being claimed is that
f
an. injustice arises
merel y because one group
ceive what it desires, whereas the other one does not re-•

though every attempt was made to acknowledge does--even
the
rignts involved in making the choice--then this equal
is a consequence the theory. cannot avoid. However, I
think the
conclusion -chat an injustice occurs, no matter what
is
chosen, is unreasonable.
To the contrary, I claim that the
random-selection procedure (v/hich is defensible on utilitarian grounds) is a means of avoiding injustices in
situan
lke th9Se and furthermore, that it is defensible
•?
^.
on
intuitive grounds, since it is closely in accord v/ith
v/hat
intuition prescribes that we should do in such situations.
Neither intuition nor a desire to maximize the general happiness could sanction doing nothing in this instance and
choosing by appealing to a fair procedure seems to be the
only plausible alternative.
As a result of having procedures like these available,
l think the general claim above is false as well.
Although
.

j
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At tnis point, it is most
important to realize, in
addition, that an injustice would
also result if whatever

hierarchy was appealed to ranked,
for some reason, sensual
over intellectual pleasures.
Consequently, according to
Mill, one’s duty in the area of
self-regarding actions cannot be decided by an appeal to any
kind of hierarchy without the possibility of resulting
injustice. Moreover, it
is now apparent that, from the
standpoint of quantitative

considerations, no appeal to any kind of
pleasure hierarchy
can be relied upon to determine which
action will produce
the greatest quantity of pleasure, because
no kinds of

pleasures are consistently

— on

all occasions

— quantitatively

superior to others.
It now follows trivially that, if appealing
to any

kind of pleasure hierarchy is objectionable,
appeal to a

quantitative hierarchy which is not extensionally
equivalent
to a qualitative hierarchy is also theoretically
objection-

able, and

ohis takes care of the last alternative regarding

appeal to quantitative and qualitative considerations;
i.e.,
an appeal to quantity, the results of which are not
extension-

ally equivalent to the results of an appeal to quality.
classical interpretations of Mill's theory may have had this
difficulty, the theory attributed to him here provides explicit directions as to what should be done whenever individual interests conflict, and justifies these procedures by
arguing that employing them results in maximization of the
general happiness (again, refer to the section on "fair procedures, pp. 243-61; also refer to the corollary to the principle of obligation on p. 174).
.
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Specifically why Mill rejects an
appeal to the latter for
determining the morality of actions

will be explained more

fully in Section III.
That Mill could not have been
advocating appeal to
either a quantitative or a qualitative
hierarchy
in de-

termining the morality of actions is
also evidenced in
a passage in "Utilitarianism"
just prior to his discussion of qualitative pleasure differences.
In a discussion of some of the more basic
misunderstandings

of the

theory, he says:

Having caught up the word utilitarian, while
knowing nothing whatever about it but its
sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some
.

one of its forms; of beauty, of ornament,
or
of amusement.
Nor is the term thus ignorantly
misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment; as though it implied
superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted
use is the only one in which the word is
popularly known.... 22
.

Had Mill thought that one was obligated to choose
the higher pleasures on those occasions in which
certeris
jqaribus^,

it was possible to do so (as we have seen, this

would have to be the case if either or both quantitative
and qualitative hierarchies were appealed to)
be

it would

Irue to say that the theory "implied superiority to

frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment."
22

.

Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 209

.

The fact
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tha^ he took this statement to
represent a misinterpretation Ox the tneory can he taken as
evidence that Mill's

thinking regarding kinds of pleasures
and the application
of the principle of utility was
much more liberal

than—

f ar dlffe rent

from— what has previously been

supposed.

The

correct account of his position in this
regard will be developed in the third and last section
of this chapter.

In conclusion, if we have shown that
Mill's discussion in "Utilitarianism" of qualitative
differences among

pleasures could not have been intended as
describing a
necessary or sufficient condition for determining

the mo-

rality of actions and that he must also have
rejected a

quantitative hierarchy (equivalent or non-equivalent) of
the kind we have supposed that the Benthamites had
in

mind, the only plausible interpretation of those pas-

sages in his essay, in which he speaks of qualitative

pleasure differences, is that he intended them to refer to

prudential rightness— as recommendations in the area of

self-regarding actions.

We might then say, as does Mill,

in a passage previously referred to,

"These are good rea-

sons for remonstrating with him, or entreating him, but

not for compelling him, or visiting
he do otherwise

23

.

Mill

,

On Liberty

,

p.

9.

v/ith

any evil in case
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Before considering in more detail
the utilitarian theory
Hill had in mind, it is necessary
to turn our attention to
another aspect of utilitarianism
in general, which has served
as a source of much confusion
concerning its account of justice and thus its plausibility
as an acceptable ethical
theory.

Section II
The Metaphysics of Right Action for
Utilitarianism
and the Problem of Justice
It is generally agreed that utilitarianism
is
proposal about which acts are right or wrong. a
Unfortunately, it is also widely held— although
this
is a mat ber of dispute— that these terms
are used
in several senses.
Hence, in order to state the
utilitarian thesis clearly, we must identify which
sense of these words (if there is more than one)
v/e have in mind.^

There is a convenient and rather precise distinction
that can be made within utilitarian theory between
judg-

ments about actions and judgments about agents.

In this

section, it will be argued that it is basically a confusion
of what might be called right action in a metaphysical
sense, according to utilitarianism, and what the agent
is

justified by the theory to do without reprehension which has

often resulted in the unwarranted conclusion that the principle of utility offends our moral intuitions with respect
24

.

Richard B. Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism," in Morality and the Language of Conduct ed.
Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1965), p. 110
,

.
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juofcxce.

Once this distinction is clearly
understood, it
will be demonstrated that
questions of justice can be dealt
with
a category distinct from
questions of metaphysical
rightness, with the result that the
offense to moral intuition can be shown to have rested
on a confusion

m

of the two.

Correspondingly, it will be the purpose
of Sub-section II-A
to develop the position of a
utilitarian theory of right action, similar to Mill’s, with respect
to the problem of the
"right to life
and Sub-section II-B will demonstrate
how,
this case, the distinction between the
theory’s position
on acts and agents can be employed to
avoid a rejection

m

of

the theory based on the claim that
it is not compatible

with accepted principles of justice.
S ub-section II-A: Th e right to life
and a utilitarian
c onception

of objective r ightness

The distinction is often

.

made in utilitarian theory between the objective
and the subjective righ tness o_l acuions; i.e,
between an action’s
,

be-

ing right, in fact, and an agent's judgment as to
its rightness.

This allows for differentiation between moral judg-

ments about actions and moral judgments about agents.
a consequence,

it;

As

is often possible to regard agents as

olameless for having chosen to perform what is, in fact,
an
.

?5

For example, textual support for this distinction
between the evaluation of acts and agents is found as a part
Ox Mill’s theory in "Utilitarianism,"
pp. 219-221.
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objectively wrong action, so long as
prior to doing so they
have done everything that can
reasonably be required to determine its objective rightness.

Conversely, it is also

possible to hold them morally blameworthy
to some extent
because they did not do everything
that can reasonably be
required to determine objective
rightness, even though
choosing to perform an action which, in
fact, is objectively right.

Concerning this distinction, Brandt says:

—

It is this sense of these terms the
sense
duty (etc.) depends on what the facts reallyin which
are
and not on what the agent thinks about
them which
1 am terming the ’’objective sense."
I shall construe utilitarianism as a proposal about which
acts
are right or wrong in this objective sense. 26

—

However, if one carefully considers this notion
of objectively right action for utilitarianism, one is
struck by

what results in what would be claimed are some glaring
in-

compatibilities with moral intuition; such that, from the
standpoint of objective rightness, utilitarianism appears
to be unacceptable.

That which follows is an attempt to

demonstrate this by developing a utilitarian position 27 with

respect to a principle held by many to be self-evident— the
Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism."
113.
27 One might
also refer to this consideration of objective rightness as the theory's "metaphysical position" with
regard to right and v/rong actions; thus saying, for example,
that an act is right, in a metaphysical sense, according" to
utilitarian theory if and only if
Henceforth, this way
of speaking will be freely employed.
P.
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principle of the sanctity of life,^®
Those who subscribe to a sanctity
of life theory usually mean by it that life has
intrinsic value; that it is
among other things something worth
preserving for its own
sake; consequently, that death has
intrinsic disvalue and
is worth avoiding for its own sake.

However, the usual

utilitarian position is depicted by Mill's
assertion in the
fourth chapter of "Utilitarianism:’* "The
utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the
only thing

desirable, as an end; all other things being only
desirable
28

Much of what follows, up to p.79 was taken or adaoted from material worked out jointly by myself
and a col-"
league, George Bowles, as part of an unpublished paper,
1 ^ ar ^ an ^ Sm anc* "k*10 Right to Life," completed
in March,
t ono^"
relevant Pages referred to in that paper are 1-6
and 13-J-5.
As stated in a footnote on the first page of
that paper, The utilitarianism set down and applied is
of
our own devising.
We owe obvious debts to J. S. Mill and
G.^E. Moore.’* Consequently, although the utilitarian theory
rei erred to in the next few pages is similar in most respects to Mill's (numerous references to Mill are noted in
me text and footnotes), there are some important differences.
For example, the principles on p.71 may not have been wholly
acceptable to Mill. Also the concept of self-regard ing
action* does not make use of Mill's distinction in On Liberty
between the 'direct* and 'indirect' effects of actions ( .g.',
see Lhe footnote on p.52); thus, for example, whereas Mill
would have argued that some actions which are means to the
happiness or unhappiness of others are self-regarding when
they do not directly affect them, this was thought to be a
problematic distinction and so was not employed
It should
be noted that the divergences from Mill are not really significant with respect to the general point being made in this
sub-section, in that the point being made with this theory
can unproblematic ally be made with one more closely approximating Mill's, as well. In fact, it is appropriate not to
refer specifically to Mill's theory in this section, since
it seems safe to say that the general problem dealt with
is characteristic of most--if not all--utilitarian theories.
,

,

.

'

.

.

.
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as means to that end." 2 ?
Consequently, since it is possible
to have life and not be happy,
life is not identical with

happiness and cannot be regarded by
utilitarianism as desiraDle as an end. The theory does
regard life as desirable, however, but only as a necessary
condition
for a

state of temporal happiness; i.e.,
life is valued as a
means, since one cannot be temporally
happy without it.

From the same passage it follows, mutatis
mutandis

.

that unhappiness is undesirable and the only
thing undesirable as an end, all other things being
undesirable as

means to that end.

Again, since it is possible to have life

and yet be unhappy, death is not identical with
unhappiness
and so cannot be undesirable for its own sake.

However,

because death is the absence of life, and since life
is desirable as a means to happiness, death is undesirable as a

means to happiness.
It is clear, then, that this version of utilitarianism

cannot support a sanctity of life theory which holds that
life is desirable and death undesirable for its own sake.

Both are desirable and undesirable, respectively, but con-

tingent upon their respective relation to happiness and

unhappiness.

The consequences of this position, some of

which appear as affronts to intuition, can be made clear by

considering three questions with reference to the theory:
2

^Mill,

"Utilitarianism," p. 23^.
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Under what conditions ought an
agent be free to deprive a
victim of life? under what
conditions is it right for him
to kill?

Under what conditions is it obligatory
for him to

kill?
The general principles which this
version of utilitarianism supplies to answer these
questions are as follows 30
:

P

i

An act of killing ought to be a free
act in just
these two cases:
(a)

Self-regarding acts of killing:

If the kill-

ing affects only the agent, then the
agent

ought to be free to kill the victim if and

only if he kills the victim intentionally 3b
(In order for an agent to be free to perform
a self-regarding act of killing,

it is not

necessary for that act to be prudentially
right
(b)

.

Other-regarding acts of killing:

If the kill-

ing affects sentient beings other than or in
30

has b9en stated that this theory is similar to
y,
Although
there is evidence to support the contention
that Mill was a rule-utilitarian (see footnote 30 pt 25-26
of
this paper, regarding Urmson, "The Interpretation of* the Moral
Philosophy of J. S. Mill"), the principles that follow with
respect, to killing are developed as act-utilitarian principles.
If one interprets Mill as an act-utilitarian, it seems un-~
problematic to assert (though it won't be argued) that he
would, for the most part, have subscribed to them.
31
A being is affected by an act if and only if he is
made happier or unhappier by that act than he would have been
otherwise

M .._

'

I

f

,

>

4
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addition to the agent, then
the agent ought
to be free to kill the
victim if and only if
either to do so is morally
right or the
P

2

victim freely consents to the
killing.
An act of killing i s right
if and only if,
,

(a)

it is an intentional act;
and

(b)

there is no alternative act which
the agent
could perform which is a means
to less unhappiness or greater happiness to
whoever is
afj.

ected by that or by any alternative
act

which the agent could perform.

(It is pos-

sible bhat one or more alternative
acts are
right.)
P
3

An act of killing is obligatory, if and
only if,
(a)

it is a right act; and

(b)

there is no alternative act which the
agent

could perform which is a means to equal
un-

happmess or equal happiness to whoever

is

affected by the act or by any alternative
act

which the agent could perform.
In the interest of clarity, it is necessary
to add some

explanatory comments. concerning these principles.
Firsx, it is desirable to provide a brief explanation
of some of the terms used in the principles.

By a 'free act*

is meant one with which there is no interference.

Rightness

and wrongness are to be understood as prudential concepts
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when They apply to self-regarding actions,
but as moral concepts when they apply to other-regarding
actions.

Ix is neither desirable nor necessary
to become in-

volved here with the intricacies of
intentionality

;

it is

included without sufficient explanation as
what seems a
necessary condition to be imposed by all three
principles,
so as to insure that actions cannot be
categorized as pru-

dential or moral unless executed by an agent having
some
intention(s) with respect to them.

If not, of course, it

is not possible to avoid admitting that animals
and even

events of nature can qualify as causing right actions,

that they should be free to perform them, etc.
Second, apart from the condition of intent ionalitv,
if is important to realize that these principles (as they

are concerned strictly with objective rightness) are for-

mulated with reference to acts

,

not agents.

They set forth

the conditions under which acts ought to be free, under which

right and under which acts are obligatory.

They do

not specify any conditions under which agents can be said
to deserve praise or blame.

Consequently, these principles

justify claims about the freedom, rightness, or obligatori-

ness of acts by reference to the consequences of those acts,
and not by reference to any specific intentions the agent
has v/hen he performs them.

This means, then, that what the

agent believes or does not believe
sire

,

,

desires or does not de-

has nothing whatever to do with the freedom, rightness,
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ooligatonness of his act.

Hence, it is possible both

for an agent to perform an act
without making every reasonable effort, before acting,
to justify his belief that
his
act will actually be one which
ought to be free; and yet
for that act in fact to be one
which ought to be
free, or

to be right, or obligatory.

And likewise, it is possible

both for an agent to perform an
act with the unfulfilled
desire that his act will be one which
ought not to be free;
and yet ior chat act in fact to be
one which ought to be
free, or right, or obligatory.
Third, although a particular act might
be a means

both to happiness and to mental attitudes
of approbation
or a particular act might be a means both
to unhappiness and
to mental attitudes of disapprobation,
attitudes of approbation or disapprobation are excluded from counting
as aspects
of happiness or unhappiness respectively.
This is a re-

striction Mill would have accepted and is supported
by
the arguments employed by him, principally in
On Liberty

Fourth, in the spirit of Mill,

v/ho

.

framed the prin-

ciple of utili oy with reference "to the whole sentient
cre-

ation,"»t33 included in the category of those sentient
forms
•

lines 3,27-330, and Chapter IV, lines
,o„.
384-394;
454-462; 617-634; and 743-750.
33

T e passage referred to is in "Utilitarianism,
9
" p.
214;
''This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion,
the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard
of morality; which may accordingly be defined, 'the rules
and precepts for human conduct,
by the observance of which
'
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of liie v/hich night be significantly
affected by our actions are animals and perhaps plants.
If there is some

plausiole sense in which they may experience
pain and pleasure (which does not seem doubtful for
animals) and so be

made happy or unhappy by at least some of
our actions, they
ought to be considered as included in the
class of "whoever
is affected" by those acts.

In this regard it might also be noted that if
one of
the sentient beings affected by our actions is a
god or gods
(as some claim good reasons for supposing) who is
made hap-

py or unhappy by our actions, then this possibility must

also be included in our metaphysical account of the morality
of actions.

For even though it is unknown whether there are

such beings or, if there are, what their nature is, the pos-

sibility requires that such effects of our actions must be
included in the notion of right action, etc., in the meta-

physical

(

objective) sense in which we are considering them.

And if there are other sentient creatures, though not known

by us to exist, who are significantly affected by our actions,
we must include these as well.
It is necessary to consider only homicide with refer-

ence to these principles.

If an act of homicide is self-

an existence such as has been described might be, to the
greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not
to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits,
to the whole sentient creation."
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regarding, 34 then it ought to
be free if and only if
it
satisfies P;L _ above; it is
right if and only if it
a
satisfies P,; and it is obligatory
if and only if it satisfies
P 3*
4'nerefore as long as the act
of homicide is a selfregarding act, and as long as
it is an intentional act,
it
is wrong to interfere with
it; under these conditions,
people
ought to be iree to kill other
people.
A self-regarding
,

act of homicide which satisfies
the further condition that
no alternative act which the
agent could perform is a means
to less unhappiness or more
happiness to the agent is a pru
dentially right act; not only ought
the agent to be free to
kill someone under these conditions,
it is prudentially
right for him to do so. Finally, a
prudentially right act
of homicide which is such that there
is no alternative act
which the agent could perform which is a
means to equal unhappiness or equal happiness for the agent
is prudentially

obligatory; in this case, it is prudentially
obligatory to
kill the other person and one acts
prudentially wrongly if
he does not commit homicide.
34

It should be noted that an act of homicide
regarding if and only if it is a means to happiness is selfor unhappiness only for the agent. It fails to be a
means to
happiness or unhappiness for the victim if and only
if the
victim, were he to. live, would experience either
no happiness and no unhappiness, or on the whole, an even
balance
of happiness and unhappiness.
As this would rarely be the
case with reference to the victim and as it would
also be
rare that the death of a victim would not be a means
to happiness or unhappiness for some third person besides the
agent and the victim, an act of homicide would very seldom
be self-regarding.
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On xne other hand, if an act of
homicide is other-regarding, then it ought to be free if
and only if it satisftes ^ _it is right if and only if it
1 b
satisfies P
and
;

2

it is obligatory if and only if
it satisfies

;

;

therefore,

as long as an act of homicide is
other-regarding and in-

tentional and such that no alternative act
which the agent
could periorm is a means to less unhappiness
or more happiness to whoever is affected by the act or by
any alternative

act which the agent could perform, it is morally
right; not
only ought the agent to be free to kill someone
else under
these conditions (by
but it v/ould also be morally

right for him to do so.
Finally, if tne act of homicide is other— regarding
and morally right and such that no alternative act which
the agent could perform is a means to equal unhappiness
or

equal happiness to whoever is affected by that act or any

alternative act which the agent could perform, it is a

morally obligatory act; not only ought the agent to be free
to kill the other person, and not only is it morally right

for him to do so, but moreover, it is morally obligatory for

him to kill his victim:

he acts morally wrongly if he does

not commit homicide.

Consider, for example, a variation of the familiar

scapegoat objection to utilitarianism.

The oppressed citizens

of a political state conspire to assassinate their tyrannical

ruler but fail in the attempted assassination.

Unable to
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discover who among the citizens was responsible
for trying
to kill him, the tyrant demands that
the citizens surrender
five of their number to be executed for
the assassination
attempt.

If the citizens refuse, he assures them
that they

will all be even more heavily taxed, their
liberties will be
even further curtailed, and they will be
subjected to other
abuses at the whim of the tyrant. These hardships
will

con-

tinue for a long time unless the citizens comply,
in which
case they will suffer no retribution.

It is impossible to

depose the young and healthy ruler, and he has now taken

thorough and effective precaution against assassination.

From a metaphysical perspective, the situation is such
that, among all the available alternatives, there is none,

other than surrendering five innocent people as scapegoats,

which

v;

ill produce less unhappiness or more happiness for

those affected; more importantly, it is also true that sur-

rendering the scapegoats

v/ill

produce only a very slightly

lesser amount of unhappiness or only a very slightly greater
amount ol happiness

than,

accepting the alternative of every-

one's having to live with the imposed hardships of the ruler

with no one's being sacrificed.

Furthermore, even though

surrendering the victims is only very slightly better than
not doing so, no alternative action is a means to equal un-

happiness or equal happiness to those affected.

Consequently,

surrendering the scapegoats under those circumstances not only
ought to be free, but also is morally right and even morally
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obligatory.
Su b-sectionJEI-B: The distinc
ti on between metap hyseal
,

an d non-iaeta-physical rightness
_

,

other examples could be con-

sidered but, insofar as a theory's
sanctioning scapegoats
under conditions like the above is
taken to constitute a
serious kind of objection, the preceding
example is sufficient
to show that, as concerns the
issue of homicide from this
perspective, the utilitarian theory being
considered is not

compatible with intuition.

That an act of homicide can be

regarded as (prudentially or morally) free,
right, or obligatory whenever the above-described conditions
obtain seems

clearly to constitute a sufficient condition for
rejecting
any theory from which inferences like this follow,
on the

ground that they are not at all in accordance with the
intuitions of any morally sane person. However, if one
recalls that all of the above was developed with reference
to acts, not agents, there is an important distinction
be-

tween this metaphysical account of actions which the theory
is committed to and what can be inferred from the
theory

concerning agents.

The result is that there is a seeming

but no actual inconsistency in allowing that, according to
the same theory, an -action can be right in a metaphysical

(objective) sense but wrong in a non-metaphysical (subjective) sense (and vice-versa).

For what the agent is justi-

fied by the theory in doing--without reprehension

— often

turns out to be far different from what seems to be implied
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by the metaphysical considerations. 35
The point is that there are two
separate and distinct
senses of justification in
operation here. On the one hand,
one can speak of an action
which is justified as right from
a metaphysical standpoint;
in this case, it would have
been
much more accurate to phrase the
questions we previously
considered somewhat as follows: Under
what conditions is
it metaphysically right or
metaphysically obligatory for
him to kill? (it was with this sense
of justification in

mind that these questions have been answered.)

On the other

nand, one can speak of the same action
from a non-metaphysical (subjective or agent's) standpoint
and so judge the action as right or wrong, etc,, from a significantly
different
set of considerations; in this case, the
questions should be
phrased somewhat as follows: Under what conditions
is it

subjectively right or subjectively obligatory for the
agent
oo kill?
These two senses of justification have, to my
knowledge, never been adequately distinguished and
it
is

the failure to do so which has primarily been
responsible
35 This means,
in the example above, that although surrendering the. scapegoats would be right on the basis of metaphysical considerations the agent would not necessarily be
abie, according to the theory, to justify the action as
right
and thereby to commit himself to its performance. That
this
is so will be made apparent below.
.

,

v;i11 bscome evident shortly, what is not meant by
subjectively' here is 'what the agent thinks is right, obligatory, etc.’ There is another sense of 'subjectively' which
bears a much closer logical relation to the metaphysical.
,

,

.
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for the charges that utilitarianism
cannot account for many
of our moral intuitions.
It is important to realize, then,
that intuitive in-

compatibility with the theory at this stage
can now be interpreted, in thi o new light, as the result
of considering
its metaphysical commitment to what
constitutes a

right or

obligatory action.

This is true with the material above

with regard to the utilitarian position on killing;
this
result can also be applied to an objection like the

fol-

lowing, taken from Frankena's Ethics

,

in which he is re-

counting objections to act-utilitarianism made by Joseph
Butler and Sir David Ross:
The other Butler-Ross argument is that in a certain
situation. there might be two courses of action, A
and^B, which are such that when their total scores
in. terras of a balance of good over evil for the
universe as a whole are calculated, the results
are as follows:
A is conducive to a slightly
larger balance of good over evil than B. But it
might also be that A involves breaking a promise,
telling a lie, or being unjust. Here the actutilitarian must say that A is right and B wrong.
But again, Butler and Ross contend, B is or at
least may.be right and A is or at least may be
wrong; this conclusion would be insisted upon by
our ordinary moral consciousness. Hence, actutilitarianism must be rejected. 37

Independently of a consideration of the success or
failure of various

o~fcher

attempts which have been made to

show that utilitarianism can counter this kind of objection,
it is certain that the distinction made above can be

3? Frankena,

p.

32.
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successfully employed to do so. 38

That is, although in

the metaphysical sense of
justification-calculating "thier
•total scores in terms of a
balance of good and evil for the
universe as a whole*'— the rejection
of

act-utilitarianism

has seemed to Ross and Butler to
follow of necessity, I
propose to demonstrate that, once we
consider the non-metaphysical standpoint of the theory, it
does not.

The success of this approach for
resolving the difficulties of utilitarianism with respect to
moral intuition
rests on the assumption that the ultimate
acceptability of
an ethical theory does not depend, in the
final analysis,
on what it implies metaphysically but,
rather, on what its

implications are from a subjective (agent's) non-meta-

physical standpoint; i.e., what it allows the agent
to do
without reprehension. In other words, if a theory
being
employed does not sanction an agent's doing something
which

clashes with intuition, then, regardless of its metaphysical

implications with respect to the rightness of actions, there
is no reason why, from considerations of compatibility
with

intuition, that theory should not be judged acceptable.
First, as is demonstrated further on, 39 it is theoretically
38

By other attempts I have in mind, for example, J.J.G
Smart's "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism," The Philosophical Quarterly. VI (1956), pp. 344-354, and John Rlwls'
well-known article "Two Concepts of Rules," The Philosonhical Review LXIV (1955), pp. 3-32.
,

^Sub-section III-D,

pp. 126-132.
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impossible for a finite moral agent
to know what the theory
entails metaphysically about the
rightness or wrongness of

particular actions.

Consequently, although it has been

demonstrated that utilitarianism may not
be compatible with
intuition from a metaphysical perspective, 40
this objection
to the theory must be judged as
uninteresting. For if it is
theoretically impossible for a moral agent
to know whether
particular actions are metaphysically right
or wrong, it is

only from a non-metaphysical perspective that
it becomes
significant, to judge the rightness and wrongness
of particu-

lar actions, 4l and, consequently, only from
this perspective
that it becomes significant to consider accepting
or rejecting the theory because of the compatibility or
incompatibility

with intuition of particular actions sanctioned by
the theory.

Secondly, as a result of this, we must conclude that
the
only purpose served by the notion of metaphysical rightness
40

This was demonstrated in Section II, pp. 66-79, which
considered utilitarianism and its implications
regarding the
^
right to life.
41
Regarding particular actions (those actions which
an agent may be considering as possible alternatives on some
occasion of moral choice), if he doesn't know which particular actions are sanctioned by a theory as metaphysically
right, how can they be compared with intuition? In other
words, a moral agent is in no position to judge particular
actions as compatible or incompatible with intuition from a
metaphysical perspective. Of course he can speculate about
possibilities but this would be a superfluous endeavor, given
what he has to do; for it has nothing directly to do with
making real moral decisions when they have to be made. It
should also be noted that it will later be made evident that
i’t is not theoretically impossible for an agent to know what
is right from a non-metaphysical perspective.
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is

point out possible discrepancies
between what a
finite moral agent may judge to be
right and what
,o

is right

in fact (i.e., metaphysically or
objectively right), ac-

cording to the theory's principles.

And this conclusion

must be regarded as trivial with respect
to the process of
accepting or rejecting utilitarian theories.^ 2
In conclusion, regardless of the objections
to a
theory's metaphysical commitments, what we
must be con-

cerned about, as philosophers concerned with
devising or
discovering an acceptable ethical theory, is whether
the

application of any theory undergoing philosophical
scrutiny
will possibly sanction, from a non-metaphysical

perspective,

at least one action for a moral agent in a possible
situa-

tion which is clearly incompatible with what would be

sanctioned by preanalytic moral intuition.

Although, as

metaphysicians, we might justifiably condemn a theory such
as Mill's version of utilitarianism on the basis of its

possible metaphysical implications, as philosophers who
are interested in justifying a moral theory that is theo-

retically unobjectionable from a non-metaphysical perspective
42

The fact that it is possible that we may make mistakes in calculating- consequences--assuming that it is a
mistake not to accord with metaphysical implications--is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for rejecting an ethical theory.
V/e might recall, for example, that
Mill rejected the contention that his theory v/as objectionable because the world was too complicated to calculate
consequences accurately, by replying that this was a defect with the world, not with his theory ("Utilitarianism,"
pp. 225 - 6 ).
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-the level

at which the theory is
applicable to moral

agents— this version

of utilitarianism can be
shown to be

acceptable
As will be demonstrated in the
next and final section
of this chapter, the metaphysical
commitments of the theory
are only of speculative interest,
whereas the non-metaphysical commitments are crucial so
far as acceptance or rejection
as an agent-oriented theory
is concerned.
In brief, it will
be demonstrated that the rejection
of the theory as a metaphysical theory about actions does not
entail the rejection
of a theory as a non-metaphysical
theory, and it is the latter which should constitute our major
concern in our search
for an ethical theory which satisfies
the requirements of
moral intuition.

The main point of this section can be
summarized with
reference to a final quotation from Brandt’s
article:
The question. whether there is an objective
sense,
or a subjecoive sense, or perhaps both such
senses,
is a difficult one.
Although I think it plausible
to suppose there is an 'objective' sense,
I do feel
doubt about the. matter.
I propose, nevertheless,
to discuss utilitarianism as a theory
about rivht
and wrong in this sense.

Because it is both necessary and possible to differentiate
both the objective and subjective senses within the
theory
and to turn to the latter in an attempt to demonstrate
the

accordance of utilitarianism with intuition,

I

propose, in

the final section of this chapter, to discuss Mill's version

43

Brandt, p. 114.
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of utilitarianism in the subjective
sense and to demonstrate
further reasons why we must do so.
Accordingly, "The question whether there is an objective
sense or a subjective
sense or perhaps both such senses”
is not a difficult one.

The theory can consistently be (and
is) committed to both.

Section III
The Metaphysical and Non-Metaphysical
Distinction
in Mill's Theory
In this section it will be argued that
Mill made this

metaphysical-subjective distinction, that several of
the
positions he is committed to necessitate its
acceptance.

Accordingly, after Sub-section III-A summarizes
Jan Narveson*s view of utilitarianism as a theory of
intrinsic

value, Sub-section III-B will turn to evidence in
"Utili-

tarianism" and On Liberty in an attempt to demonstrate
that

Mill was committed to a similar theory of intrinsic value.

Through an analysis of the first half of Mill’s proof in
the fourth chapter of "Utilitarianism," Sub-section
III-C

complete the picture of Mill's theory of intrinsic

value by explicating his conception of the general happiness and revealing the part it plays in the second half of
the proof.

Sub-section III-D will discuss the effect of

Mill’s theory of intrinsic value on the calculation of
consequences, concluding that it is theoretically impossible
for a finite moral agent to know whether actions are meta-
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physically right or wrong.

xhese results necessitate,
in

Sub-section III— E, that we
distinguish between two kinds
of
rightness (metaphysical and
non-metaphysical)

and formulate
a principle of utility
corresponding to each. At this
point
the metaphysical and
non-metaphysical distinction in Mill's
fcheo-y
s established and the
last Subsection
(III-F) is

meant to show that the problems
of justice can only arise
with the principle of utility
formulated with respect to
non-metaphysical rightness, thus eliminating
one of the

commonly alleged sources of incompatibility
between the
principle of utility and principles of
justice.

Eventually,

in Chapter IV, it will be demonstrated
that, once we consider this formulation of the principle
of utility, utili-

tarian theory is not at all incompatible
with our intuitions
regarding distributive justice.
Sub-sectio n

trinsic
bool:

I II-At

Utilitarianism as a theory of in -

value according t o Narveson

Morality, and Utility

,

.

Jan Narveson, in his

proposes and attempts to support

an interesting hypothesis about the commitment
of utilitarianism to a theory of intrinsic value.
In several places he

asserts that utilitarianism is not a theory of
intrinsic

value in the way that philosophers have generally
supposed.
For example, early in the second chapter he says:
...it. does not provide an answer to the following
questions:
V/hat is the (general) criterion
(1)
of value?
(2) How ought I (anyone) to live?
What, is intrinsically good?
V/hen I say that
(3)
it ’’does not" provide an answer to these questions,
t
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however, perhaps I should say
that we snouid
should
not think of it that way/*

And later in the same chapter,
while criticizing Sidgwick's
contention that utilitarianism
requires that we produce as
many people as possible (to "produce
the greatest amount of
happiness on the whole"), he concludes,
"This is a fundamental
error, involving as it does the
supposition that utilitarianism is a theory of intrinsic value,
coupled with the moral
position that the moral value of an act
is proportional to
its production of intrinsic value,
For Narveson, it is desirable to reject
utilitarianism
as a theory of ‘'absolute intrinsic value
:

If we say that the moral value of an act
is proportional to the absolute intrinsic value of * its
consequences, then there is no logical connection
between the principle and a concern with other
persons as such. Whereas... a concern for other
persons as such is precisely the hub of utilitarianism.
In other words, it is his contention that commitment
of the

theory to a specific substantive theory of intrinsic
value

results in unacceptable inconsistency with what is
sanctioned
by preanalytic intuition.

Among the examples he provides

for both hedonistic and ideal varieties of utilitarianism,
the following is an example of the latter:
44

Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 19 &7 ), p. 30
45
^Narveson, p. 47.
46
Narveson, p. 67
.

.

The
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hitler could have been an
"Ideal"utilitari an
an^ probably was,
He probably believed that the
quantity of absolute intrinsic
value brought
nto being by
millions of Jews, and
Stin rni l 1 i° n s of people from
h
the activities
+ u^
e
y
0
e
they
ht g0 ™t~and
die on^he fie?d o? H
everyone had been permitted to
lfve as he SeaLd
th S W Uld
S dis P ute about inurinsic
Sglfvalu
valuee
H
+ to be
How
is it
resolved? This
S1
ra Se a
° f thS ° ld questions
over
Sain xvhi'nh h WS ii
that ldeal utilitarianism is
untati’
unsatisfactory as a moral theory. 4 ?

^

^

'

h

-

.

The denial that utilitarianism
is a theory of absolute
intrinsic value does not, however,
commit one to the position
ohat ’value" is ”sub jective "
Narveson is careful to point
out that the view he is advocating
implies no "theory of
value" at all. As a utilitarian, one
can consistently subscribe to either the view that intrinsic
values are "objective" or the view that they are
"subjective." Although it
.

is difficult to determine what may
be meant by "objective,"

Narveson takes it to mean "at least that if two
people are
o± difierent opinions about the
intrinsic value of
some-

thing, then at least one of them is wrong;"
if one takes the
suo jective view, the position adopted is
that "such quarrels
are made of thin air." Utilitarians may
consistently admit

either if they are so inclined.
deny, however,

per

s_e

What the utilitarian must

is that "statements about intrinsic value

may be admitted among the premisses of moral argu-

ments.
47
'Narveson, p. 69.
48
Narveson, pp. 69-70.
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However, it is not the cuse
that utilitarianism is
committed to no theory of
intrinsic value whatever.
As a teleological ethical theory, it
has to he. So what Narveson
really
means when he asserts that
utilitarianism is not a theory
of
absolute intrinsic value is
that it is not a theory of
intrinsic value of the kind that
has generally been attributed
to

Having rejected the latter,
Narveson's proposal in this
regard is that "We need to
complicate the picture of evaluation for moral purposes, by
introducing a category which might
be labeled 'intrinsic moral
value,' or perhaps 'intrinsic
value
for moral purposes' or 'intrinsic
value from the moral point
it.

of view.

In short, what he means is that

generating idea of utilitarianism is a
concern for the values that individuals
adhere to
3 utllit y> then, is its
productiveness of*
what those affected by it believe
^caiiy good. Utilitarianism will tobe betheint?inprinValUe (i,e ” that by reference
aiSe a ° tS BoraU *>’ iB utility
in thafsl'L^

Sub-section III-Bi
what hanpiness is:

Mill 's theory of intrinsic

an open question

.

value-

Rather than proceed

with further explication and discussion
of Narveson’s theory
49

har^eson, p. 66.
In the same paragraph in which he
discusses the new category of intrinsic good
on p. 78, Narvehlch is hel P ful by way of explanation.
;'
ne a ct.tha», o oner people enjoy something
is a good reaJ
son**J
for helping
them to procure it, or at least for lettinethem do it unimpeded, regardless of what one
thinks of their
ihe Stylization of this would be to say
that if someone regards doing X as an intrinsically nrima facie.
(nonmorally) good thing, then it is a good thing (morally)
to
assist him in doing X (regardless of the ’real’ intrinsic
value of doing X)
.

f,

*

.
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at this point,

wish to do so indirectly by
considering in
some derail something which
Narveson mentions but does not
argue for. He observes, at
one point, that his own view
of
utilitarianism might be "in accord
with Mill's intentions."
In what follows, therefore,
the contention that Mill was
committed to a similar view of
intrinsic value will be argued
for on the basis of the evidence
that can be found in "Utilitarianism" and O n Liberty to support
the following hypotheses:
(1) Mill is committed to the position
that what happiness is,
fact, is an open question. Contrary
to a hedonist (such
as Bentham), who regards 'happiness'
as identical with 'pleasure and the absence of pain,' Mill
is quite obviously a kind
of "liberal eudaemonist. " —And this,
despite his own alleged
agreement with Bentham.
( 2 )
Even if what happiness
I

m

is,

in

fact, were not an open question, Mill is
committed to the

position

that it is to he treated as if it were.

If either

interpretation of Mill's position can be supported,
it will
become clear that he could not have held the
position
that

the morality of actions is to be determined
with reference
to a theory of intrinsic value of the kind
that has been

attributed to him and most other utilitarian writers.

It

will also substantiate the preceding discussing in
Section

I

regarding the theoretical differences between Bentham and
Mill and eventually will result (at the end of this section)
in a new formulation of the principle of utility.

Before getting into the substance of these issues,
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however, something must be made
clear at the outset. Some
critics have contended that
Mill's defense of freedom
in
On_Liberty is incompatible with
his utilitarian theory which
supposedly commits him to the view
that ultimately pleasure
IS the only good.
Thus, for example, Henry D.
Aiken
has

asserted

Bri^ly

I c° ns i der the case for
i iber ty, either on
strict utilitarian or idealist-utilitarian
grounds*
I
shaky n eed
At one point or another! both
T
}
nf These
h
^
of
points
of view betray the cause of liberty
the betrayal was more’
or less
less^xolic
explicit;
the case of the utilitarians
it remained for the most part
implicit, and, atiA
the case of Mill, recognition of the
fact was forestalled only by muddle-headedness and
inconsistency -5°
*

.

i

m

»

.

Aiken’s position is typical of all those
who operate
on the presupposition that Mill’s
utilitarian theory
is

based on a theory of intrinsic value
sufficiently similar
to Bentham’s so that either he could
not have been evidencing adherence to the theory in his defense
of liberty
or,

if he was, he shouldn’t have, since appeal
to it does

not support his views on liberty.

Rather than accept the

hypothesis that On Liberty is inconsistent with the
author's
utilitarian theory for this reason, the method adopted
in

v/hat

follows will be to proceed on the much more plausible

view

much more consistent with the supposition that Mill,

Henry David Aiken, Reason and Conducts New Bearings
M oral Philosophy (New York! Alfred A. Knopf, 19S2),
p.
29b.
Aiken goes on to offer some very weak arguments for
the much. more implausible view, which' Mill denied, that
liberty is to be looked upon as a kind of natural right.
.

.121
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as a careful thinker, was
at least somewhat
consistent in
his thinking— that the
position defended in On liberty
is
to be interpreted as
evidence that Mill's utilitarian
theory
has been seriously
misinterpreted in this regard.
That the
converse of the usual interpretation
has never seriously been
argued in the history of moral
philosophy must be judged as
somewhat incredible.

In the second chapter of
Oft Liberty

,

the suppression of opinion
on two grounds.

Mill argues against
First, if the

opinion which is suppressed is true,
those who suppress it
are "deprived of the opportunity
of exchanging truth for
erior.
Second, even if the suppressed
opinion is false,
those who suppress it lose "what
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.”
In other words, "we
can never be sure that the opinion
we are endeavoring to
stifle is a false opinion; and if we
were sure, stifling
it would be an evil still." 51 He
then proceeds to defend
each hypothesis in turn.
The means most often employed for
supporting the first
is to emphasize the fallibility of
man.

Among the many

places in which he makes this assertion, the
following is
its most cogent expression:
...the opinion which it is attempted to suppress
by authority may possibly be true.
Those who desire
51

.

Mill, On Liberty

,

p,

1 6.
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to suppress it,

of course deny its truthbut
they are not infallible.
They have no aithoritv
to aecide the question for
all mankind, and ex "
9V0ry°ther person from the
means of jud*-in^.
lo refuse a hearing to an
opinion because'
iS

is

~

tha^Lirceroainty is the same thing as
absolu te certaintv
ot discussion is an assumption
of
infan
ItS condemnati °n may be" allowed
to rea+^+h-'
thlS common argument, not the
worse
for
i or being ,
common. 52

Llm

Insofar as all claims of absolute
truth rest on an
assumption of infallibility, and insofar
as the latter is
severely disparaged by Mill as an
unwarranted
assumption,

it is reasonable to suppose that
Mill must have thought
of his own beliefs about happiness
as in the fallible

category.

His claim in "Utilitarianism" that
"happiness
is pleasure, and the absence of pain,"^
his subsequent
claim chat indulging in the higher pleasures
is conducive
to

a happier life than indulgence in the
lower pleasures,

and his assertion that an appeal to competent
judges would
he

the best way of

determining which pleasures were pre-

ferable could not have consistently been regarded
by him
to oe what his readers should accept as the
final word on

xhe matter.

m

On L b e rt y
.

Rather, in light of his position just noted
,

and the additional evidence presented

below, a more plausible interpretation of his
discussion
in "Utilitarianism" of what happiness is,
52

„

is that he was,

Mill,^ On Liberty p. 17. Other places in the essay
in which the fallibility of man is emphasized are
pp. 21 and
,

56

.

^Mill, "Utilitarianism,"

p.

210.
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on the one hand, generally
expressing his own beliefs and
preferences and, on the other,
specifically suggesting that
the best means available to an
empiricist like himself for

determining which pleasures are best
would be to confer with
those who have experienced a wide
range of pleasures and take
note of their preferences.
For example, although what competent
judges prefer is
some evidence (indeed, perhaps the
only evidence available
to a finite being) for making the
decision as to what the

content of happiness is, it cannot be taken
to entail coextensiveness with what happiness is, in fact.
Because not
all competent judges can be consulted
or, even if they could,
might prefer on one occasion something quite
different from
what they preferred on another, any previous
judgment as

to what happiness is might have to change
on the basis of

the available evidence.

For this reason, and the fact that

continued agreement could only be construed as
empirical
evidence in support of a particular hypothesis, even
though
Mill may ha>/e believed it to be a necessary truth
that

happiness

is

’pleasure and the absence of pain'*' and that

this was the general preference of competent judges,
he

would have nad to concede that he and they might be mistaken.

Mill could not consistently have supposed there to be a

necessary connection between the preferences of competent
judges and what happiness is, in fact.

Since competent judges

(and Mill) are not infallible, it is certainly possible that
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their judgments with respect
to the content of happiness
can be and/or are mistaken.
And this must also extend to
the general judgment that
'happiness' is co-extensive with
pleasure and the absence of pain.

will's beliefs about happiness can
only appear as the
conclusion of an inductive argument
or of a deductive argument in which the premisses can
only be regarded as contingently true.
From the argument of man's fallibility,
then, it follows that Mill must have
held that what happiness is,
fact, is an open question.
It is not even
necessarily, as Mill at one point stated

m

it was,

and the absence of pain.'

—And

'pleasure

this, even though he may

have believed or been quite certain that
he knew what happines s was J
.

54.

pr 01

,

^ or a discussion of this see the material
on Mill's
pp. 97-IOO and especially Sub-section III-C,
pp. 111-26.

the
thesis it follows that the
i
claim(s)
by any fallible being(s) to know what happiness
is
must.be suspect, that any judgment about the
content of
happiness (e.g., that it is 'pleasure and the absence
of
pain ) must not be. unquestionably accepted as true.
And
this
is precisely what it means to speak about
happiness as an
open q uestion i.e., to regard happiness as an
open question
is, qui te literally, to be open to the
possibility that happiness is,
fact, correctly identified with something other
than pleasure and the absence of pain,' or any other
proposed equivalency, even though v/e may strongly believe
and
have good reason for believing that it is "such and
such."
In orief, no proposed definition is to be regarded as
having
finally settled the question as to what happiness really
is?
Moreover, it should be noted that even if 'pleasure and the*
absence of pain' were to be accepted as an adequate definition, this would be philosophically uninteresting and, consequently, not very helpful. As will be demonstrated shortly
(pp. 103 and 102)
even though Mill stated that this is what he
,

m

,

9?

Apart from any problems in the
proof Itself, brief
consideration of the second half
of Mill's proof of the
principle of utility in "Utilitarianism”
will provide additional
evidence for the hypothesis that
Mill regarded the actual
content of happiness as an open
question; that he was not
committed to a specific theory of
intrinsic value of the kind
that has generally been attributed
to him; that he was,
rather, committed to a theory of
intrinsic value of the kind
discussed above with reference to Narveson.

After having supposedly proven in the
first half of the
proof that both individual and the general
happiness are intrinsically desirable, Mill proceeds in the
second half to
prove that happiness is the only thing
which is intrinsically
desirable. Here, he is attempting to answer
those critics
who claim that there must be '’other ends
of human action besides happiness” because it is an empirical
fact that people
do seem to desire other things than happiness
in and for
themselves.

At this point, happiness "has not... proved
itself

to be the sole criterion.

To do that, it would seem, by the

same rule, necessary to show, not only that people
desire

happiness, but chat they never desire anything else,”^^

meant by ’happiness* in actuality he must have intended
this
to be interpreted quite differently than has usually
been
supposed.
In fact, it v/ill be noted that this difference
represents one of his major points of departure with Bentham.
Acceptance of this as an adequate definition is seriously problematic for additional reasons noted on pp. 107 - 11
^°Mill, "Utilitarianism,” p. 234.

.
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kill replies to his critics by
contending that whatever is desired as an end—
though it might, at one time,
have been desired as a means
only— is really a part of happiness
Tne ingredients of happiness are
very various and
each of them is desirable in
itself, and not ^erSv
S
swellin S an aggregate. The princiDle°of nt?V+
"2* mean that ari ^ given Pleaas
instance, or any given exemption
from’nafn
rom pain, as for
^
example health, are to he looked
t ° a collective something
termed happiness, and to be desired on that
account. Thev
1
and desira ole
and
besides be mg means, they are a for themselves
part
Virxue^ according to the utilitarian of the end.
not naturally and originally part of doctrine, is
the end, but
ic is capable of becoming so; and
in those who love
disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to
happiness,
but as a part of their happiness, 57

ce

„

^

^

'

'

.

The second half of the proof can be made
explicit by
means of the following argument:
(1) Happiness is desirable as an end.
(2)

Whatever is desired as an end is a part of happiness.

(3)

If whatever is desired as an end is a part
of

happiness, then happiness is the only thing de-

sirable as an end.
Therefore, happiness is the only thing desirable as
an end

The first premise is the conclusion of the first half
of the proof (which will be examined later) except that the

^Mill, "Utilitarianism,

"

p.

235.
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happiness he's concerned with at this
point is interpreted,
for tne purpose of the discussion,
as individual rather
than general happiness. Premise 2
is obviously regarded
(
by Mill as true; this is evident
from the passage above and
from tne fact that he also considers
things like health,
)

money, fame, and power as parts of
happiness for those who
pursue them as ends; for if the latter can
be parts of happiness, it seems unlikely that other things
desired as ends
can be excluded; or, at least, it is not at
all obvious how
one would go about doing so.

Acceptance of (2) is also

evidenced in the following, in which it seems clear
that
he is referring to any object of desire whatever.

"What

was once desired as an instrument for the attainment
of happiness, has come to be desired for its own sake.

In being

desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as oart of
cr

happiness.'

o

That

(

3

)

is accepted by Mill as true is sub-

stantiated in the last statement in "Utilitarianism" re-

garding this part of the proof:
...if human nature is so constituted as to desire
nothing which is not either a part of happiness or
a means of happiness, we can have no other proof,
and we require no other, that these are the only
things desirable.
If so, happiness is the sole
end of human action, and the promotion of it the
test by which 'to judge of all human conduct; from
whence it necessarily follows that it must be the
criterion of morality, since a part is included
in the whole. 59

^Mill, "Utilitarianism,"
^Mill, "Utilitarianism,"

p.

236.

p.

237.
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Tha. Mill regarded the actual
content of happiness as an
open question and that he
was committed to a theory of
intrinsic value of the kind referred
to above with reference to Narveson now appears
to follow readily 60
.

As noted, people desire many
things as ends in themselves; consequently, virtue,
health, money, power and fame
are all mentioned by Mill as
parts of happiness. These can
only plausibly be construed as
examples, however, as it is
obvious that many other things are
pursued as ends in themselves (e.g., cars, entertainment,
love affairs, etc.).

Whatever it is that people desire as an
end, "...from being a means to happiness, it has come
to be

itself a prin-

ciple ingredient of the individual's
conception of happiness." And as Mill goes on to conclude,

this "may be said

oj.

the majority of the great objects of
human life." 6

'1'

Because Mill says that what is a part of
happiness

what is desired as an end) may differ from
individual to
individual and because he believes that whatever
is desired
as an en<3 is a part of individual happiness
(premise
(

(2)

above), it is safe to conclude that Mill is,
in reality, a
roight be thought plausible to attribute to
the view that 'happiness] is 'pleasure and the absence Mill
of
pain,, and that the particular content or states of
hapniness include money, fame, etc. However, although the
above account of the second half of the proof is compatible
with and may support this contention there are serious
problems with accepting 'pleasure and the absence of pain'
even as what might be called an adequate general definiens.
As is also suggested in the footnote on p. 97 see
pp. 107-11.
6l
Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 236

—

,

.
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kina of "liberal eudaemonist.

"

For we can conclude, with

Narveson (though he was not
specifically referring
mg to Mill),
Mil
that

oiicj

regara as intrinsically good. 62

Mill is not unfairly interpreted, then,
as meaning by
pleasure and the absence of pain,
'whatever
'

people regard as intrinsically good.'

it is that

In fact,

the best interpretation of his
intentions.

it seems

And because

there is a great deal of diversification in what
is regarded
by individuals as intrinsically good, it seems
to follow
that there is nothing specific Mill had in mind
when he

Uo0 d the word 'happiness,

'

What he personally desired

is what he tnought competent judges would have
preferred,

Dut This could only have been thought by him to be a
"part

of happiness."

Whatever else is desired by others as ends

comprises the other parts.

Consequently, the interpreta-

tion which commits Mill to a specific theory of intrinsic

value (such as 'pleasure or the absence of pain,' which

Bentham was clearly committed to), is untenable.

All that

can be said is that happiness (v/hatever is desired for its
own sake) has intrinsic value.
/2

'Narveson, p.

66.

What happiness is, in fact--
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its actual content is

is an open question for
Mill.

The only evidence available
to finite moral agents is
what
it is that people actually
desire as ends in themselves,
but
this kind of evidence can never
justify the inference that
what is desired by someone or
some group is, in fact, happiness.
It is this theory of intrinsic
value which will
result, at the end of this section,
in a new formulation
of the principle of utility.^
We can now return to On Liberty
for evidence that,

whether or not what happiness is is an open
question, Mill
thought that it should be regarded by any
moral agent as
if it were.

In the first paragraph of the third chapter
of On

Liberty

.

Mill asserts*

The liberty of the individual must be thus far
limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to
other people. But if he refrains from molestmg others in what concerns them, and merely
acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same
reasons which show that opinion should be free,
prove also that he should be allowed, without
molestation, to carry his opinions into practice
at his own cost. 64
.

This brings us to the second argument against the
3

It should be' noted that these considerations of the
second part of the proof strongly support the previous contention that Mill's talk of competent judges, etc., was
only a prudential recommendation; i.e., was not to be taken
as the last word from an infallible being with a grasp of
ultimate truth.
64

Mill, On Liberty

,

pp,

55-56.
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suppression of opinion, which we
now realize is also used
against those who hold the
corresponding position regarding
actions, that men should not be
-free to act upon their
opinions— to carry these out in their lives,
without hindrance, either physical or moral,
from their
fellow-men,

so long as it is at their own
risk and peril.

We have

just considered the reasons for not
suppressing opinions
that are not known to be false. The
reasons for not sup-

pressing those which are known to be false
are succinctly
presented by Mill in a summary at the end of
the second

chapter as the last two of four grounds for
"...the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on
which all their
other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion,
and freedom of the expression of opinion,"
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only
true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered'"
to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly
contested, i o will, by most of those who receive
it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with
little comprehension or feeling of its rational
grounds.
And not only this, but fourthly, the
meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger
of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its
vital effect on the character and conduct: the
dogma becoming mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience. 66
63

.

"'Mill,

On Liberty

,

p.

66

55*

Mill* On Liberty p. 52. It might be noted that although Chapter II of On Liberty is concerned with opinions
in general (among which, those about the content of happiness are only one variety) Chapter III is devoted almost
entirely to the question of acting on only one kind of
,

,
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This argument applies to the
problem of happiness,
generally, as follows: Even
if we know at present or
might
ln thS fUtUre know with
certainty what happiness is,
in fact,
and so would know that other
opinions are false, stifling
these differing opinions would
be wrong.
Consequently,

even if we know what happiness
is, Mill is advocating that,
as moral agents, we must
nevertheless treat the issue of the
real content of happiness as
though it were an open question.
According to the passage just referred
to, failure to
do so
is to dispense with the possibility
that beliefs regarding

happiness will be rationally chosen,
defended and pursued
with conviction.
It can be concluded, therefore, that
on either the

supposition that our opinion as to what happiness
is may be
false or on the supposition that we know
it to be true,

it

io highly unlikely -chat Mill was
committed to a theory of in-

trinsic value

.for

utilitarianism any more specific than the

one which says generally that "happiness"
has intrinsic value.

opinion, viz., those as to the content of the hapoy
here the position being argued is that people ought life,
to be
u
ac - on their own. opinions as to what happiness
?
con•if
s ^'ts ln
3<
- on S a s their doing so is not injurious
to
?
others.
This is worth mentioning insofar as it serves as
further indication of the concern Mill had that each individual be allowed to live in accordance with his own conception of happiness, and consequently, supports my previous conclusion that Mill was not insisting upon appeal to
quant itative and/or qualitative hierarchies of pleasures
or determining the morality of actions that consulting
such hierarchies in determining the morality of actions
would sometimes require choosing contrary to the pleasure
preferences 01 others and would thereby result in injustices.
*

.

-i

—
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But then, as has previously
been noted, we are to interpret
this i or individual happiness
as equivalent to ’’whatever
it
is that people regard as
intrinsically good."

In

any case,

as moral agents, we are
directed to proceed on the assumption

Before leaving this topic, it is
necessary to recall
v/hat was stated above with
respect to any individual, that
"...the same reasons which show that
opinion should be free,
prove also that he should be allowed,
without molestation,
to carry his opinions into practice
at his own cost." This
means that, ceteris paribus, individuals
should be allowed
to adopt their own life-styles (pursue
their own means) to
obtain whatever they believe constitutes
happiness. At one
point, in which he is emphasizing individual
differences,

Mill maintains that the question regarding life-styles
must
always be answered relative to the individual;
consequently,

given the various opinions about happiness and the
possible
life-styles that should be (and are) chosen as means to
the
same conception of happiness, the question regarding
life-

styles would receive a (perhaps limitless) number of answers.
same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one,
keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in
their best order, while to another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal
life.
Such arc the differences among human beings
in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibility
of pain, and the operation on them of different
physical and moral agencies, that unless there is
a corresponding diversity in their modes of life,
they neither obtain their fair share of happiness,
nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic
stature of which their nature is capable. 6?
-‘he

^Mill, On Liberty

,

p.

68.
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For our purposes, this means
that, ceteris
It would he as wrong to
suppress life-styles as means of
ing on one s beliefs as it
would be to suppress beliefs
about happiness. And, of course,
the same arguments which
apply to opinions about happiness
would apply also

tmHw

,

to opin-

ions about life-styles; i.e.,
if beliefs with respect to
happiness should not be suppressed,
neither should beliefs
with respect to the best means
for obtaining happiness (lifestyles).
Not only is the content of happiness
to be regarded
as an open question but also the
best means to happiness is
bo be so regarded.
And This includes opinions about desired life-styles. 68

All of this marks a very striking and
significant difference between Mill's utilitarian theory
and a theory like
Bentham s
Because Bentham accepted the position that
only
pleasure has intrinsic value, his theory is best
termed
1

.

hedonistic.

Mill's theory, on the other hand, is better

categorized as eudaemonistic

,

for when it is said that Mill

is not committed to a theory of intrinsic value
in the usual

sense, it can be inferred from this as also meaning
that he

was no

o

value.

committed to saying that only pleasure has intrinsic
Good empiric-ist that he was, Mill held that "the sole

evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable,
68

Throughout his third chapter, Mill emphasizes the desirability of a diversity of life-styles within society as
good for the individual as well as for society.
In particular, see pp. 56-60 and 67.

10 ?

is that people do actually
desire it," 6 ? meaning that the
only evidence we have for
anything’s having

intrinsic value

is gained by observing
whatever it is that people desire as

ends

m

themselves.

However, since whatever is desired as

an end in itself is thought by
Mill to be a part of happiness (as previously demonstrated) and
because what is desired

for itself is often only remotely—
if al

all— connected with

what is ordinarily meant by pleasure,
the only conclusion one
can infer from the available evidence
is that happiness— what
ever people desire for its own sake— has
intrinsic value. 70
If it is thought doubtful that one might
desire some-

thing as an end with no corresponding thought
or expectation
of ensuing pleasure, one might consider, for
example, the
6q

Mill,

"Utilitarianism,"

70

p.

234

.

Of course, given Mill's position with respect
to the
UeS 0n as
w ^ a c happiness is, to interpret 'hanniness
3
J:i
lor the purposes of the employment of utilitarian theory
as
whatever people desire for its own sake' must also be regarded as uncertain, though based on the best available
evidence (for another example of Mill's attitude with respect -to evidence^, see the discussion of the first part of the
proof, ^pp, H5“12o.
In brief, it has been argued that, given
the evidence, the interpretation as to what happiness is cannot be made any more specific than this. As will later be
discussed, there are certain restrictions which must be placed
on those desires for happiness which necessitate harming
others in the process of satisfaction, such that we might
conveniently distinguish between what might be called "legitimate desires" and "illegitimate desires" (meaning, by the°latter, "those which are only satisfied at the expense of harming someone," and, by the former, the negation of this). What
is meant by "harm" will also be discussed later.
There are
perhaps, in addition, qualifications that must later be made
concerning what people regard as having moral value.
'

^
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pursuits of some kinds of religious
ascetics, who seem to
pursue as ends what would ordinarily
be classified as paine..p^riences
if such things as sleeping on
beds of nails
and sitting for hours at a time
contemplating one’s navel are
to be included as instances
of pursuing pleasure, it must
surely be admitted that "pleasure”
has become a useless con.

cept; it is no longer capable of
being used to distinguish
the agreeable from the disagreeable
because its extension

now seems to be every and any kind of
experience whatever.
Consequently, it is only by a very gross and

ill-conceived

extension of the term that desiring, as ends,
things like the
above can also be said to be instances of
desiring pleasure.
These are not the activities which one v/ould
normally be

attributing to someone in describing him as a hedonist.

Yet

ohis is what we must do if, even in light of
the second part

of the "proof," we insist on categorising Mill as a
hedonistic

utilitarian.

Mill plainly seems to be arguing in the second half of
the proof that people pursue as ends either pleasure or only

tnose tnings which are so intimately linked with pleasure that
though there is no conscious thought of the connection whenever

they are desired, there is, through long association, what

might be called an unconscious connection.
ever,

All in all, how-

it seems apparent that what his position really commits

him to is the admission that some things can be (and are) pursued as ends (even for the first time) with no conscious thought
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of association with pleasure;
consequently, that the

best-

perhaps only-evidence we have,
as moral agents, regarding
the actual content of individual
happiness is (with the necessary qualifications) just what
we have said it is— whatever
people desire for its own sake 71
.

And because it is possible

to desire otner things as
ends than pleasure, Mill must
be
interpreted as a eudaemonist and not
a

hedonist.

Even if it were plausible to interpret
Mill as a hedonist, it is worthwhile noting
that the problem of

deciding just

v/hat

pleasure is, is a major difficulty.

m

As Narveson admits,

the first part of a discussion of
pleasure, what it is
is no easy question, and I do not
intend to answer it in a

precise way .” 72

After having considered

at. some'

length the

insight that others have offered in the
attempt to deal with
the problem, he concludes with the
observation that:
...when writers attempt to define the notions of
pleasure and enjoyment, invariably they end up saymg,
one way or another, that they consist of
pro-attitude or positive evaluation of some experience on its own account.
If this is so, then small
wonder that ’psychological hedonism’ was so popular

m

71

Though it is somewhat difficult to imagine, I suspect
it would be possible for one to desire as ends some
of the
things Mill mentioned as examples of parts of happiness (e.g.
money and health) with no thought of resulting pleasure, even
when they are first desired. For more nlausible examples,
consider the pursuit of knowledge or self-realization, which
many might originally desire with no thought of a pleasant
result, in the ordinary sense of the term.
72
Nar-veson, p. 63.
.
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is

regaled

In the lengthy dehate over
intrinsic goods, carried out
throughout the history of moral
philosophy, many have denied
that pleasure is a good at
all and many have held that
there
are, in any case, other good
things besides pleasure. For
ampl^, tioor. s ideal utilitarian”
theory was meant to obliterate the identification of
good with pleasure, as Moore
regarded "good” as a primitive term
which was correctly applied to many other things held to
be good in themselves be-

sides pleasure.

For at least two reasons, it is clear
that

this is not the kind of debate that
Mill could have been conce^n-d ^oout. First, metaphysical or
intuitionist assertions
about intrinsic goodness which are not
susceptible to empirical confirmation or refutation would
have to have been regarded by Mill as meaningless.
The available evidence shows that
things desired as ends are multifarious; they
are,

says Mill,

to be looked upon as parts of happiness;
what connection they

have with what is really intrinsically valuable
(what has been
called 'objective” intrinsic value) cannot be
known on the
basis of the only evidence which finite moral
agents have

available to them.
ol'

Second, and more importantly, on the basis

previous discussion of On Liberty and pleasure hierarchies,

it is abundantly clear that whatever it is that is
regarded

by moral agents as having intrinsic worth is not something
that Mill thought utilitarians should be concerned about,
73 Narveson,

p.

65.
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Signer to condemn or to recommend,
in anything other than a
prudential sense. 73 In the essay On
liberty and elsewhere,
it is apparent that Mill regards
the individual's conception
of happiness— as well as his style
of living— as up to the

individual, and not something that the
moral theorist should
ever suggest or consider imposing on
others.

Suffice it to say that the concept of
oleasure is
either vacuous or its status as an intrinsic
good

is suffi-

ciently nebulous so as to be of little or no
value in the
calculation of consequences and therefore in the
determination of the morality of actions. As will be
discussed further
on,

the implication is that calculation of
consequences in

the manner urged by Bentham's hedonic calculus is,
for finite

moral agents, theoretically impossible.

—ab-s ection Ill— C:
th e general happiness

.

frill's theory of intrinsic value -—

Thus far, we have only considered

what Mill meant by individual happiness.

We reached our con-

clusions partly through analysis of the second half of Mill’s
proof; we can discern what he meant by the ’’general happi-

ness” if we examine the first half of the proof.

It will be

helpful if we first discuss briefly an essay by Everett
Hall, who attempts

t.o

W.

demonstrate that Mill was not attempt-

ing a strict proof and, consequently, that objections to the
73

•

qualification (see p. 107n) that the resulting desires are "legitimate;” i.e., that their fulfillment
would not be other-regarding and harmful.
-'With the
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proo; which are based on the
assumption that he was, are

easily dispensed with.
that our 'great

modem

-Bradley, like Moore, is assuming

logician,' as he derisively charac-

terized Mill, must be presenting in
his 'proof of the principle of utility a strict logical
deduction.
It is high time
that this whole interpretation be
fundamentally and decisively
challenged. "

Hall claims that Mill, as an empiricist,
clearly disavows any attempt to give a strict proof
of the principle of
utility.
Because he is an opponent of all forms of
intuition
and a priorism, and, consequently, cannot appeal
to self-

evidence or inductive generalization (because the
rightness
or wrongness of individual acts is not open to
direct perception)

,

Mill is not attempting "to prove the principle of

utility, but to make it acceptable to reasonable men."^^
He offers an interpretation of what Mill is doing here

which he claims "at least makes sense of Mill's argument as
a whole.

His procedure is to draw an analogy between an

empiricist's approach to the first principle in epistemology
and the first principles of ethics.

He explains that "in the

area of knowledge the empiricist cannot strictly prove his
74

Everett W. Hall, "The 'Proof of Utility in Bentham
and Mill," in Mill, A Collection of Critical Essays ed.
J. B. Schneewind (Garden City, New York;
Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., Anchor Book's, 1968), p. 156.
75 Hall,
,

p.

159.
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first principle,"

it is not possible for him to use
an in-

ductive argument or to deduce from a more
ultimate principle
that there are no unobserved entities,
no visible
things

never seen, audible occurrences never heard,
etc.

However,

he can, claims Hall,

...set it up as a plausible principle (as a
'meaning criterion,
as a later positivist put it) that
any epistemological theory that requires visible
or audible entities that are never seen or
heard
is talking nonsense.
The only test anyone can
seriously propose that a thing is visible is that
it is actually seen.
A theory that conflicts with
the requirement will just not be accented by reasonable people.
^

'

It is the same in ethical theory:
A theory that sets up as ends desirable in themselves (i.e., good, not simply capable of being desired), states of affairs that nobody ever desires
is just academic and unrealistic.
"If the end
which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself
v/ ere not,
in theory and practice, acknowledged to
be an end, nothing could ever convince any person
that it was so." That is, if no one appealed to
the greatest happiness to justify ethical principles, or ever in practice desired the greatest
happiness, no considerations capable of getting
reasonable people to accept that principle as
ethically ultimate could be presented. Let us
call this the requirement, directed toward any
ethical first principle, of "psychological realism.
_

.

^

Contrary to Hall, it is my contention that the first
half of Mill's proof can plausibly be interpreted as containing two separate proofs--a proof that individual happiness is desirable followed by a proof that the general hap-

piness is desirable.

For the sake of convenience, they will

be referred to in the following as
76

'Hall

,

pp.

160-161.

I

a and

1^,,

respectively.
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It is Hall

s

contention that, for Mill, neither could he con-

strued as an inductive or deductive proof.
I

believe uhe conclusion of

On the contrary,

is an inductive generalization

and the conclusion of
1^ (given what Mill means by "general

happiness") can be established as the conclusion of a de-

ductive argument.

Something needs to be said at this point about Mill's
contention, in the first chapter of "Utilitarianism," that

any proof of the principle of utility "cannot be proof in
the ordinary and popular meaning of the term," that "ques-

tions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof.

Although Hall has taken these statements to mean that Mill
was asserting the impossibility of constructing either in-

ductive or deductive arguments and has employed this in-

terpretation to exonerate Mill from accusations that he
has made use of logical fallacies in his proof,

I

find it

difficult to believe that inductive and deductive arguments
could not have been unproblematically constructed by Mill
in support of his ultimate ethical principle.

Given our

knowledge of his empiricist stance, plus plausible in-

terpretations of the passages in "Utilitarianism" in which
he talks about the proof, it seems reasonably certain that
the employment of inductive and deductive arguments is not

something that Mill v/ould have thought impossible.

However,

conceding that he might have thought it impossible, there
"^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 207.
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seems to be no substantial reason for his
adopting this
position, since appealing to inductive and deductive
proofs
(although with conclusions that have less than lOOfo
prob-

ability of being true) is something that appears to have
been
clearly open to him. In this case, what he meant or should
have meant in the passages quoted above was merely that
em-

pirical propositions (in this case, "individual and/or general happiness is desirable"

)

can never be completely con-

firmed, an assertion that is much less difficult to accept

than the one Hall attributes to him.
In brief, it is my contention that the following

analysis of the first part of Mill's proof as a separate
inductive and deductive proof is

— contrary

to Hall's analysis

--much more in accordance with his empiricist stance; more-

over--as with Hall's analysis--it is not susceptible to
the objection that he was employing logical fallacies.

Essentially, there are three reasons why the first

half of the proof should be looked upon as consisting of
two parts,

I

and

I

.

fe

In the first place, Mill made a point

of maintaining that "the sole evidence it is possible to

produce that anything is desirable is that people actually
do desire it."

Because both individual and general happi-

ness were thought by Mill to be desirable, it is reasonable to suppose that this passage was meant to apply to
both, with the result that the desirability of each kind
of happiness is proven as the conclusion of a separate
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inductive argument 78
.

Secondly, it is only in this way that

it is possible to avoid attributing
to Mill the empirically

vacuous theory of psychological hedonism, thereby
avoiding
having to ascribe to him a position which is
blatantly in-

consistent with his empiricist stance.

Finally, if there

were not this division, it would be difficult to
make much
sense of the second half of the proof since (as will
soon be
shown) it is obvious that the "parts of happiness"
referred
to are to be thought of as parts of both individual
and

general happiness.

The conclusion, then, is to be inter-

preted as referring to both individual and general happiness,
but in order for it to follow, there needs to be a premise
to the ef f ec

that both individual and general happiness are

desirable (a premise which must be the result of the conjunction of the conclusions from two separate arguments).
It is Hall's contention that,

7^

in arguing for the de-

sirability of the general happiness, Mill is assuming the
truth of psychological hedonism.

This, he thinks, is the

only plausible interpretation of that passage in which Mill
says that "each person, so far as he believes it to be
78

However, it will be argued that although the desirability of individual happiness appears as the conclusion
of an inductive argument, the desirability of the general
happiness appears as the conclusion of a deductive argument.
Nevertheless, this is not inconsistent with the
assertion that Mill intended two separate proofs in this half.
79
'The second half of the proof was previously discussed
in terms of individual happiness only, for the purpose of explicating what Mill meant by individual happiness.
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attainable, desires his own happiness."

However, it can be

much more plausibly contended that Mill,
as an avowed empiricist, must have asserted this as a
contingent proposition,
which he realized could quite possibly be
(or become)
false.

Bearing

m

mind that, upon analysis, the position of
psycho-

logical hedonism is found to be held as a
necessary truth
(in the sense that its adherents allow no
evidence to count

against it), it would,

think, have been quite inconsistent

I

of him to subscribe to such an empirically vacuous
position.

Consequently, the proposition that "everybody desires his
ov/n

happiness

(equivalent to the passage above) was most

likely thought ox by Mill as the conclusion of an inductive
argument in which the degree of probability of the conclusion's being true is dependent on the strength of the evidence presented in the premisses:
(1)

Individual A desires his

(2)

Individual B desires his own happiness.

ov/n

happiness.

Therefore, it is probable that everybody desires
his own happiness.
As an empiricist who maintained that "the sole evi-

dence it is possible to produce that anything is good is
80

Good evidence that Mill rejected psychological egoism is found in Mill's essay on Bentham in John Stuart Mill
on Bentham and Coleridme ed, F. R. Leavis (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 19^2 ) pp. 66-6?.
,

,
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that people actually do desire it," it
is also plausible to
interpret Mill as having thought of this same
evidence
as

support for the desirability of individual
happiness as the
conclusion of an inductive argument. Part I of
Mill's
a

proof should than be set up as an inductive argument
with
the same premises as the argument above.
Again, the degree
of probability of the conclusion's truth is dependent
upon

the strength of the evidence presented in the premisses:
(1)

Individual A desires his own haopiness.

(2)

Individual B desires his own happiness.

Therefore, it is probable that individual happiness
is desirable. °l
The conclusion’s having been established with a high

degree of probability means, of course, that individual

happiness is a good worth aiming at, a worthwhile objective that we can recommend to others, etc., from a pru-

dential standpoint.

Its connection with morality, though

Mill, of course, would have thought the conclusion
established with a very high degree of probability, as it
was undoubtedly inconceivable for him--as for us that there
could be anyone ( or' very many) who did not desire to be
happy.
However, in the true spirit of empiricism, because
it is a fact that not everyone who has lived or will live can
be questioned on the matter, the conclusion is necessarily
something less than lOOfo probable. It could, of course,
turn out sometime in the future that the conclusion would
be very weakly supported if many or all of those of some
future generation should, for some reason (insanity, perhaps) not desire to be happy.

—
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not immediately apparent at this point,
is evidenced by the
part it plays as a premise in the proof
for the desirability
of the general happiness, to which we
now turn.
Part

I

,

fe

however, immediately poses a problem, for if

the only evidence that it is possible to
produce that anyohing is good is that people actually desire
it, the em-

pirical evidence in support of the general happiness
as a
good will turn out to be embarrassingly weak.

That is, it

seems safe to say that the number of individuals who desire
the general happiness is far less than those who desire

their own individual happiness.

As a consequence, the con-

clusion of the following inductive argument is going to be
less probable --perhaps far less— than the conclusion of the

previous argument for the intrinsic goodness of individual

happiness
(1)
(2)

t

A desires the general happiness.
B desires the general happiness.

Therefore, it is probable that the general happiness is desirable.

As this is presumably the most important part of the
first half of the proof, since the principle of utility is

formulated with reference to the general happiness (the
greatest happiness of the greatest number) as the end by
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which one is to determine the morality
of actions, this resuit must be regarded as most unfortunate.
At this point, however, we must turn
to another point

Hall makes about Mill's proof:
mill cannot and does not argue that each
seeks the
general happiness or that society as a whole somehow has its own motives, over and above those
members, and that these are directed toward theof its
genral appiness Ra ther Mill simply says
?
(anticipatJ.u
lng ohe outcome of step 2 and the acceptance
of the
pleasure of each individual as a good ) that, since
he pleasure of each is a good, the sum of these
must be a good:
"each person's happiness is a good
to that person, and the general happiness,
therefore,
a good to the aggregate of all persons.” Or, as he
explains in a letter:
"I merely meant in this particular sentence to argue that, since A's happiness
is a good, B's is a good, etc., the sum of all
these goods must be a good. ”82
'

*

»

.

If Hall is right here about what he takes Mill to be

doing in this part of the proof, then it is obvious that the
objections raised by Moore, Bradley, and others simply don't
hold.

As Hall goes on to say,

"This may be incorrect; it

may be that goods cannot be added, though surely it is not
just obvious that Mill is mistaken in this matter.

However

that may be, Mill is clearly not trying to prove /~as claimed
by Moore and Bradley, for example/ that

'

because everybody

desires his own pleasure, therefore everybody desires the

pleasure of everybody else.'” 88
I

82
83

should like to add here some support for Mill's proHall, pp. 161-162.
Hall, p. 162.
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cedure, assuming that Hall has interpreted
it correctly.

Although rail's claiming that the sum of individually
good
things is also good seems to be an instance of the

informal

lallacy of composition

— inferring

that a property charac-

teristic of the parts is also characteristic of the whole
it certainly is not obvious that it is.

First of all, not

a ll instances of inferring from the property of a part that
the same property characterizes the whole are instances of

the fallacy of composition.

For example, although it is

certainly fallacious to argue that if all the individual
parts of an engine are light, the engine itself is light,
it unproblematic ally follows that if each of the apples of

a bushel is sweet, the entire bushel of apples is sweet.

Secondly, it is not at all apparent that the inference that
the sum of individually good things is good is not more

like the second unproblematic example than like the first.
In other words, if Hall's interpretation is correct, there

seems to be no compelling reason(s) for concluding that

Mill has employed a logical fallacy; rather, there seems
more reason to believe that he wasn't, though it won't be
argued for further here.
However, if it is clear that Mill was not trying to
prove what Moore and Bradley contended he was, it is also

clear that 1^ no longer has to be interpreted as an inductive argument similar to

I

.

Contrary to Hall's asser-

tion that no strict proof is possible or intended, with
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the concept of general happiness
defined as it is, it is

possiole

uo

interpret 1^ as a deductive argument.

Whether
Mill intended this or not, it was clearly
open to him if
what he meant by general happiness is
in accord with Hall's
interpretation. Part
can now be constructed
as follows:

1^

(1)

Individual happiness is desirable.

(2)

On the basis of (1), A's happiness is a
good,

B*s is a good, C's is a good,
(3)

If A’s happiness is a good, B's is a good,
C's
is a good,

C*s,
(^)

...etc., then the sum of A's, B's,

...etc. happiness is desirable.

'General happiness' = df 'the sum of A's, B's,
C's,

(5)

...etc.

...etc. happiness.'

Therefore, the general happiness is desirable.

Premise (1) is the conclusion of 1^; (2) follows analytic-

ally from (l) in that 'desirable' for Mill is a synonym for
'good;'

(3) and (4) must have been acceptable to Mill as

following from the meaning of the passage "the general
happiness is good to the aggregate of all persons," on
the assumption that Hall's interpretation is correct.

And

is acceptable to us if, as suggested above, Mill was

(3)

not guilty of employing a logical fallacy.
As the conclusion of a deductively valid argument,
(

5)

'

truth is 100% probable on the assumption that all the

premisses are true.

In terms of soundness, however, because
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premise (1) is the conclusion of an inductive argument and
so is a contingent proposition,
100/6

probable.

(5)'s truth is not, in fact,

This result is in accordance with the position

we have previously maintained Mill would have subscribed

to—

that empirical propositions cannot be completely confirmed.

There are several reasons for accepting Hall's in-

terpretation as to what Mill meant by the general happiness,
not the least of which are the evidence Hall provides and
the fact that it allows one to make sense of Mill's proof.

In addition, however, it is supported by what has previously

been argued is what Mill meant by individual happiness.

Here it was argued that there is no one conception of individual happiness which everyone must strive for; Mill's

primary concern was that each individual should be able to
live according to his own conception of happiness, with the

restriction that his doing so did not harm others unnecessarily.

84

Given this conception of individual happiness,

the most plausible way of characterizing the general hap-

piness seems to be to say —-not that it is some kind of abstraction, somehow independent of individual happiness-~but
R4

'Unnecessarily' is to be interpreted as 'without
It is essential to add this, since it
moral justification.
is clear that there- are some occasions on which to harm
others would be morally justified; e.g. when all the alternatives available to a moral agent involve harming others
and not at least one action, if performed, would result in
less harm than the others. The necessary conditions for the
moral justification of harm are elaborated on in parts of
Chapters III and IV of this work; see, for example, Sections
I and II of Chapter III.
8
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tha^,

in any given society, the general happiness is
equal to

the sum of all those living within it who are happy.

Con-

sequently, if the general happiness is equivalent to the sum
O-f

2-11

those

v/ho

are individually happy, then, in any given

society, the general happiness would he at a maximum if as

many individual members as possible were living as they
chose, according to their own conception of happiness; i.e,,
if as many members as possible were individually happy.

It

would follow that, in any society, the degree of general

happiness within it would be, at any one time, directly proportional to the percentage of its populace enjoying individual happiness.
At this point it should be noted that, because some

individual conceptions of happiness (what is desired for
its own sake) v/ould, if acted upon, seriously infringe

upon and hamper the efforts of others in the pursuit of
their own conceptions of happiness, it is apparent that the

general happiness can be maximized only if some such desires are classified as "illigitimate.

"

In other words,

in order to maximize the general happiness, it is neces-

sary to differentiate between two conceptions of happiness:

"whatever is legitimately desired for its own sake" and
"whatever is illegitimately desired for its own sake," and
to do whatever possible to prevent the latter from being
O

acted upon.

c'

9

^Something

is legitimately desired for its own sake if
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Considering what Mill meant by general
happiness, it is
now apparent that there is a close logical
relationship between it and individual happiness, in that
pursuing individual happiness is the same as pursuing a
part of the general

happiness and pursuing the general happiness is
nothing other
than pursuing its parts.
We can now return to

^

the second

and only if satisfying or attempting to satisfy
the desire
would not result in. harming someone unnecessarily. Conversely something is illegitimately desired for its own
sake
n and only if, satisfying or attempting to satisfy a desire
would^ result in harming someone unnecessarily.
It is necessary, here only to note the necessity for making the
general
distinction; it is the purpose of Chanter III to relate the
distinction to specific desires, to define the concept of
.harm em
ihat people should have the general right to satisfy their legitimate desires is argued on p.142. Mill, of
course, argued for this distinction at several places in On
Ljfberu^y. ror example: “All that makes existence valuable
to
anyone, depends on the enforcement of restraints on the actions of other people'' (u. 5; see also n. 63 ). He also recognized the great difficulty involved in making specific decisions in this regard: "What these rules should be is the
principle question in human affairs" (p. 5). From now on,
the phrase "whatever is legitimately desired for its own sake"
will be freely employed when speaking of the content of individual happiness.
,

,

.

® This is not to be construed as meaning that
one's moral duty is to. do his best to see that he is individually happy;
insofar as this is a duty at all, it is a prudential one.
Rather, as will later be made clear, our moral duty is, roughly, as Mill expressed it in On Liberty not to harm others;
i.e., not to interfere with their pursuits of happiness, unless their doing so is harmful to others and, whenever possible, to prevent others from interfering with anyone's harmless
pursuits.
Our duty, then, as moral agents, is not to make
people individually happy but to allow them the opportunity to
become so.
In this way, we guarantee the optimum conditions
for the growth and development of individual (and, consequently,
the general) happiness.
Mill thought of individual happiness
as an extrinsic as well as an intrinsic good.
For example:
"In proportion to the development of his individuality, each
person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore
capable of becoming more valuable to others" (p. 63 ). He goes
on, in the next few pages, to elaborate on this.
,
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Ox

tne prooi

,

previously considered only with reference

to individual happiness.

With the knowledge that both in-

dividual and the general happiness were regarded by Mill
as

having intrinsic worth (there having been a separate proof
for each)

,

and that there is an intiinate logical relation-

ship between them, it is also apparent that both are to be

included in uhe second half.

It is now correctly set up

as follows:
(1)

(Individual and the general) happiness is

desirable
(2)

Whatever is desired as an end is a part of
(individual and the general) happiness.

(3)

If whatever is desired as an end is a part

of (individual and the general) happiness,

then (individual and the general) happiness
is the only thing desirable as an end.

(4)

Therefore, (individual and the general) happi-

ness is the only thing desirable as an end.

Sub-section III-D: effect of Mill’s theory of in trinsic value on the calculation of consequences

.

It has

been established that, for Mill, the general happiness for
any society is equal to the sum of its members who are happy,
that in order to maximize the general happiness the content of

individual happiness is to be interpreted as "whatever is

legitimately desired for its own sake," and that, consequently,
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pleasure is not the only thing that can
be judged by the
theory to be intrinsically good. It can
now be demonstrated
that a further consequence of all this, and
one which serves
to mark another major difference between
Mill's theory and
one like Bentham's is that it is theoretically
impossible

for a moral agent to calculate and determine, with
any degree of certainty, whether actions are metaphysically

(ob-

jectively) right or wrong.

8^

One reason for this is the

fact that, for finite moral agents, what happiness
is, in
fact,

is an open question.

Since a decision on this issue

is a necessary condition for being able to determine meta-

physical rightness and wrongness, it is theoretically impossible for a finite moral agent to know whether any given

action is metaphysically right or wrong, 88
8 *7

The claim. being made and supported in the next few
pages is that it is theoretically impossible (for an explanation of this term, see footnote immediately below)
to know. which acts are metaphysically right or wrong, etc.
The claim is not that we can't know any empirical truths,
though it has been asserted that Mill subscribed to the position that general empirical propositions cannot be completely confirmed (see material on first part of the proof,
pp. 111-126.) The conditions under which one could justifiably claim, metaphysical knowledge of this type are roughly
specified in a footnote on p.131. For the distinction between metaphysical and non-metaphysical rightness, etc,,
see pp. 79-86; also, pp. 132-135.
'

.

88

The term 'theoretically impossible' is not meant
in the strict logical sense, according to which it is logically impossible that one could ever accomplish whatever is
so regarded.
Obviously there is no logical restriction in
this sense on one's knowing what happiness is, in fact (or
on one's f initeness non-omniscience
if it is this which
is responsible for the lack of such knowledge).
But given
the absence of this knowledge (and the fact of one's finite
--non-omniscient--nature)
it is impossible in a very strong

—

—

,
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Bent ham and other utilitarians have supposed
that happiness
is identical with pleasure.

aole,

If this assumption were accept-

it would seem that the difficulties encountered
in

calculating the consequences of actions (and so determining
their morality) could be categorized as merely practical.

Consequently, it would be theoretically possible to overcome
these difficulties by, for example, developing the technology

for implanting a sensing device in the pleasure center of

everyone's brain and observing on a pleasure-meter the effects
of innumerable actions.

Over a long period of study and ob-

servation, it would become possible to predict, with a great

deal of accuracy, which actions among those available as al-

ternatives on any occasion of choice, would be productive of
the most pleasure for all those affected and, therefore, which

action would be morally right.

Such a system might be justi-

fiably regarded as a paradigm situation so far as the measurement of pleasure is concerned and v/ould certainly be the
ideal for the employment of Bentham's “hedonic calculus .” 89

— perhaps

—

more than merely practical sense that such a being could employ utilitarian theory for attaining knowledge
as to which actions are metaphysically right or wrong.
Given
that knowing what happiness is, in fact, is a necessary condition for knowledge of metaphysical rightness and wrongness,
it is in this sense that the term 'theoretically impossible'
is intended.
89

.

Given a sufficient degree of sophistication, such a
pleasure-measuring device could more or less adequately take
into account all of the “circumstances" for measuring quantities of pleasure which Bentham deemed important " intens ity
"duration," "certainty or uncertainty," "propinquity or remoteness," "fecundity" and "purity." At least I see no

—

,
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However, because it has been observed that,
according to
Mill, what happiness is, in fact, is an
open question or that,
in any case, it is to be looked upon by
any moral agent as if
it were, using such a pleasure-measuring
device would be to

presuppose that ’happiness’ is identical with
'pleasure (and
the absence of pain)’ and so would have to be
regarded
as

theoretically objectionable.

In short, because Mill's theory

is not committed to any theory of intrinsic
value sufficiently

specific that one could conclude that only pleasure or
some

other particular mental state has intrinsic value, it is
theo-

retically objectionable to proceed as if it were so committed; and if one proceeds as if it weren’t (as one should), it
is theoretically impossible,

in employing it, to know whether

actions are metaphysically right or wrong.

The only thing

which has intrinsic value is happiness and, on the basis of
the only available evidence, this is to be interpreted by

any finite moral agent as "whatever it is that is legitimately
desired.”

From a metaphysical perspective, then, the content

of happiness is an open question and, since it is not known

what to calculate with reference to, it is obvious that we
cannot, so to speak, even get started with the metaphysical

calculation process.

reason why it wouldn't be theoretically possible to do so.
For Bentham's description of these terms, see "An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," Collected Works
cf Jeremy Bent ham pp. 38-39.
,
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However, even if one were able to calculate with reference to pleasure and/or some other intrinsic good(s) (and

.
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This brings us to the old practical
difficulty of calculating consequences. Suppose that it
were known what happiness is, in i act, and that (operating
with a theory other
than Mill's) moral agents are not required
to proceed as if
the question of happiness were open.

Even though one could

now operate as a utilitarian with a substantive
theory of
intrinsic value, it would still be (at least^ 1
practically
impossible for finite moral agents to know the extent
and/
)

or the nature of all of the effects of their
actions.

Bear-

ing in mind that a right action, metaphysically speaking,

was defined as one v/hich is intentional and such that
"there
is no alternative act which is a means to less
unhappiness

or greater nappiness, to whoever is mads unhappy or happy by

the act," and that "whoever is made unhappy or happy by the

act

was taxen to include "the whole of sentient creation,

so. employ a classical formulation of the principle of utility)
this would presumably result in all of the previously noted
objections in the early part of Chapter I with regard to distributive justice, etc. Because, in Mill’s theory, the question as to what happiness is, is open; and it is theoretically impossible to calculate in this way, the theory is able
to avoid objections like those which are based on the assumption that one is able to use the theory for making this kind
of quantitative calculation.
The specific demonstration of
this is the concern of Chapter IV.

°1
'

'At least* is used because, although it is certain
that the difficulty is practical, it is not certain that it
is not also theoretical (in the sense defined above), insofar as the knowledge of the effects of actions might require
an omniscient being; hence, use of the term ’finite* to qualify 'moral agent' v/ould preclude the possibility of being able
to know the extent and/or nature of the consequences of one’s
actions, etc.
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See

p.

?4-75, footnote.
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it cannot be seriously doubted
that we cannot know the extent

and/or nature of the effects of our
actions and, consequently,
cannot know that our moral judgments
are in accord with what
is really (i.e., objectively or
metaphysically) right and
wrong, etc.
Though we might regard this as only a
practical
difficulty (in that the theory now allows
us to know what
has intrinsic value), insofar as knowledge
of the nature and/
or extent of the consequences of actions
is a necessary—
though not sufficient

— condition

for having knowledge of

metaphysical rightness or wrongness, absence of this
knowledge of consequences can be said to constitute an
additional
reason why it is theoretically impossible (in the sense
de-

fined) to know when and if actions are metaphysically
right
or wrong.
It is not necessary to maintain that we cannot know

the utility 01 a given act because the consequences of our

acts go off into the indefinite future (although this may
be true).

It is enough to realize that we do not know who

93 Although

I do not wish to become involved in a discussion oi epistemological theories of the necessary conditions for knowledge, I am assuming that it is not sufficient for knowing that P is true (where P is some proposition asserting the metaphysical rightness or wrongness of
some action)
that one believes that P is true and that P
is true, in fact.
I 'am contending that at least two other
conditions are required in order to have knowledge that P
is true; viz
knowing that two other propositions are true:
one with respect to the nature and extent of consequences;
the other with respect to what happiness is, in fact.
To
go on and attempt to specify the conditions under which one
would know that the latter are true (and so avoid the circularity of this procedure) would be to delve unnecessarily
into a superfluous epistemological diversion.
,

.

132

or what to include as significantly
affected by our actions
or how they are affected, so we cannot
know who or what to

include in calculating the consequences.

Thus, even though

we might know what happiness is, in fact,
we still cannot

know that our moral judgments are objectively
true (at least
not at our present level of knowledge about the
relation
of

cause and effect, etc.).

Consequently, a rational moral agent

will look for the best method available for determining
which
actions maximize happiness on the basis of the evidence
available.

It is to this that we now turn.

Sub- section III-E: Objectively Rjght

,

1

—an d

t he

Objectively

principle of utility corresponding to each

,

ihe present situation can be illustrated by distinguishing

between three concepts of rightness.

We can speak about an

action’s being right from three different perspectives
(1) Objectively Right

-,

:

This is what has been re-

ferred to previously as "metaphysical rightness" or "what
is right,

in fact,” and, as has been noted,

is not the kind

of predicate which finite moral agents can knowingly use
to characterize actions.

It is only possible to use it

abstractly; thus we say that an action is Objectively Eighty
if,

and only if, among the alternative actions available on

any occasion of choice, it maximizes the general happiness,

where the general happiness can be taken as meaning the sum
of those who are individually happy.

But it is recognized

that it cannot be known which action is right in this sense
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because sentient beings may be affected
by our actions which
we're not aware of, or they may be
affected in ways we're
not a, /are of, in addition, what individual
happiness is, in
fact,

is something we do not know. 9^
(2)

:

This is the concept of right-

ness which is based on the evidence that a
finite moral agent
has regarding the content of individual
happiness.
As has

been demonstrated, Mill's conclusion was that
the only evidence we have is "whatever people regard as
intrinsically
good.

Where the concept of the general happiness remains

ohe same, we will say that an action is Objectively
Rightg
if,

and only if, among the alternative actions available

on any occasion of choice,

it maximizes the general happi-

ness, where the general happiness is the sum of all those

who are individually happy and where the content of individual

happiness is taken to be whatever it is that is desired for
its own sake.

Because in formulating the concept of Ob-

jective Rightness

2

one is attempting to determing what is

Objectively Eighty, but is restricted to the only evidence
available, it is apparent that Objective Rightness
q4

2

is

A comment by Narveson is worth noting with regard to
the uselessness of Objective Rightness., from the standpoint
of the agent:
"...if the applicability of a predicate is
sufficiently difficult or obscure, that in itself constitutes
a reason for not placing very much weight on the outcome.
It
it surely contrary to the general interest to require people
to spend too .much time trying to make precise calculations of
happiness or unhappiness, so long as methods for doing so are
not available." (pp. 40-41),
.
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logically dependent, in an important sense, on
Objective
Righ vness^
w ^y this is so will become more apparent
by
comparing Objective Rightness^ with the concept of
Subjective Rightness, discussed below.) Of course,
it is possible
that Objective Rightness is equivalent to Objective
Right2
ness in some or all moral situations, though this
(

.

point is,

l

for all practical purposes, irrelevant; because a
moral

agent cannot know what is Objectively Right^j even if
he
knows what is Objectively Right

2

,

it follows that,

on any

given occasion, he cannot know whether or not they are
equivalent.
(3)

Subjectively Right

;

It is desirable to define

this predicate so as to make certain that what is meant

by it is not confused with Objectively Right^

This is

used to refer to whatever the agent thinks is right, in-

dependent of any rational process based on available sources
of evidence.

He might, for example, decide upon the right

action in any moral situation by flipping a coin.

Thus,

an action is said to be subjectively right if, and only
if,

the agent performing the action thinks that the action

is right.

It is possible that an action which is subjec-

tively right is also Objectively Right-^ or Objectively

Right

2

(or both,

if they were co-extensional predicates for

that action) but the agent, in this case, would not know or
be concerned that they were.
It may now be clearly stated that when a utilitarian
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of the kind we're concerned about makes
judgments about the

objective rightness of actions he can only be
said to do so,
as a rational moral agent, from the perspective
of Objective
Rightness^.
Because this is formulated with respect
to the

evidence that a finite moral agent has regarding
Objective

Rightness^ (i.e., the evidence with respect to happiness--

whatever is desired for its own sake), and so bears a
logical relationship to the latter, we avoid having to say
that

his moral judgments are merely subjective.

At the same

time, we are not to be interpreted as making the untenable

assertion that his moral judgments must be (and are) in
accordance with Objective Rightness^, in fact.
It is now obvious that it is perfectly consistent to

formulate a principle of utility which specifies the conditions which must be met by an action to fall under Objective Rightness^ and to formulate another principle of

utility which specifies the conditions which must be met by
an action to fall under Objective Rightness,-,.

By formu-

lating both, it is possible to call atention to the fact
that there may be a discrepancy between what is really

right (Objective^) and what an agent must judge as right

according to the only conception of rightness appropriate
for a finite moral agent (Objective Rightness ).
2
forth, the principles will be referred to as

respectively.

P-^

Henceand P^,

Q£

9^0f course, these principles are not to be confused
with those in Section II of this chapter.
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Tne P rinci Ple of utility is usually
formulated with
the intention that it be interpreted
as
Where
X is a

variable for actions which are alternatives
to each other
on an occasion of choice, P can be
formulated simply as
1
follows
X is right IFF X maximizes the general
happiness

more than any alternative action
which the agent could perform.

Correspondingly:
X is obligatory IFF there is no alternative
action
which the agent could perform which
is as right as X.

Again, it is important to realize that for this for-

mulation of the principle, even though the meaning of
"general happiness" might be taken to be "the sum of all

ha PPy individuals," the meaning of "individual happiness"
is undefined, v/ith the result that there is no theory of

intrinsic value which can be specified as the one that
is formulated with reference to.

p.^

However, if the actual

content of individual happiness is unknown, and one can't

know when individuals are really happy, it follows, as

previously noted, that it is theoretically impossible for
the agent to know which action,

in fact (among available

alternatives) will maximize the general happiness, and
so be right according to P^.

From the standpoint of the

agent, therefore, P^ is of no use for the determination of

duty and, as noted, can only serve

the

function of marking

a possible discrepancy between what is really (i.e., meta-
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physically or objectively) right and what the
agent judges
to be right in accordance with the
much more plausible

prin-

ciple, P

2

.

Examination of Mill’s theory has revealed that the
only
evidence we have for v/hat constitutes individual
happiness,

in fact,

is what is actually desired.

Consequently,

is to be formulated with reference to a theory
of intrinsic

value wnich holds "happiness" to be the only intrinsic
good;
which, in turn, is to be regarded by the moral agent as

"whatever is desired for its own sake."
P

2

In other words,

is not to be formulated with reference to a theory of

intrinsic value in the usual sense but rather with reference
to what Narveson has alternatively called a theory of "in-

trinsic value from the moral point of view."^

The general

happiness is "the sum of those who are individually happy"
and is determinable with reference to this notion of in-

dividual happiness.
At first glance, it seems that P

lated in the same way

— in

2

should be formu-

the same words--as P^, with

the difference that "individual happiness" and "the gen-

eral happiness" are both defined; i.e., as P

lated precisely in accordance

v/ith the

1

is formu-

definition of

"the general happiness" in the account of Objective Right-

ness^, P^ should be formulated precisely in accordance

with

the definition of "the general happiness" and

9^See p. 90.
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individual happiness" in the account of
Objective Rightness
2
however, to formulate P in the same way
as
would be mis2
leading, for it seems to entail an unacceptable
conclusion re
garding moral obligation. Consequently, before
formulating

^

P

more precisely, it is essential for its
justification and
understanding that we turn to consider briefly the
problem
of moral obligation.
2

In accordance with the utilitarian theory which
has

been developed thus far, it might seem that one's
duty, at
any one moment, is to do whatever possible to provide as

many people as possible with the object(s) of their desires, i.e., to do everything possible to make the most

people happy.

To state this more precisely, if P

formula oed in the same way as P^

»

were

2

it would seem that the

only right action at any time for any moral agent is to

satisfy as many legitimate desires as he is capable of
satisfying.

However, if it is remembered that the prin-

ciple of utility is intended as an absolute ethical principle, and so is universally binding, it is obvious that
in most societies it v/ould not maximize the general hap-

piness (understood in terms of Objective Rightness
everyone acted as if this were an obligation.

2

)

if

In fact,

97 This is
more precise because, as previously noted
on p. 124 given the meaning of "individual happiness" and
the "general happiness," in order to maximize the general
happiness it is necessary to distinguish between 'legiti-

mate" and "illegitimate" desires.
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ix

is no

t

difficul

u

"to

see "that a definite inconsistency

with the principle is likely to arise if this is a duty;
for if everyone

s

duty is always to do whatever possible to

provide others with the object(s) of their legitimate desire^, then it follows that it would be wrong for anyone
v/hose own

conception of individual happiness was something;

other than making other people happy

— to

pursue or enjoy individual happiness.

take the time to

As is the case in

any society, there are many whose desires for their own

happiness is something other than making other people happy.
In those societies, it will follow that everyone's having
as his goal the maximization of the general happiness will
be inconsistent v/ith everyone's duty being to do whatever

possible to provide for the happiness of others.

For if

the general happiness is regarded as equivalent to the sum
of individually happy people, and if there are some who

desire to pursue their own legitimate pleasure preferences
but are not allowed (are not obligated not) to do so; if
it follows that they cannot obtain individual happiness

(which surely it must, in most cases), then the general

happiness cannot be maximized.
However, although it is true that in most societies
the general happiness would not be maximized if it were

everyone's obligation to make others happy, it is, of course,

theoretically possible for there to be a society in v/hich the
general happiness would, in fact, be maximized if this were
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the case.

Consider, for example, a hypothetical society,
A,
in which there are some whose only desire
for individual happiness is that others he happy and who have the
means for nro-

viding all of the others in the society with whatever
they
legitimately desire. In Society A everyone would he happy

and

uhe general happiness would he at a maximum if
everyone's

obligation was to do whatever possible to make others happy.
Even though the general happiness is maximized in this
case, the objection to requiring, as an obligation, the satis-

faction of others' desires can be made on theoretical grounds.
First of all, if it is maintained that our duty is the maxi-

mization of the general happiness but that the best means to
it is for everyone to regard as a duty the maximization of his

own happiness, it would be, as a matter of fact, absurd to

maintain that "satisfying others' desires for happiness, so
far as possible" is either identical with or the only means
to individual happiness.

QR

In addition, this would be theo-

retically objectionable, for it would be to presuppose that
the question as to what happiness is or the question of the

best means to it is closed

— that

individual happiness or the

best means to it is, in fact, "satisfying others' desires for
98

.

This could be regarded as an answer to the question
as to what happiness is if it were maintained that it is
the only thing which is capable of being regarded as intrinsically good. It could be regarded as an answer to the
question as to the best means to happiness if it were maintained that this life-style is the only way in which anyone could obtain happiness.
Of course, both of these possible answers are absurd.

happiness, so far as possible.

1
'

As previously noted, closure

of these questions is not something that
could be sanctioned

by our Theory.

Finally, establishing the satisfaction of

others’ desires as a duty would be to accept
the absurd sug-

gestion that maximizing the general happiness is not
desirable in every society, meaning that the
principle of utility
is not to be regarded as a universal ethical
principle.

For

in other possible societies than A, requiring this
as our

duty would constitute an inconsistency with the principle
of utility which requires as our general duty, maximizing

the general happiness.

For there are possible societies in

which the situation in society A would not obtain and, yet,
because of the universal character of the principle, if it
were everyone's duty in A, it would be everyone's duty in
these other societies as well, to do whatever possible to
make other people happy.
a duty would,

Therefore, to insist on this as

in many cases, make it theoretically impos-

sible to maximize the general happiness.

It must be con-

cluded that the utilitarian theory we have been examining
could never sanction, as a duty, satisfying others' desires for happiness.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from all of
this is that although it v/ould be right (and also praise-

worthy) to give to people that which they legitimately
desire,

could never require that it be one's duty to
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m

do so.

above

,

fact, it is to be noted that even in Society
A,

the general happiness would be maximized on
either

the assumption that it was right or on the
assumption that
it was one s duty to satisfy others' desires.

However, now

that it has been established that ? could only sanction
it
2
as right,

it is clear that its universal employment will
not

3-How for the maximization of the general happiness in

Society A but in all other societies as well.
On the other hand, it is apparent that one thing v/hich

can be established as a duty, on the basis of p^, is not to
interfere with others in their attempts to satisfy their

legitimate desires and, whenever possible, to prevent others
from engaging in this kind of interference.

The justifica-

tion for asserting this as an obligation can best be stated
in terms of a universal right v/hich can be sanctioned by P^.

Because it has been established that what individual happiness is, in fact, and the best means to it, is an open ques-

tion (or at least is to be regarded as such) it is apparent
that anyone advocating a utilitarian theory in v/hich this

presumed to be true must also justify, as a right, that anyone be allowed to pursue his own individual conception of

happiness, in any way he pleases, so long as his doing so
99

This is perhaps what Mill v/as referring to in Chapter V of "Utilitarianism" v/hen he was speaking of imperfect
obligations, to which there were attached no correlative
rights; thus, it v/ould sometimes be our duty to make others
happy, but not always, which v/ould be the case if they had
this as a right against us.
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does nor interfere with others' doing
the same (i.e., in the
previous vernacular, as long as their desires
for happiness
are legitimate).
Such a right is justified in the only way
that any right can be justified by utilitarian
theory— estab-

lishing it as a right is more conducive to the
maximization
of the general happiness than not establishing
it as a right.
If one then takes the usual route with reference
to rights

and assumes that for every right there is a correlative
ob-

ligation for those against whom the right may be exercised,
it is everyone’s duty to prevent himself and others,
when-

ever possible, from interfering

v/ith

anyone's legitimate

pursuit of individual happiness. 100
The utilitarian justification for establishing the

right to the pursuit of individual happiness and requiring

others to respect that right is stated by Mill as follows:
As much compression as is necessary to prevent the
stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching
on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with;°
but for this there is ample compensation even in
the point of view of human development.
The means
of development which the individual loses by being
prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the
injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the

That Mill had this concern for respecting the rights
of others to pursue individual happiness is evident in a passage from Chapter II of "Utilitarianism:" "The great majority
of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the
world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the
world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man
need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights
--that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations— of
anyone else" (p. 220).
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expense of the development of other
people.
And
even .0 himself there is a full
equivalent
in
the
be oxer development of the social
part of his nature
S
e by the restraint put upon
the*™’
s:Si^p^t ?ioi
In opposition to this view, it has been
argued by several

philosophers that the general happiness cannot
be maximized by
allowing as much freedom as possible in the
area of self-regarding actions, that maximizing utility and
providing as
much liberty as possible for the satisfaction
of legitimate

desires are incompatible objectives.

However,, all of the

sources of this contention that I’m aware of base
this objection on classical formulations of the theory? 102
and,

although the objection may be valid against classical
forms
of the theory,

it is not applicable to the form of the theory

being dealt with here.

That is, given what is meant by

'individual happiness’ and ’the general happiness,’ it follows that the amount of liberty should be granted which would

insure as many individuals as possible being enabled to pursue their own conceptions of happiness, meaning that as many

as possible should be able to freely perform in the area of

self-regarding actions.
Thus, for example, Robert Paul Wolff argues for inter-

fering with self-regarding actions as follows:
101

Mill, On Liberty

102 -,

,

p.

63.

For v/hat is meant by "classical formulations of the
theory," see pp. 1-2,
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...oho very best way in the world to
increase
social sum of happiness would be to interfere this
exuensiveiy in people's lives, prodding them toquite
do~
xne things that will bring them happiness,
stopping
them from imprudent or self-defeating actions
which
xnreaten to make them unhappy, 1^3
.

However, this kind of interference is justified only
if we're dealing with a classical formulation of
the theory,
in which the question as to what comprises individual
hap-

piness and the best means to it is assumed to be closed;
if
it may well be true that the general happiness will be

so,

maximized by sometimes interfering with self-regarding actions; i.e., on the grounds that we assume that we know what

will make people happy.

However, if we're not permitted to

proceed on the assumptions that the content of individual

happiness is something other than "whatever is legitimately
desired for its own sake" and that we know which are the best

means for attaining happiness

— something

which is clearly

disallowed by our theory-then one is not justified, as

Wolff supposes, in interfering with self-regarding actions.

For it is only by not preventing people from engaging in such
actions, whenever possible, that the general happiness can be
104
maximized.
.

.

,

103

Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston
The Beacon Press, 1968 ), p. 8,
104
A much more extensive defense of- the claim that
people should have the right to pursue the objects of their
legitimate desires (should have liberty in the area of selfregarding actions) can be found below in the sub-section
titled "Mill's Commitment to the Right of Liberty," pp. 17781, and especially the sub-section titled "The Justifiable
Extent of Liberty," pp. 181-191. This position is also
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It can be concluded, then, that
insofar as non-inter-

ference with pursuing the objects of
one’s legitimate desires
is a necessary condition for realizing
individual happiness;
and insofar as the latter’s being possible
for everyone is
a necessary condition for maximization
of the general happiness, it follows that the utilitarian using
P

£

as his ethi-

cal principle must justify the pursuit of
individual happiness
as a universal right and respecting that
right as a duty binding on everyone.

If our duty, as utilitarians, is to maximize the general happiness— where this is understood to be "the
sum of

individually happy people" and where individual happiness is
to be regarded as "whatever is legitimately desired
for its

own sake
ate wi

til

it is obvious that we can do so only if we opera principle of utility which defines rightness and

obligation in accordance with the above analyses.

P

can

now be more precisely formulated as follows:
X is right IFF X is intentional a.nd X satisfies one
or more legitimate desires of one or
more persons.

Corresponding to the discussion of obligation above,
X is obligatory IFF X is right; the desire or desires
to be satisfied by X is (are) a
member(s) of the class of desires

brief ly argued on pp. 158-59*
The last-mentioned sub-section
deals with another specific objection to utilitarianism-John .Rawls’ claim that the theory cannot justify the degree
of liberty and non-interference required to account for certain principles of justice.

14 ?

not to be harmed; among the real
alternatives for the agent, X is
uhe only action wnich will
result
in preventing the most harm.
.

This principle of obligation would seem
to have the
unfortunate result that one could be in a
position of seeing
someone who v/as unknowingly about to be
harmed and yet not
be obligated to do anything to try
to prevent it because the
person had no desire, at the time, not to be
harmed.
Consequently, we must add that what is intended
here is that
the person about to be harmed either has
the desire not to
be harmed or we have good reason to believe
has the desire

or would have the desire if sufficiently aware of
the im-

pending events, etc.

Similar objections regarding the ir-

rational and insane can be handled by adding, similarly, that
we have good reason to believe one would have the desire
if

rational or sane.

It should also be noted that by "desires

not to be harmed" is merely meant desires which can, in
fact, be characterized as those in which the actual content
or

object is "not to be harmed."

What is not meant is that

the content or the object of the desire is something else
(e.g., food or money), and that desires like these are not
10 ^
to be harmed.
In other words, desires are satisfied or

In the first two pages of Chapter III the distinction
is made between " justified” desires not to be harmed" and "unjustified desires not to be harmed." It is also demonstrated
early in the chapter that, for the purpose of dealing specifically with justice, our utilitarian theory regards "harm"
as "a violation of rights," so that "desires not to be harmed"
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unsatisfied; only people are harmed.
is mean

u

By ’’real alternative”

an alternative action which the agent is aware

of and aole to perform.”

With this qualification, the prin-

ciple of obligation is in accordance with the "ought
implies
can” principle, and so does not require, as an agent's
dutv,

something which he is unable to do.
It is essential to realize that one is not to infer

from the above that the greater the number of legitimate desires satisfied, the greater the quantity of happiness produced,

If we re not in the position, as finite moral agents,
'

to say what happiness is,

it seems obvious that we’re also

not In the position of being able to embrace the extremely

simplistic vi ew that if someone has more desires satisfied
than another, he is the happier of the two.

Consequently,

we can say that it is always right, ceteris paribus

,

to

satisfy legitimate desires, but it is not necessarily the
case that the more legitimate desires that are satisfied,
the greater the amount of happiness produced.

turn out to be "desires not to have one's rights violated."
these rights are is made more precise in the rest of
the chapter.
106
Narveson makes this mistake on pp. 92-93 of Moral ity and Utility when speaking of "objective moral value,”
as part of the formulation of the principle of utility.
V/here X and Y are variables which range over any set of acts
which are alternatives to each other on any particular occasion of choice, he says that X has more objective moral
value than Y if, and only If, X produces a greater net
amount of v/hat is valued by those affected than Y produces.
It should be noted that, although Narveson attempts to develop principles of rightness and obligation in Morality and
V/hat
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m

conclusion, the relationship between

tive Rightness-^ and P
lows:

Whereas P

ligatory/

1

2

P,

and Objec-

and Objective Rightness,-, is as fol-

indicates which actions (right and ob-

will maximize the general happiness, as defined

-

)

in the account of Objective Rightness^, P

2

indicates which

actions (right and obligatory) will maximize the general
happiness, as defined in the account of Objective Rightness
The major difference between

^

^-

s

P-j^

and ?

2

2

is that by appealing

'theoretically impossible for a finite moral

agent to know which particular actions (right or obligatory)
will maximize the general happiness in accordance with Objective Rightness^; whereas by appealing to ?

2

it is not

theoretically impossible for a moral agent to know which

particular actions (right or obligatory) will maximize the
general happiness in accordance with Objective Rightness 2<
Once again, P^ merely serves to indicate possible discrep-

ancies between what the agent judges as right or obligatory
in accordance with P 9 and what is metaphysically right or

obligatory in accordance with P^.
In other words, to operate with P^ is to operate with
a principle that a finite moral agent cannot employ for de-

termining the rightness or wrongness of particular actions,
etc,, because in order to do so he would need to know both

what happiness is in fact and what the nature and/or extent

Utility in some ways similar to those developed above, they
are significantly different in that they are seriously inadequate in many respects and are not argued for in the same
way

.
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of the consequences of his actions are.

And as it has been

arguea that this is theoretically impossible
for him, to
employ ? is nothing other than to speculate
(what has been
1
rei erred to as metaphysical speculation).
On the other hand,
operating with P^, he is employing principles of
rightness
and obligation which are based on the empirical
evidence

available as to what individual happiness is ("whatever
is
desired for its own sake") and which enable him to determine
which actions are right, wrong, or obligatory in accordance
with those principles.

Because

is formulated on the basis

of available empirical evidence and can be employed by agents

for determining the moral status of particular actions, it
is sai e

to

say that, v/hereas to employ

is a wholly specu-

lative process, to employ P is not; with P
£

2

there is no

metaphysical speculation involved. 10 ^
107

Professor Robert Ackermann has noted a possible
problem.
If Objective Rightness 2 represents the attempts
of finite. (non-omnisc lent ) moral agents to determine what
is right in the sense of Objective Rightnessq, then, since
P2 and Pq are formulated with reference to these senses of
rightness, respectively, there may be a serious problem in
determining which specific rights P 2 should be formulated
with reference to. For two moral agents may legitimately
disagree about what specific human rights should be established, because the best evidence for each suggests divergent sets of rights. If, in reply, it is insisted that
the total evidence, if available to both, would resolve
the problem, it's not clear how P 2 differs from Pq, which
has been argued is vacuous because of unascertainable metaphysical commitments. On the other hand, in the absence
of more evidence or agreement as to what the evidence is,
P2 is still problematically vacuous with respect to the
establishment of particular rights. And although this may
not be so much of a problem with respect to the general
.
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Sub-section III-F: J ustice--associated with only one
ox

.

the p rinciples

.

Before concluding this chapter, it is to

be noted that if we accept Mill's assertion
that justice is

the adherence to, and injustice is the violation
of, a right

or

justified as such by the principle of utility,

ohe concept of justice we're concerned about
is associated

with P

2

and not at all with

P^

First, P

1

is formulated

only with reference to actions and specifies the conditions

under v/hich an action is metaphysically or objectively
right.

As such (and as previously noted) the only function

P^ serves in the theory is to indicate a possible discrep-

ancy between what is right, in fact, and that which the
agent judges as right on the basis of the only principle
he can successfully employ, P^.

Second, even if it makes

sense to say that acts can also be judged metaphysically

rights to life and liberty, it might be so when one begins
to consider particular liberties (which liberties there
should be in a particular society, and/or how much, is discussed on pp. 181-91 of Chapter III). This may be a serious problem, but I think it can only be replied at this
point that the theory I develop does rest on the assumption
that, although there may be difficulty at times in resolving
these disputes, there can be sufficient agreement about what
the available evidence is, and what follows from it, with
respect to the establishment of particular rights. This is
the kind of problem which I think (and which I believe Mill
thought) can only be resolved empirically (also see footnote on p.16 6)
On -the other hand, if it is maintained
that metaphysical disputes may arise as to what "evidence"
is and that these may be irresolvable, then P 2 could perhaps turn out, in the long run, to be as metaphysically problematic as Pi.
.

^^See Chapter

V of "Utilitarianism," pp.

240-259
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just according to

that P

and that it therefore makes
sense to say

can be used to establish rights
from a metaphysical
perspective, it is theoretically
impossible for a finite
1

moral agent to know which acts are
just, for the same reasons
(noted previously) that it is impossible
to know which acts
are merely right.
However, since P is formulated for
the
£
purpose of specifying the conditions under
which an action
is right for an agent (on the basis
of Objective Rightness )
2

and so is formulated with reference to
both acts and agents
in a way that P
is not, P
is also capable of being used
]L
2
to establish and

justify rights (as with the universal right

to the pursuit of individual happiness, above).

can be derived and justified by P

g

,

As rights

so can justice.

Fi-

nally, there is a very significant consideration
which has
to do with punishment.

If it is unjust to violate someone’s

right(s), it also constitutes an action which we ordinarily
feel merits punisnment of some kind (indeed, Mill advances
this position in the last chapter of "Utilitarianism”).
Now, as it would be absurd to consider punishing someone for

not complying with obligations specified by p

but not at

all for not complying with those derivable from P
0

,

it is

obvious, again, that justice can only be considered with

reference to P 2#
It must be concluded from all of this that it is not

possible to consider any inferences from P^ as incompatible
with our intuitions regarding justice from anything other
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than a metaphysical perspective

— if

at all

— since

have nothing to do with justice in any other sense.

can

Conse-

quently, although it may be possible to reject the theory

from considerations of justice based on P
in Section II 01

1

(such as those

chis chapter), this would be a rejection

on metaphysical grounds alone.

perspective of the theory

From the non-metaphysical

— which

we are interested in as

moral philosophers searching for an intuitively acceptable

agent-oriented ethical theory
1*2

— it

is only with reference to

that we can determine whether or not utilitarianism is

compatible with justice.

If it turns out that P does not
2

sanction agents' performing unjust actions, it must be concluded that the theory is unobjectionable in this respect.

With this is mind, we proceed to Chapter III to consider
P 9 in more detail and, finally,

in Chapter IV, to deal

specifically with the problems of distributive justice.

CHAPTER

III

THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY AND THE NECESSARY
CONDITIONS FOR HAPPINESS
...it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or rejection, that the formula should he
correctly understood. I believe that the very
imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meani n S»^is the chief obstacle which impedes its
reception; and that could it be cleared, even from
only the grosser misconceptions, the question
would be greatly simplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed.

Section

I

Harm as a Violation of Rights
As P

2

has been formulated, it would be right to satisfy

legitimate desires but obligatory to satisfy, whenever possible, those legitimate desires which are of the class of de-

sires not to be harmed.

However, as it is a fact that there

can be erroneous conceptions as to
is not,

v/hat

is harmful and what

it is necessary to differentiate clearly within this

category between those desires not to be harmed which are justified and those which are not.

Roughly, we can say that a

desire not to be harmed is justified only if it is held with

respect to something which is, in fact, harmful; all other

’Mill

"Utilitarianism,"
15 ^

p.

208.
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2

desires not
justified

uo

be harmed being correctly classified as un-

.

oy definition of right action, it is also true that a

desire not to be harmed is justified only if it is a legiti-

mate desire, all illegitimate desires not to be harmed being
unjustified.

V/ith

this in mind, our principle of obliga-

tion can now be more accurately formulated:
X is obligatory IFF X is right; the desire or desires
to be satisfied by X is (are) member(s) of the class of justified
desires not to be harmed; among
the real alternatives for the
agent, X is the only action which
will result in preventing the most
harm.

Our principle of obligation is of little value until
the meaning of a

more precise.

”

justified desire not to be harmed" is made

Since the problem of justice is the one we are

specifically concerned about, the task is somewhat simplified.

For although there are perhaps occasions on which one may be
justly treated and yet harmed, we need only concern ourselves
2

.

m

This distinction is
accordance with Mill, who
wanted to disallow that something like disapprobation could
be regarded as harm.
3
-'in

the formula for rightness, it now appears that one
can have a legitimate desire which is other-regarding and
harmful, since it is possible that a desire not to be harmed,
if satisfied, may result in someone’s being physically restrained, shot, etc. However, as harm is to be discussed in
terms of a violation of rights, we can often speak of one who
violates the rights of others as forfeiting his own right(s)
not to be physically abused, etc. Consequently, since his
rights are forfeited, there are none violated and he is not
harmed
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wi uh ohcse harmful acts which can he categorized
as injustices

Generally, we will regard an act of harm which is an
injustice
as Mill did-~as the violation of someone's right(s).

For our

purposes, therefore, we will say that "A desire is a
justified

desire not to he harmed if, and only if, it is a desire
which
can correctly he described as a desire not to he treated
unjustly

,

where

1

to he treated unjustly" is to he interpreted

as "to have one or more of one's rights violated."^

Mill's adherence to the position that justice has to do
with rights is made clear in Chapter V of "Utilitarianism."

Referring to the distinction between what he refers to as
"perfect" and "imperfect" obligations, he says:
Now. it is known that ethical writers divide moral
duties into two classes, denoted by the ill-chosen
expressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect
obligation; the latter being those in which,' though
the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of
performing it are left to our choice; as in the case
of charity or benef icience which we are indeed bound
to practise, but not towards any definite person, nor
at any prescribed time.
In the more precise language
of philosophic jurists, duties of perfect obligation
are those duties in virtue of which a correlative
riaht resides in some person or persons; duties of
imperfect obligation are those moral obligations
which do not give birth to any right.
I think it
will be found that this distinction exactly
,

Once again, the desire is one v/hich has as its object
"not to be harmed" or "not to be treated unjustly" or "not
to have one or more of one's rights violated."
Consequently,
it is not to be interpreted as a desire, having something
else as its object, v/hich can be harmed or treated unjustly,
etc.
Again, it does not seem to make much sense to speak
of desires in these ways; they are, among other things,
either satisfied or unsatisfied; but only sentient beings
can be harmed, treated unjustly, etc.
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coincides with that which exists between
justice and
°hs other obligations of morality.
'To

say that someone has a right is to say
that:

...he has a. valid claim on society to
protect him in
the possession of it, either by the force
of law, o^
by that of education and opinion.
If he has what we
consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account,
to
have something guaranteed to him by society,
we say
he
a
"t 0
it.
If we desire to prove
at ^ything does not belong to him by right,
thinx this done as soon as it is admitted that v/e
society ought not to take measures for securing
it to
him, ou o should leave it to chance, or to
his own
exertions.

^

.

Mill justifies rights in terms of general utility.
have a right, then, is,

I

"To

conceive, to have something which

society ought to defend me in the possession of.

objector goes on to ask why it ought,

reason than general utility."

I

If the

can give him no other

In fact, the kind of utility

that the assigning and protection of rights provides for is

security, ".. .to everyone's feelings the most vital of all in-

terests."

Moreover, security is regarded by Mill as a neces-

sary condition for happiness.

"Nearly all other earthly

benefits are needed by one person, not needed by another; and

many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or
replaced by something else; but security no human being can

possibly do without."

It is not, however, a sufficient con-

dition, as he goes on to mention physical nutriment as another.
5

.

uMill, "Utilitarianism," P. 247.
^Mill,

"Utilitarianism,"

p.

250.
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"Now this most indispensible of all
necessaries, after physical nutriment, cannot be had, unless
the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active
play .” 7

hill

s

position can be better understood within the

context of the theory attributed to him in
the previous chapter.
If tne concept of the general happiness
is to be understood as the sum of all those who are
individually happy,
then a necessary condition for the maximization
of the general happiness is as many people as possible
attaining in-

dividual happiness (the ideal state of general hanpiness
being one in which everyone is individually happy)

.

How-

ever, because the theory is also committed to the
position

tna t what happiness is, in fact, is an open question (or
should be treated as such), no one conception of happiness

(within the bounds of legitimacy) is to be looked upon, for
the purposes of morality, as better than any other.

Conse-

quently, the general happiness would be most effectively

maximized by providing everyone

— so

far as possible

— with

an equal right to whatever conditions are necessary for
the attainment, by anyone, of individual happiness.

These

conditions can more accurately be referred to as 'universally

necessary conditions for happiness,' the conditions which
every individual must have satisfied in order to be happy.
We can say, then, that this is what it means to say (as was

7

Mill,

"Utilitarianism,” pp. 250-251.
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said on pp.

142-143) that everyone has an equal right
to the
pursuit oi happiness, i.e., that they have
an equal right to
the conditions which are universally
necessary for its attain
O
ment
As no ued

,

one of the necessary conditions recognized

by Mill is security.

It is evident from several passages in

the chapter that what he means by this is that
a necessary

condition ior happiness is the knowledge that one will
not be
harmed unnecessarily 9 and that a necessary condition for
the

latter is establishing not being harmed as a general right,
such that anyone for whom this right is unjustifiably 10 vio-

lated is also treated unjustly.

However, to know that every-

one has a general right not to be harmed is not very helpful
so far as knowledge ol
it is desirable

to

specific obligations is concerned, and

determine the specific rights everyone can

.Hereafter, the term 'necessary condition,
unless
otherwise specified, v/ill be used to mean 'universally necessary condition.
'

1

oy

See Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 255, in which reference
in this context, to "the moral rules which forbid
mankind to hurt one another." Also, p. 256;
"Thus the
moralities which protect every individual from being harmed
by others .... Now it is these moralities primarily, v/hich
compose the obligations of justice."
is made,
.

10

.

Unnecessarily' and 'unjustifiably' are added as quali
f.ications because, as will soon be noted in explanation of
the principle of obligation, there is one condition under
which utilitarian theory must sanction the violation of
others' rights--when all of the alternative actions involve
violating at least one right; in this case, one is obligated
to choose the action which does the least amount of harm;
i.e., usually, which violates the least number of rights.
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^

^ ve

violations Ox which would constitute
specific
kinds of harm.
In other words, the important
question with
which we must deal is, "What, specifically,
are the necessary
conditions for happiness which can be established
as
*

rights—

as necessary conditions for the general
right to security—

and violations of which are to be regarded
as injustices?"
In answering this question we will be able to
determine what
some of the desires are which are such that they
are
justi'

fied desires not to be harmed,' thereby giving
substantive

content to both the general right to security and the
principle of obligation.
The principle of rightness and the principle of obli-

gation have been formulated so as to insure that, by acting
in accordance with them, the general happiness (as defined

for Objective Rightness^) will be maximized.

In the last

three pages it has been argued that the general happiness

can be maximized if, and only if, the "rights" referred to
in the principle of obligation are interpreted as rights to
the universally necessary conditions for individual happiness.

Further on, a corollary to the principle of obligation will
be formulated which will specify the conditions under which

these rights can be violated.

Although the above defense of

rights as rights to universally necessary conditions for

happiness provides a general utilitarian account of rights
which

I

think is clearly not circular, it will be a sig-

nificant part of the purposes of that which follows, in
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speaking of the specific rights to the universally
necessary

conditions for happiness (life, liberty, etc.), to insure
thal

uhe utilitarian account of them will continue to
be

non-circular.

worked with,

Given the particular utilitarian theory being
I

am confident that doing so will pose no major

problem.

Section II
The Right to Life

Having noted in the last section that harm is to be regarded as a violation of rights and a right is a universally

necessary condition for happiness, Sub-section II-A of this
section will demonstrate that, with life as an obviously

necessary condition for happiness, we can develop a corollary
to the principle of obligation which specifies the conditions

under which life can justifiably be taken.

In Sub-section

II-B, it will be demonstrated that no necessary condition

for happiness can justifiably be sacrificed for conditions
for happiness which are either not necessary or not univer-

sally necessary conditions; in other words, it will be shown

why the corollary developed above with respect to life alone
must be generalized so as to encompass all necessary conditions for happiness.

As a result, violating rights only in

accordance with the corollary results in no incompatibility
with intuition.

Sub-section II-A:

a corollary to the principle of
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o

oligation

Though not mentioned specifically hy
Mill, one
of the most obviously necessary
conditions for happiness is

lue.

.

ho temporal being could be happy if it
were not alive

and no xhmg without life could possibly
be happy.

sition,

The propo-

"If one is happy then he is alive" is
analytically

true.

Life is also a necessary condition for whatever
other
conditions are necessary for happiness. As a necessary
con-

dition for happiness, establishing life as a right
for everyone allows us to deal with the problem of the
right to
life

in a way which is intuitively unobjectionable.

Before turn-

ing to other matters we will diverge for a time to consider

this
In the second section of Chapter II, it was noted that
a strictly metaphysical view of actions from the standpoint
of utilitarianism allowed us to infer that killing someone

would be a right action whenever (generally speaking) the

general happiness would be maximized by doing so. 11

This

seemed to be grossly inconsistent with our moral intuitions

until it was later pointed out (last part of Section III)
that what the theory implies metaphysically about the right-

ness of actions is not necessarily identical with what it

allows moral agents to do without reprehension.

when we made the distinction between

Pi

,

Consequently,

formulated with

reference to metaphysical rightness (Objective Rightness^)

^For
back to pp.

the specific conditions which allow this, turn
71-72 of Section II of the last chapter.
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and P^, lormula^ed on the basis of the
evidence a finite

moral agent has regarding metaphysical rightness
(Objective
Rightness ), it became apparent that whether or not
the theory
2
resulted in inconsistencies with intuition can
only be judged

on the basis of the latter; i.e., knowing what
is right via
?! is theoretically impossible, an agent's only being able
to know what is right according to P

2

;

therefore, if apply-

ing the latter principle results in any incompatibility
with

intuition, we concluded that we are justified in rejecting

utilitarianism as an unacceptable ethical theory; if it does
not, we are not.

At this point,

it has been established that among the

'justified desires not to be harmed' are desires, in general,

not to have one's rights violated and that one of the specific
rights that has been justified as a necessary condition for

happiness is the right to life; moreover, the latter also
serves as a necessary condition for every other condition

which is necessary for happiness.
to life being what it is,

The importance of the right

it is necessary to establish a

corollary to the principle of obligation.
A right or rights to life can be violated if, and only
if (1) all the alternative actions on the occasion of choice

involve harms, and either (2) taking life results in the
least amount of harm, where alternative harms are violations
of the right to life or necessary conditions for life,
1

2

or

By necessary conditions for life is meant subsistence
items (food, water, shelter, sometimes medicine, etc.).
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there is sufficient evidence to indicate
that taking life
is the only alternative for obtaining
one of the other neces(3)

sary conditions for happiness and that
production of this is
sufficient compensation for taking life.
In any situation
whlch these conditions are satisfied, it would
be contrary
to intuition not to take life; under any
other conditions, taking life would be contrary to intuition.
It is desirable to

m

consider some examples.

Consider the following, which satisfies (1) and the first
disjunct of (2). The president of a small country is aware
of

the fact that a much more powerful enemy is erroneously
con-

vinced that one

o_l

his cabinet officials has been a spy and

so they are demanding that he must be surrendered for execu-

tion or they will engage a war, in the event of which the

smaller nation will be inundated, and it is a certainty that

thousands

oj.

its inhabitants will be killed.

If, no matter

what kind of evidence is produced to establish the official's
innocence, the enemy disregards it, it would be irrational
and contrary to intuition if the president did not decide to

sacrifice the official.

In other words, given that life is

a necessary condition for whatever else is a necessary con-

dition for happiness, that taking it is an irreversible action
and

that no one's life (according to the theory) is to be re-

garded as intrinsically better than another for moral considerations, this is the only alternative that can be sanctioned via

? -~as it would clearly result in the least amount of harm-2
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and ths only alternative that any
norally sane person can
regard as compatible with intuition.
lhe same example can be altered to
satisfy (1) and the

second disjunct of (2) if we suppose that
the extrinsic worth
of ohe cabinet official is such that he
is the only man in the
country possessing sufficient knowledge and
skill to insure
that the people ol the nation can be assured
of subsistence,
i.e., enough of the staples of life to assure
their continued

existence.

In this case, his execution at the hands of the

enemy would mean that a very large number of the
people of
his country would eventually starve to death.

Because his

extrinsic worth is such that his continued existence in the

country is necessary for maintaining a necessary condition
i.

or life,

ii

there is a greater likelihood that more people

in the country would starve to death than would be killed in
an enemy attack, the justifiable move in this case would be
to go to war.

Numbers (1) and (3) are satisfied if it is supposed
that the official's extrinsic worth is such that his con-

tinued existence and service to his country are necessary
for preserving certain liberties for the inhabitants of the
country.

This might be the case, for example, if someone

opposing the president is desirous of becoming a tyrannical

dictator and this man is the only one with sufficient prestige and power to prevent him from doing so.

If these lib-

erties are necessary conditions for happiness and if all or
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most of the inhabitants would lose them
if the official were
surrendered, the president would be justified
in choosing war
if he could determine (in satisfying
that
(
3 ))

there is suf-

ficient evidence to indicate that this action
is the only alternative for obtaining--in this case, maintaining--these

lib-

erties and That xheir production or maintenance
is sufficient

compensation for lives that will be lost.^^
Sub- section II-B: violation of any right-- justified
fb r-y
.

i

.

— —

Ue—corollary

j-

.

It is important to realise, however,

chat although an agent would on some occasions be
justified

in sacrificing life for one of the other necessary con-

ditions for happiness, one would never be justified in

sacrificing life or any other necessary condition for
13

there is great difficulty involved in determining
when (3) is satisfied, as the concept of 'sufficient evidence' is difficult--perhaps impossible in this case to make
precise, .Although it is surely true that one would sometimes
be justified in sacrificing life for actualizing or maintaining one or more of the other necessary conditions for happiness, decisions in these cases must, unfortunately be left to
the judgment of the moral agent deciding.
I know of no way to
set up a calculus on the basis of
to equate so many lives
to so much of other necessary conditions for happiness; it is
only clear that sometimes such sacrifices would be necessary
and. morally justifiable.
This points out, I suppose, that
ethical theories are unlike mathematical theories in that it
is not possible to calculate with the precision of the mathematician, and so mathematical theories are unrealistic models
ior ethical theories. However, as Mill pointed out, not being
able to calculate in this way is not attributable to a defect
of the theory, but to the complicated nature of the world;
"It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated nature of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so
framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind
of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory
or always condemnable" ("Utilitarianism," p. 225).
.

—

,

f
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the purpose of satisfying one or
more conditions for happiness which are not necessary.

By a ’condition for happiness which
is not a necessary
condition,’ is meant ’one for which there
are adequate substitutes or for which there is some chance
that it can be re-

placed by an adequate substitute.’

This is in contrast to

necessary conditions for happiness, for which
there are no
adequate substitutes and no chance that they can
be adequately
replaced. For example, Jones might adequately
substitute love

for money as a condition for his happiness, but there
is nothing ohat can adequately replace his life as a necessary
condi-

tion for happiness.

Because of the absence of adequate subs-

titutes, a utilitarian of the kind we have been discussing

would not oe justiiied in sacrificing one or more necessary

conditions lor happiness for one or more conditions for happiness which are not necessary.
I

suppose it is possible that there are some conditions

for happiness which are necessary conditions for some but
not all people, i.e,, that there are some necessary condi-

tions which are not universally necessary conditions for
happiness.

However, knowing that universally necessary con-

ditions for happiness cannot be adequately replaced but not

knowing that any other condition claimed to be necessary for

happiness (though not universally necessary) could not be

adequately substituted, our utilitarian theory would not justify, on any occasion, sacrificing one or more of the former
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for one or mors of the latter.
mif.hu claim that

Thus, for example, Smith

money is a necessary condition for his

happiness and that, since Jones has enough to
make him happy,
he contends his killing Jones and taking
his money
is justi-

fied on utilitarian grounds; since there is
only one happy
man in either case, what difference does it make?
However,
a utilitarian proceeding rationally, on the
basis of the evi-

dence he has available to him, would reason that he knows

Jones

life could not be adequately replaced but does not

know that Smith's desire for Jones' money (or even his
general desire for money) could not be replaced

consequently,

his only justifiable choice would be to condemn Smith's action.

And this reason is in addition to all the often-used

utilitarian arguments that could be revived with respect to
a diminishment of security if such actions were allowed;

providing a greater chance that such actions will occur
again because of the damage done to Smith's character, the
bad example he sets for others, if seen, etc.

The last two paragraphs can perhaps be made clearer by
the following considerations.

If the necessary conditions

for happiness are, like life, conditions that everyone must
have satisfied in order to attain happiness, and if the general happiness is the sum of all those individuals who are
14

Of course, it should be, if possible, since finding a
suitable substitute one which did not involve abusing others
--would obviously be more conducive to the individual happiness of others, and, consequently, the general happiness.

—
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happy,

.hen the general happiness is at a
maximum only when

everyone is happy.

This means that the general happiness

can be maximized, in this sense, only if the
necessary conditions for happiness are satisfied.
In other words, when
we speak of the necessary conditions for
individual happiness,
we are also speaking about the necessary
conditions for maximizing the general happiness. 15 Thus, for example,
if we

sanctioned killing Jones in order to take his property
and
give it to others because this would maximize happiness

in

°he

particular situation, this would constitute an extremely

short-sighted approach to the maximization of the general happiness.

Just as one advocating hedonism is not committed to

maintaining that one should be satisfied with the pleasures
of the moment but would sometimes be justified in concluding

that future pleasures would be more worthwhile

,

so utilitari-

anism is not committed to maintaining that one should do

whatever possible in particular situations to make as many
people as happy as possible (even if this involves violating
rights)
It must be remembered that utilitarianism requires that
we maintain those conditions which will best serve to maximize

the general happiness in the long run.
15

.

As was previously

With reference to the corollary above this means that
if, ^as utilitarians, we say that violating the right to life
is justifiable we mean that its violation is a necessary condition for maximizing the general happiness; which means, in
turn, that the conditions specified by the corollary above
are satisfied.
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noted, after defining Objective
Rightness,,, the best way
(means) so maximizing the general
happiness in the Iona run
would be to allow everyone, so far as
possible, to pursue
individual happiness; what we are saying
presently is that
what this really amounts to (and what Mill
really meant by
this) is providing everyone, so far as
possible, with the

necessary conditions for happiness, and regarding
them as
nights which can only be violated when the conditions

speci-

fied by the corollary above are met.

In other words, on the

basis of available evidence as to what is right (Objective
nigh tness^ )

,

the general happiness can be maximized in the

long run only if

ohe

necessary conditions for happiness are

acquired or maintained for everyone, so far as possible; it
cannot be if they are sacrificed for the maximization of the

general happiness in the short

run— in particular

situations.

What this means for our example is that, although the general

happiness would be maximized in the particular situation for
a short time, Jones' happiness could never be attained; by

making Jones’ happiness impossible, we also render impossible maximizing the general happiness in the sense in which
it includes Jones’ happiness and so constitutes maximization
ox

the general happiness in this larger sense

— in

the long

run.

Most importantly, if it is claimed, as it usually is,
that utilitarians are under an obligation to provide for

other people's happiness (which sometimes requires the
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sacru ice

of necessary for non-necessary
conditions for hap-

piness) it raust he emphasized that our
utilitarian theory is
committed to maintaining that they are not. 16
Yet,

to regard,

if we are

as our obligation, violating rights to
the necessary

conditions for happiness in order to satisfy
desires which are
not directed toward necessary conditions
for happiness,
this

would be to suppose that our duty is to make other
people happy, that they have a right against us regarding happiness.
Consequently, if we consider it an obligation to take life
for the purpose of satisfying such desires, it is apparent
that we are no longer subscribing to the utilitarian theory

developed thus far, but rather, to some other ethical theory. 1 ^
Finally, we concluded in the last chapter that our ob-

ligation is not to make other people happy but rather to prevent them from being harmed whenever possible; i.e,, to pre-

vent them from having their rights violated.
ing this as an obligation was justified

— on

Again, assert-

the basis of Ob-

jective Rightness^—as the best means for maximizing the general happiness in the long run.
lb
17

See pp.

m

Consequently

,

we could not

137-142.

For
any situation in which we regard this as our
obligation, we are subscribing to the theory that not the general happiness, but some person's or group of persons' desires
should be maximized. In fact, it v/ould perhaps be correct to
say that doing so would be to suppose that the question as to
what happiness is, is closed, at least on particular occasions;
that our duty on some occasions is to cater to particular conceptions of happiness, something which is clearly disallowed by
the utilitarian theory which has been developed.
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even say that sacrificing necessary
conditions for happiness
to provide others with the objects of
other desires is right
To do so would be to disregard our obligation
by satisfying
illegitimate desires; for their satisfaction v/ould
involve
harming others when it is not the case that all
the alternatives involve harms.
±

o

.

summarize, according to our utilitarian theory one

would never be justified in sacrificing universally
necessary

conditions for happiness for conditions which are not necessary
or not universally necessary because of the following
reasons;
(a)

it could never be our obligation to do so, since we have

demonstrated previously that no one has a right to be happy;

consequently we have no correlative obligation to see that
they are.

(b)

For those conditions for happiness which are

not necessary, there are adequate substitutes or at least a

chance that adequate substitutes can be found, whereas this is

not the case for universally necessary conditions.

Since we

are interested in maximizing the general happiness in the

largest sense

— where

everyone is happy in the long run--we

could not be justified in sacrificing those conditions for

which no adequate substitutes can be found.

(c)

If there are

necessary conditions for happiness which are not universally
necessary conditions, we could not be justified in sacrificing
the latter for the former, because we don't know that they are

necessary conditions
cannot be found)

.

(

consequently

,

that adequate substitutes

Whereas we do know that adequate substitutes

173

cannot be found for universally
necessary conditions, we
could not be justified in sacrificing
them in this

case for

the same reasons advanced in (b)
above.

(d) As we have dem-

onstrated that no one has a right against
us to be happy but
that everyone has a right against us
not to be harmed, 18 it
could not even be right-let alone
obligatory-to sacrifice
universally necessary conditions for those which
are not.
So far we have only specified that life
and the neces-

sary conditions for life are necessary
conditions for happiness.
Before moving on to consider another, it would
be
helpful, perhaps, to provide an example of a situation
in

which it would not be right to sacrifice life in exchange
for other non-necessary conditions for happiness.

For some reason, one is faced with the alternatives
of taking the

people,

li.j.e

of an inventor or two or more ordinary

ihe inventor is responsible for creating many items

of luxury that many people in the society of which he is a
raemoer enjoy, whereas the others combined do not equal his
1

r
it
must ^be remembered that the term "harm'' is beinpused to reier only to ''necessary conditions for happiness"
and that this restriction is made because we are dealing
specifically with justice. Consequently, what is not being
argued for is that Mill maintained that everyone has the rimht
not to be harmed, where the harm referred to includes those
cases of harm where no right is violated (i.e,, where no injustice is committed). First, it seems clear that Mill
thought that people could be harmed without having any of
their rights violated (see, for example, p. ?5 of" 0n Liberty ),
Secondly, it. seems clear that Mill thought that it was sometimes justifiable to harm others in this sense (see, for example, p. 95 of On Liberty ).
Lastly, whether or not Mill
really subscribed to these positions, it is beyond the scope
of what is being argued here to be concerned about it.
,

.
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extrinsic worth to the rest of society.

However, because the

inventor's efforts are such that only a portion
of the population is aDle to benefit from them, and consequently
do not
constitute universally necessary conditions for
happiness, it

would be obligatory to save as many lives as possible
in this
case and not sacrifice the others to save the inventor.
Again, it is not our duty to make others happy, but it is
our

duty to abide by our principle of obligation and the corollary

whenever possible, thereby violating as few rights as possible in this case.
V/e

have observed that not only would it be wrong to

sacrifice life in order to satisfy desires which are not

directed toward necessary conditions of happiness; it would
be wrong to violate any right for the purpose of satisfying

such desires.

The corollary above, which was restricted to

life, can now be stated more generally so as to apply to the

violation of any right whatsoever.

Where rights are restrict-

ed to universally necessary condisions for happiness, where

harms are violations of rights and X is a variable for rights:
X is justifiably violated IFF
all the alternative actions on the occasion
of choice involve harms and either
(2) violating X results in the least amount of
harm, where all of the alternative harms are
violations of X or necessary conditions for
X
or
there
is sufficient evidence to indicate that
(3)
it is the only alternative for obtaining one
of the other necessary conditions for happiness and that production of the latter is
sufficient compensation for violating X.
(1)

,
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What all of this ultimately means, regarding the right
to life,

is that all of the usual objections concerning

scapegoats and sacrificing lives for the purpose of making
other people happy cannot he leveled against the theory, as
has previously been supposed.

The principle of obligation

and its corollary, specifying the conditions under which life

can be taken by a moral agent, are in accord with moral intuition. 19
.

.

Although

is not and,

P-^

seemed inconsistent with intuition,

so far as acceptability of the theory is con-

cerned with respect to this particular problem, this is all
that can reasonably be required.

20

^As these principles also apply to all other rights,
their application is in accord with intuitions concerning
these as well. The intention in that which remains, at
least in part, is to demonstrate this.
20

Professor Ann Brentlinger has commented that F^ m ay
be vacuous; that it would not, for example, enable one to decide whether one's duty is to do everything possible to stop
the U. S. bombing of Cambodia or to continue living much as
Similarly, Professor Robert Ackermann has
as one has been.
suggested that the principle could not clearly choose between
a society based on a form of Marxism or a capitalist society.
For example, many Marxists claim that in capitalist societies
people are misled about what they desire and what is desirable, and there seems to be no way that the employment of P 2
could enable one to decide whether or not to accept^ this
In reply, it must be remembered that the utilitarian
claim.
theory which has been developed here claims to do nothing
more than provide the theoretical framework with which to approach the resolution of moral problems, that the solutions
to problems as complicated as the above are found to be difficult due to the complicated nature of the world, not necessarily due to a defect in the theory (for Mill's statement of
In my
this position, see "Utilitarianism," pp. 225-226).
clearly
think
Mill
what
I
with
judgment- -and in accordance
had in mind what one must do in these situations is (as the
theory prescribes) to judge as best he can the consequences
which would result from the available alternatives and choose
.

—
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Section III
The Right to Liberty
In

L,his

section it will be demonstrated in
Sub-section

III-A that Mill

v/as

committed to the position that liberty

is a necessary condition for happiness
and so is a right,

violation of which constitutes an injustice.
"th 0

the

In Sub-section

question is posed, "How much liberty is justifi-

able by our utilitarian theory?" and the answer
is shown to
be identical with one of John Rawls* principles
of justice.
to act on the one for which there is the greater
probability
that it would produce the best consequences.
For" example,
if the evidence available in the situation suggested that*
the
general happiness would not be maximized if one did do everything. possible to stop the bombing of Cambodia (such as destroying the U. S. government if the opportunity arose)-*- that
more rights to the universally necessary conditions for happiness, will be violated by doing the latter than something
else (i.e., supposing that this conclusion is the result of
appealing to the corollary to the principle
of obligation)
then. one should not regard as one's duty doing everything
possible to stop the U. S. bombing of Cambodia. And whether
a Marxist society is to be judged by a moral agent as better
than a. capitalist one is going to be dependent upon whether
the evidence the agent considers leads to the conclusion that
the Marxist society is better able to provide the conditions
necessary for attaining individual happiness (and/or discovering what it is), and so maximizing,
in the long run, the
general happiness.
(Historically, the evidence would seem to
suggest that it is not, and Mill appealed frequently to the
kind of empirical evidence in his defense of a democratic
free-enterprisc kind of society in On Liberty ). Of course,
one. may choose wrongly (in the metaphysical sense), but as
a. finite (non-omniscient ) moral agent, one can only make decisions on the basis of the best evidence one has available.
Appealing to available empirical evidence was essential to the
development of P2 and is no less essential to its application.
Given the empirically-based theory which has been developed,
I know of no other way for the satisfactory resolution of these
difficulties
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liberty

Mill

'

s

commitment to the right to

There is one other necessary condition
for happiness to consider before turning specifically
to the problem
of distributive justice.
C. L. Ten, in his essay,
.

"Mill on

Self-regarding .actions,"

^

claims to understand what Mill

means by utility which is "grounded in the
permanent interest of man as a progressive being." He
explains it

in terms

of liberty:

Liberty is ^necessary for "the free development of
individuality,' and without liberty "there is wantlne one of the principle ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual
and social progress." Thus Mill is still appealing
to utility or the promotion of human hacpiness as
the standard for appraising the value of liberty.
He also argued that because of the diversity of the
sources of human pleasures and pains and their different effects on different human beings, men will
nei tner ootain their fair share of hapciness, nor
grow up to the mental, moral and aesthetic stature
of which their nature is capable" unless they are
allowed freedom to pursue their own modes of life 22
.

.

Ten is correct up to this point, but he goes on to
claim that, according to Mill,

Liberty is not to be valued because it increases
the sum of total human happiness, for this implies
that the connection between the two is a contingent
one, but because it is a necessary condition for
the growth of individuality. .. .Men must be allowed
to choose for themselves not because this will lead
to an increase in their happiness, but because this
is in itself the most important ingredient of happiness.

And later,
21
22

Philosophy
Ten, p.

35

,

.

XLIII, No. 163 (January, 1968), pp. 29-38.
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ill's reason for allowing liberty in
self-regarding:
actions was not that human happiness would
thereby
-- increased, but that without such
liberty there
can he no "individuality." His defense of
freedom
xo no o in terms of utility, but of
utility in "the
largest sense," i.e., "individuality "23
.

Ii

the previous analysis of what Mill meant by
individu-

al happiness is correct, fen is wrong in
supposing that Mill

did not consider liberty to be a necessary condition
for in-

creasing "the sum total of human happiness" (wh at we have
noted

bO

be what Mill meant by the

he interpreted it,

individuality.

'general happiness'); that

instead, as only a necessary condition for

According to our previous analysis, liberty

is desirable only as a means to happiness because only happi-

ness is intrinsically good; consequently, if liberty is a

means to individuality, individuality is also most plausibly

regarded as an extrinsic good, desirable only as a means to
happiness.

In fact, the passage above by Ten adequately sum-

marizes Mill's concern for liberty as a necessary condition
for individuality.

"...because of the diversity of the

sources of human pleasures and pains and their different ef-

fects on different human beings, men will 'neither obtain their
fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the moral and aesthetic

stature of which their nature is capable* unless they are al-

lowed freedom to pursue their own modes of life."
To suppose that individuality could be regarded as an
'Ten, p.

37.
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intrinsic good, is, at first glance, an absurd utilitarian thesis to attribute to Mill; for, according to Mill, only
happi-

ness is intrinsically good; meaning that, if individuality
is
no

c

a pars of happiness, then,

only be extrinsically good.
Utilitarianism.'

if it is good at all,

it could

This position is made clear in

Having explained that "by happiness is in

tended pleasure, and the absence of pain," Mill says;
...pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only
things desirable as ends; and that all desirable
things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian
as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the
pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to
the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of
pain.

If we dispense with the suggestion that individuality is in-

herently pleasurable, it is clear that Mill could only have
regarded individuality as extrinsically good, as a means to
the only thing which is intrinsically good

— happiness, 2 ^

In all fairness, however, in our analysis of the second half of Mill's proof,

it was pointed out that Mill held

that many things could be (and are) held to be intrinsically

good besides pleasure and that whatever was so regarded was

thought by Mill to be a part of happiness. 26

Consequently,

we say that liberty is a necessary condition for acquiring

whatever is held to be intrinsically good, if there might be
24
9

Mill, "Utilitarianism,"

p.
'

210.

cr

~-^See also On Liberty
p. 63 and the next few pages,
where Mill speaks exclusively of individuality as having
,

ex tr ins i c wo rt h
26
See pp.

97-102.

H
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some who hold individuality to be intrinsically
good, then

lib-r oj is a necessary condition for their
acquiring
1

can go this far with fen.

We

it.

However, to maintain, as does Ten,

that liberty is good as a necessary condition
only for acquiring individuality is untenable.
For it would entail, in this
case, contending that only individuality is or would
be held
to be intrinsically good,
f ac
oj.

u

,

something which is, as a matter of

false, and clearly denied by Mill (given his discussion

intrinsic goodness in the second part of the proof.

)

Even

if Mill considered individuality to be "the most important

ingredient of happiness," as Ten asserts at one point, it is
obvious that there are others and that liberty is a necessary

condition for acquiring these also 27
.

Among other things, Ten has missed what Mill had in
mind by individual happiness, that Mill regarded its content,
for moral purposes, as "whatever is legitimately desired."
Had he noted this, he would also have discovered that, as a

consequence, Mill held that the best way to maximize the num-

ber of people who are individually happy (i.e., the general
happiness) is to grant them whatever conditions are universally
27

It is worth mentioning that Ten’s analysis rests on interpreting Mill as meaning by ’ingredient,' ’part,' rather than
’necessary condition.
However, in the passage Ten quotes in
which Mill says that "without liberty ’there is wanting one of
the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the
chief ingredient of individual and social progress,'" it can
be argued that it is much more plausible to interpret Mill,
in this context, as using 'ingredient' to mean 'necessary condition.
Because it would constitute a lengthy diversion, it
will not be argued here.
'

'
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necessary for pursuing whatever it is they
legitimately desire.

As it turns out, liberty is one of
the necessary conditions.
With happiness understood in this sense,
it is not
at all "misleading to say simply that
On Liberty provides a

utilitarian defense of freedom," a defense
grounded on the
premise that liberty is a necessary condition

for individual

happiness, the maximization of the number of
individually

happy people, and, consequently, the general
happiness.

cording

uo

Ac-

our present terminology, then, liberty is a right,

and one which everyone has equally.

Sub-se ction III-B:

the .justifiable extent of liberty

,

ihe question remains, however, as to how much liberty
is

necessary.

Paradoxically, the general answer is provided by

John Rawls, an anti-utilitarian.

In several articles and

nis recenu book, A Theory of Justice

Rawls arsues for a

.

kind of social contract theory of justice and defends a prin-

ciple of justice which he claims utilitarianism can’t account
for:

"Each person is to have an equal right to the most ex-

tensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for
others
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 60.
The articles referred to are "Justice as Fairness," The Journal of Philosophy LIV, No. 22 (October 24, 1957), pp. 653 662; "The Sense of Justice," Philosophical Review 72 (July,
1963), pp. 231-305; and "Distributive Justice," Philosophy
Politics and Society (3rd Series), ed Peter Laslett and
W. G. Rune iman ( London
Billing & Sons, Ltd,, 1967 ), pp. 58The principle has been formulated somewhat differently
83
in Rawls' articles and is reformulated on p. 250 of A Theory
,

,

,

.

:

.
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It should be apparent, first of all,
that this principle serves as a rather accurate description
of the general
position that Mill was defending in On Liberty 29
For it was
.

t.ill s

concern that everyone should be free

— should

have the

righ t~~to perform those actions which are
self-regarding and
should be restricted only at that point at
which they became
other-regarding and harmful. In other words, "the
most ex-

tensive basic liberty compatible with a similar
liberty for
others" was, for Mill, restricted to the area of
self-regarding actions.

Rawls' principle is descriptive of only the

general position which Mill was defending, however, for the
line between self- and other-regarding actions was thought

by Mill to be the major difficulty.

As he says in the early

part of the first chapter:
All thax makes existence valuable to anyone, depends
on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of
other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore,
must be imposed by lav; in the first place, and by
opinion on many things which are not fit subjects
for the operation of law. V/h at these rules should

Jysbic
As I am making only a general point regarding
Rawls* principle, the slight differences between formulations
are not significant enough to be concerned about.
It should
also be noted that, of his two principles of justice, Rawls
gives priority to this. one. As he says on p/244 of A Theory
of Justice
"The two principles are in lexical order, and
therefore the claims of liberty are to be satisfied first.
Until this is achieved no other principle comes into nlay."
.

^

,

29

It is apparent, that is, as soon as we realize that
the "basic liberties" Rawls is referring to are almost identical with the liberties Mill was concerned about defending in
On Liberty
(See A Theory of Justice p. 6l.)
.

,
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made

ne Principal question in human
affairs:
exce P"t a few of the more obvious cases.
one °~ ^h° se which least urogress has
been
resolving. 30
^
’
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Rawls’ denunciation of utilitarianism is not
surprising,
as his contention is that

"This conception of justice differs

from that of the stricter form of utilitarianism
(Bentham and
Sidgwick) and its counterpart in welfare economics,
which
f

assimilates justice to benevolence and the latter in turn
to
the most efficient design of institutions to promote
the gen-

eral welfare.

^

If this is the kind of utilitarian theory

he is considering, then he is correct in maintaining that,
al-

though his principles of justice can sometimes be justified by

utilitarianism
As an interpretation of the basis of the principles
of justice the utilitarian conception is mistaken.
It can lead one to argue against slavery on the
30

On Liberty p. 5.
There is substantial confirmation
Liberty that Mill was, in fact, arguing generally in
this way for "an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." A
few passages from the essay will suffice as examples.
"The
only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it"
"The liberty of the individual must be thus far lim(p. 12).
ited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.
But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns
them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and
judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons
which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he
should be allowed, without molestation, to carry out his opinions into practice at his own cost" (pp. 55-56).
"As much
compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others,
cannot be dispensed with..." (p. 63 ).
.

in. On

3
J

,

Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," p. 660.
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grounds that the advantages to the slaveholder
do
n ° : counterbalance the disadvantages to the
slave
society at large burdened by a comparatively
mefucient system of labor.
Whereas, he goes on to say, "The conception of
justice as
fairness, when applied to the offices of slaveholder
and
slave, would forbid counting the advantages of
the slave-

holder at all."-^ 2
The utilitarian theory that has been developed thus
far
as the more explicit formulation of what Mill had
in mind

would also disallow "counting the advantages of the slave-

holder at all,"

For, as has been made clear through explana-

tion of the principle of obligation and its corollary, it

would not be justifiable to deprive other human beings of
one of the necessary conditions for happiness--in this case,

liberty— in order

to satisfy particular desires which must

be classified as illegitimate.

The utilitarian theories

Rawls considers perhaps would sanction the objectionable

reasoning concerning slaves and slaveholders.

The one that

has been developed in the preceding pages would not.

The situation can be explained somewhat differently.
One of the criticisms of utilitarianism Rawls offers in

A Theory of Justice is that "there is no reason in principle

why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the
lesser losses of others; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the
32
J
Rawls,

"Justice as Fairness,"

p.

66l,
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greater good shared by the many." 33

if we bear in mind that

he is concerned about classical varieties
of utilitarianism,
we might agree that a metaphysical view
of right actions ac-

cording to these theories might justify this
allegation. Thus,
the "in principle" in the passage may be
interpreted as referring to the principle of utility which

v/as

previously develop-

ed to specify the conditions for metaphysical
rightness (p

)

However, our utilitarian theory, which does not employ
this

principle for the assessment of actions by moral agents,
does
not allow, "in principle," the kind of situation above
which

Rawls suggests,

rrom a non-metaphysical perspective, and

the principle of utility which corresponds to it, the theory
is not subject to Rawls'

objection.

Liberty, then, is another necessary condition for happiness.

However, it might be objected that some people need

very little liberty to attain happiness and that, in general,
the degrees of liberty required are relative to the needs of

particular individuals.

Nevertheless, the amount of freedom

that our utilitarian theory justifies having available to
each individual in society is, in accordance with Rawls'

principle of justice, as much as is compatible with everyone's

having the same amount.

The reasons for this are many.

The

major one is simply based on the many actual and possible conceptions of individual happiness.

Because of the number of

unique individuals and the consequent diversity of individual
33

Rawls, A Theory of Justic e,

p.

26.
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conceptions of happiness, some are obviously
going to require
more lioerty for realizing happiness
than
others.

Consequently,

because our utilitarian theory is committed
to maximizing the
happiness of the greatest number of individuals
and regards
no legitimate conception of individual
happiness as intrin-

sically superior to any other; in a society
in which the variance between individual conceptions of
happiness is such that
some require more freedom for realisation than
others, the

more liberty it is possible to have available (i.e.,
within
tne bounds of compatibility), the greater is the
probability

that all of the people will be happy.

Those requiring the

maximum amount of allowable liberty will have this as a necessary condition for their happiness, as will those who require lesser amounts.

Other

— perhaps

no less important

— reasons

marized from previous discussions of On Liberty
(a)

can be sum:

If it is supposed that what happiness is, in fact, and

the best means to it are in the category of open questions, people should have available to them as much

opportunity as possible to experiment with different
conceptions of happiness and styles of living.

In ac-

cordance with Mill's arguments in On Liberty which

favor the open society as the best means for attaining truth, only under these conditions is the possi34

See the quotation above on p. 178 of this text, which
very much supports the point being made in this paragraph.
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oility maximized, that the truth might
someday be discovered.
Insofar as truth in these matters is desiraoie, a maximum of liberty is the best
means towards
its discovery.
(b)

Even in a society in which what happiness is
and the
best means for attaining it are known, a diversity
of

conceptions of happiness and life-styles is desirable.
For, according to arguments previously examined
from
Oji

Liberty

,

only in an atmosphere wh ere truth has

opposition will it remain alive and not become mere
dogma from the lack of necessity to defend it.

Inso-

far as this is conducive to the maximization of happiness,

it is desirable.

Again, there is a much greater

likelihood of this situation’s existing in a society
with a maximum of possible liberty.
(c)

A maximum of liberty is conducive to individual devel-

opment, which is extrinsically good in that it provides
the best chance for discovery of the conception of hap-

piness and the means to it which best matches one's
potential.

In a manner of speaking, one might not be

as happy in a society with little freedom as he could

be in a society with a great deal more, because in the

latter he is better able to discover the kind of life
he is potentially most capable of enjoying.

Without further argument,

I

think it can be maintained

that utilitarianism can deal adequately w ith Rawls' objections.
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In ana it ion
theory.

,

it may have a significant advantage
over Rawls'

It perhaps allows one to avoid an
important objec-

tion against a social contract theory of
justice.
ply

oo

Rawls

paper,

In his re-

"Justice as Fairness," Everett W. Hall

ha° no oed a serious difficulty.

He considers the problem of

going from "a contract freely entered by
individuals to their
obligation to live up to it," as one involved with
the "is-

ought-distinction.

"

Referring to the contract one enters

into with respect to the principles of justice,
Hall con-

cludes,

"Hume and Bentham played this up:

the notion of a

duty to keep a contract once entered must be there from the
start on the social contract theory.

What is its basis?

Clearly, Mr. Rawls' modernized version is involved in this

deduction of an 'ought' from an 'is.'"^
in contrast, the principle of utility is a normative

ethical principle which justifies one's obligation to abide

by principles of justice, not by the antecedent fact that
one has previously agreed to do so, but because doing so is

more productive of general happiness in the long run.

Inso-

far as a violation of the "is-ought-distinction" is a serious problem (as

I

believe, with Hall, that it is), utilitari-

an theory may have an important edge over Rawls' theory in

possibly being able to avoid it.^

In conclusion,

perhaps

35

Everett W. Hall, "Justice as Fairness: A Modernized
Version of the Social Contract," Journal of Philosophy LIV,
22 (October 24, 195?), pp. 667-668.
,

^

This position is further argued by Hall.

Because this
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right in concluding that

^3-11 is

Rawls is up to differs from what he
l ^am saying that he is doing an
intuixional justification of fairness as hisic to the
concept of social justice as a normative idea,
whereas he explicitly disclaims that he is. 37
^

.

,

v/hat Mr.

LhinKs he is;

There is one other objection by Hall that is worth
noting.

In addition to other criticisms of the social con-

tract theory of justice, Hall also thinks that Rawls is in-

correctly interpreting utilitarian theory when he claims
that according to the theory,

Justice is interpreted as the contingent result of
a higher order administrative decision whose form
is similar to that of an entrepreneur deciding how
is a minor point in contrast with the major thrust of this
sub-section, and is merely mentioned as a -possible advantage over Rawls' theory, I do not v/ish to become involved
in a. lengthy discussion of the "is-ought" problem, relative
to Mill's theory.
Very simply, having concluded in the
first part of the proof that "happiness is desirable," and
in the second part that "happiness is the only thing desirable,” Mill also (at least implicitly) accepted a further
general premise which he thought to be acceptable to reasonable people "whatever is desirable (i.e., good) ought
to be maximized as much as possible,"
In fact, the question, "Why should we maximize v/hat is good?" may be one of
those highly skeptical queries which defies attempts at
"proof" and so cannot be seriously or sensibly dealt with.
Having accepted this general premise, it unproblematically
follows that, if an action is more productive of good (happiness) than any alternative action, then one ought to perform it. What has been argued against Rawls is that a promise made on the basis of a social contract theory is not justified by anything independently good and, consequently, it
is much more difficu-lt
if not impossible--to derive from
"the promise has been made" the conclusion that "the promise
ought to be kept." That is, a premise like the above--"whatever is desirable ought to be maximized as much as possible"
--is not available. At the very least, the "is-ought" problem appears to be much more of a problem for a social contract
theory than a utilitarian theory like Mill's,

—

—

-^Hall, "Justice as Fairness," p. 668-669.
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"

°P tnis or that commodity in
view
evenue or to that of someone discriDUbing goods f
to needy persons according to
th®
relative urgency of their wants. 38
P-

1

0

^

1100

’

(Rawls makes a similar statement about the
nature of these
utilitarian decisions on p. 27 of A Theory of
Justice
As
Hall astutely observes:
.

think it does not in the least help when Mr.
Rawls
talks o± acceptance by the parties involved
and contrasts it with executive decision from above.
In the
±irot place, the latter method of implementing
utilitarianism is not logically demanded by that doctrine.
It might plausibly be argued that the greatest
happiness can only be achieved in an essentially democratic
jy
society
I

.

.

.

.

Insofar as a democratic society is thought of as one
where everyone has at least some rights equally, what Hall
is anticipating here is roughly the kind of society
and the

kind of social justice that results from the employment of
our utilitarian theory.

In other words, not only is Hall

correct in asserting that Rawls' account is "not logically
demanded by' utilitarianism, he is also correct in saying
that "It might plausibly be argued that the greatest happiness
can only be achieved in an essentially democratic society."
In fact, what

I

am contending and what

I

believe Mill was

maintaining is that "an essentially democratic society" is
the only kind of society in which the greatest happiness can
be achieved.
In summary, liberty, like life, is justified by utiliqQ

Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," p. 66l.

19
J
Hall,

"Justice as Fairness,"

p.

668.
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tarian theory as a universal right which
everyone has equally
and which can only he violated according
to the conditions

specniea

in the corollary to the principle of
obligation;

where, once again, not violating the right to
liberty when

these conditions are satisfied is as contrary to
intuition as
violating the right to liberty when they are not.
In addition,

it is obvious that the limit of liberty which
Rawls

has specified as a principle of justice is that which
is

necessary for maximizing the general happiness.

Finally, in

addition to the general happiness being maximized in "an
essentially democratic society," the utilitarian theory we
have developed may have a significant advantage over Rawls'
theory, in that it may be able to avoid objections stemming

from the "is-ought-distinction.

CHAPTER

iv

A UTILITARIAN ACCOUNT OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE

Having established life and liberty as rights,
and
having thereby avoided two objections to the
theory--the

one

that it violates our intuitions concerning
the right to life,
and the other, Rawls' objection, that it cannot
account for
the principle of justice which requires equal
liberty for

an— it

is time to consider the theory's capabilities
for

accounting for principles of distributive justice.

One of

the most forceful attacks against utilitarianism in
this re-

gard is Nicholas Rescher's book, Distributive Justice .^
In

order to narrow the scope of this topic within the bounds of

manageability, much of the discussion which follows will be

focused on Rescher's arguments.
Section

I

Rescher's Objections to Utilitarianism

Distributive Justice is dedicated to demonstrating
that utilitarian theory is inadequate alone to account for

intuitively acceptable principles of distributive justice:
We shall base our inquiry into the principle of distributive justice upon an investigation of the doctrine of utilitarianism.
This doctrine is founded

^(New York:

The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968).
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UW'

01 ? 18
u
Exact as it sounds,
ffiog^principle
classic
is lmrrecise and indeed inadequate.
The first objective of our discussion
is
uo.x.nbit these shortcomings in considerable
detail,
..na v/nen i,he necessary emendations
are made,
sulting position will be such that the label the re'utilitarianism' (as usually construed) can be
pinned
to
it only with serious reservations,
if at all,
-:-?=
~ nis

-

•

It is not difficult to demonstrate that,

from the stand-

point of che utilitarian theory that has been
developed and
defended as the most plausible interpretation of what
Mill
had in mind, Reseller'

s

entire enterprise is ill-conceived.

Generally, all oi his objections to utilitarianism are made

with reference to "classical” formulations of the principle
of utili ty

,

and there is absolutely no indication that he was

aware that, when considering justice, Mill spoke in terms of

rights which are justified because their establishment is

necessary for the maximization of the general hapniness.
Analysis of some of his objections

v/ill

make it readily

apparent that this is the case.
In the example referred to in the first part of Chap-

ter

3

I,-

Rescher asked us to suppose that there are three per-

sons (A, B, and C) who are to be given the utility shares (a),
(b),

and (c), respectively, in accordance with either of two

schemes, as follows:

Share

'

TiT
(b)
(c)
2
3

Rescher, up. 8-9.

^pp.

5~6, above.

Scheme
3 units

I

Scheme II
2 units

3

2

3

6
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lx is his contention that because
Scheme II yields "the

greater good" and Scheme

yields the greater advantage in

I

goods for "the greatest number," application
of the principle
o± utility cannot result in a decision
as to
v/hich scheme we

should adopt.

"The example brings out the fact that the
prin -

ciple of utility is a tv/o-f actor criterion

(

'greater good,

*

greater number'), and that these two factors can in
given
cases work against one another,"^
First of all, it is obvious that if

is the principle

of utility which he has in mind in this example, it is
true
uhat employing it in this case would not allow us to
choose

one scheme rather than the other; but this is so quite irre-

spective oi any specific difficulty inhering in the concepts
of "greatest good" and "greatest number."

As it has been

demonstrated that P^ only specifies the conditions under

wnich an action can be said to be metaphysically or objectively
right, that it is theoretically impossible for a finite moral

agent to know what is right according to this principle, and
that this principle has nothing whatever to do with justice,^
4

Rescher, p. 25
^That is, although Pq may have something to do with justice from a metaphysical perspective, it has nothing to do with
it in a non-metaphysical sense.
Consequently, as argued previously (Subsection ’III-F)
justice, in the only sense that
can be interesting and relevant to finite moral agents, is associated with ? 2 not Pq.
I see no reason why this claim
about Pq does not apply generally to all kinds of justice
(distributive, retributive, etc.), although the present concern is not to elaborate on this but only to demonstrate that
P 2 can account for intuitively acceptable principles of distributive justice.
.

,

.

,
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there is no way that

can he employed for the purpose of

determining which distribution scheme is
just according to
utilitarianism. As previously noted, the only
function this
principle can succeed in fulfilling is to
point out what

must be judged as the relatively trivial
truth--that the
judgments that moral agents make regarding the
rightness of
actions on the basis of P are not necessarily
in accord with
2
that which the theory justifies as metaphysically
right.

However, application of P

2

would allow us to decide

which scheme is best; but since we are dealing

v/ith justice,

it would allow us to decide only by a consideration
of rights

justified by P

6

2

.

Presumably, in the situation described

by Rescher, the individuals involved are to be thought
of as

having equal rights to the item in question, since he mentions nothing at all about any of them having a special claim
to whatever is being distributed.

In this case, our first

reaction might be that he has presented us with what might
well be regarded as an instance of a false dilemma.
6

For,
~

Rights have previously been spoken of only in connection
with necessary conditions for happiness. Although it is not
necessary to do so for the purposes of the argument, the examples Rescher employs can be adapted in this way, so that we
can speak, for example, about his distribution schema in terms
of subsistence items (necessary conditions for life), such as
food.
However, Reseller's examples need not be restricted to
the rights we have spoken of thus far, since, later on, other
rights will be justified as aspects of the general right to
liberty.
That Rescher has failed, throughout his entire book,
to consider rights with reference to utilitarianism is sufficient evidence, I think, for concluding that he has not
read Chapter V of "Utilitarianism" or, if so, that he has not
read it carefully.
^
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Dviousiy

if we have ten items to distribute
to three individuals, all of whom are presumed to
have an equal right to
the item in question, there are two
other options available:
(a) if the items are divisible,
we could distribute according
,

to a Scheme III,

in which individuals A, B, and C each
re-

ceive 3-1/3 of the items in question.

(b)

If the items are

not divisible, and assuming there are no other
considerations
that could be employed which would enable us
to decide who
should have the tenth item, some sort of random
selection procedure (e.g., coin-flipping) should be used to decide
the is-

oue,

since this kind of procedure would recognize everyone's

equal right to the item in question.

Consequently, we have

another scheme as an option in which either

A,

B,

or C would

receive four units, the other two receiving three. ^ In any
case,

it would be irrational to consider one's options for dis-

tribution limited to Rescher's Schemes

I

and II, if all three

individuals have an equal right to the items in question

°-

and there is another distribution which is possible.

8

7

Assuming A, B, and C are rational, it would be absurd
for Them not to agree on the use of a random selection procedure in. this situation
It would also perhaps be absurd to
suppose, in this particular situation, that happiness would
not be maximized if they did so, since all would be assured
that they were given equal consideration in accordance with
their rights, and so* would have no grounds for complaint. If
they were utilitarians, they would also be assured" that the
decision as to who was to receive the tenth item was made in
accordance with the principle of utility (P2). Of course,
there is also the possibility that one or two would abdicate
their right in the situation and so execute a much more laudable- -super erogatory--act ion.
.

0

.

That A, B, and C have equal rights to whatever is being
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..o./9'/er,

ii

,

ior some reason, there is no
possibility

of employing another distributive schema
and we are left with

only Sen ernes

I

and II to choose between, P

us to make a selection.

2

will still allow

Because our principle of obligation

uells us, generally, that we are to violate
as few rights as

possible on any occasion of choice, and since it
is evident
that A's and B's rights to the distributed item
are both violated if we act in accordance with Scheme II (assuming
everyone

rights are equal in this case), it is obvious that we

s

snould distribute in accordance with Scheme
righ

^

are violated (again,

I,

since no one's

if we accept the somewhat absurd

assumption that no alternative scheme of distribution is possible).

To distribute in accordance with Scheme II would be

to distribute in accordance with some other theory than utili-

tarianism, for if would be to presuppose that our sole concern

distributed in Reseller's schema is assumed on the grounds that
u
indicate that any of the three have a. special
claim (right) to the distributed items.
If C has a right to
a greater share than A and B, then an unequal distribution like
Scheme Ii will be justified, and there is no problem. It must
be remembered that Rescher is concerned about distributive justice and that, for the utilitarian theory which has been developed, just actions are those which are in accordance with
rights as specified by the principle of obligation and its
corollary. Consequently, it" makes sense to speak about one
distribution scheme's being more just than another only by
considering the rights involved. In the absence of rights,
one can distribute in any way he chooses (see pp.198 and 199
since one is not obligated to make others happy (argued on
As mentioned In the footnote on p. 195» the
pp. 137-42).
major objections to Rescher 's criticisms of utilitarian theory stem from the fact that he did not consider rights at all
in connection with distributive justice in Mill's utilitarian theory.
What is being argued, of course, is that, once
the rights which are established by the theory are considered,
the theory is not incompatible with distributive principles
Reseller does no

—

)

of justice.
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should,

tnat only C's happiness he maximized in
this case,
rather than that there should he equal concern
for the happiness of A, B, and C. Whereas, if we choose
Scheme I, and
ce

oo distribute in accordance with their
supposed equal rights,
v/e

demonstrate equal concern for the happiness of all three.
It is important to note at this point that,

if justice

has to do with rights, in the absence of anyone's
having a

right

to

something we possess, we may distribute in any way

ve please or not at all,

V/e

are to be reminded, once again,

that it is not our duty, as utilitarians, to make other people

happy;

vie

are only obligated not to violate their rights when-

ever it is possible to do so.

That

vie

are obligated to dis-

tribute only in accordance with rights is noted by Jan Narveson in Morality and Utility

:

That I have an obligation to give something to Jones
entails that Jones has a right to the thing in question, and if the emphasis is on "I" then it entails
that he has the right "against" me in particular....
What common sense tells us, surely, is that we do not
in general have an obligation to distribute things:
What we own is ipso facto what we have a right to
use and hence, normally, to dispose of, as we see
fit.
Being what it is for us to have these rights,
and obligations being what we have said in Chapter V,
it quickly becomes evident both that we do not normally suppose that we have obligations, in general,
to distribute anything, and that there is good utilitarian reason for this belief. A fortiori we would
0
have no obligations in general to distribute equally,-'
,

,

Narveson provides an illustration in which he claims
that a millionaire who "takes it into his head to give a

hundred thousand dollars to some beggar he meets on the street
^Marveson, p. 206

.
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one day,

but not a single dime to the next one"
could not be

guilt/ of an injustice if none of the beggars
has a riyht to
the money in the first place.
He then concludes
that

...there is no sense in discussing the justice
xribution^ m^a pure vacuum (as is usually done) of disat
all.
It is time to consider some reasonably genuine
situations, of which I submit the above as a good
example.
And the lesson thus far is simply that in
the absence of any special obligation, we have
no
general obligations to distribute anything at all,
and thus no obligation to distribute" it equally. 10

This is obviously in accordance with our previous analy
sis of Mill's theory and means, for the Rescher example,
that
in the absence of rights to the item in question there could
be no obligation to distribute in accordance with any
schema

of distribution.

Consequently, Rescuer's illustration can

make sense to us as utilitarians concerned with adhering to
the dictates of P

2

only if we assume that rights are involved

And if we suppose that each of the individuals being distrib-

uted to has an equal right to the item being distributed,
appeal to our principle of obligation prescribes which schema
should be chosen and, in doing so, avoids any alleged incom-

patibility with intuition.
As a final comment on Rescher'

s

illustration, it can be

concluded that, contrary to Rescher'

s

assertion, "the great-

est good of the greatest number" is not a phrase which can be

thought to lead to difficulty for our utilitarian theory so
far as distributive (or any other kind of) justice is con1.0

Nam/ e son

p.

20?.
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cemed.

As noted previously,

"the greatest good" is to be

oaken as referring to a theory of
intrinsic value no more

specific than the one which holds that
happiness is intrinsically good. And as every legitimate
conception of happi-

ness is to be regarded as intrinsically good
as any other,
"the greatest number" refers to everyone.

The result is

that there is no ambiguity, for both have been
referred to
in the process of establishing as universal
rights those

conditions which are necessary for the realization and

maximization of everyone's happiness, and for calling an
action just only if it is in accordance with those rights.

Although the phrase may be problematic if one is attempting to determine v/hat is metaphysically right and so, like
Reseller,

attempting to determine

v/hat is

just according to

utilitarianism without a consideration of rights established
by the theory, this cannot be our concern.

From the per-

spective of the principle which is our concern, however,
it poses no problem.

With the correct theory in mind, it

looks, at this point, as if Reseller's whole enterorise re-

garding justice and utilitarianism must be judged as entirely misconceived.
The same misunderstanding of utilitarianism is evi-

denced again a few pages later on where Rescher is con-

sidering "one of the standard textbook objections to the

principle

:
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Scheme

I

Scheme II

(c)
|

(b)
(a)

Here Scheme II not only yields "the greater
good,"
but, works to the advantage of
"a greater number "
since two of the three people involved are
obvious
beneficiaries of its adoption. But is it reasonable^ that we should in all such cases be
prepared to
sacrifice an "individual interest" in "the general
benefit," as the principle of utility says we must
do.
The answer to this question cannot be other
than no!
We would surely not want to subject one
individual to unspeakable suffering to give some
insignificantly small benefit to many others (even
^innumerable myriad of them). Actual privation
offends our sense of justice in a more serious way
than do mere inequities.il
Once again, in the absence of special rights which A
and B have to the distributed item that C doesn’t, there is
no reason

v/hy

we should prefer Scheme II over Scheme

I.

12

If these distribution schemes are our only choices and it
is assumed that A, B,

and C each have an equal right to the

items being distributed, it is clear that

I

is preferable

to II on the grounds that II violates C’s right to an equal

distribution, whereas
11

I

violates no one

's,

However, where

Rescher, pp. 28-29.
Again, the assumption of equal rights is made on the
grounds that Rescher does not indicate that any of the three
has a special claim (right) to the distributed items. And,
as noted previously, we must be speaking about rights when
referring to justice. See footnote on p. 196-197.
13
This assumes, of course, that this is not a situation
of scarcity, in which, for example, the item being distributed
is a subsistence item (i.e., a necessary condition for life,
12
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neither A, B, nor C have rights to the
items being distributed, whoever is doing the distributing
is
justified in

distributing in accordance with any scheme he
wishes, including Scheme II. If, on the other hand,
the much more
plausible situation obtains whereby some other
distribution
scneme could be opsed for which was preferable
to
either

I

or II (such as, in the last example, dividing
a divisible

item or adopting a random selection procedure
for an indivisible iuem), is would be irrational and contrary
to utili-

tarian theory to choose either

I

or II

Of course, Reseller's insistence that the principle of

utility demands that it is "reasonable that we should in all
such cases be prepared to sacrifice an 'individual interest'
in the

'general benefit'" is completely misguided.

Because

everyone's happiness is to count as much as any other's; in
the interest of maximizing the general happiness in the

long run, the theory justifies assigning everyone an equal

right to all the necessary conditions for happiness.

trary to Reseller's supposition,

Con-

the principle of utility

such as food) and the amounts represented by Scheme I are
not sufficient to do either A, B, or C any good (in this
case, to sustain their lives).
In such a situation, we would
be aole to justify dividing the item between only two of the
three (probably via a random selection procedure), thus saving two lives instead of losing three.
In this case, however, we would be choosing the least of two harmful alternatives, thereby acting in accordance with the principle of
obligation. Moreover, it should be noted that, in this
situation, Scheme II would have to be changed so as to
represent only A and B--if they were selected--since C's
life would necessarily be sacrificed.
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does not regard this kind of sacrifice-a
sacrifice of rights
--as "reasonable. .in all such instances."
Although it might
.

be

ohe case that (all or some)

sacrifices like this are meta-

physically light, according to

the only conditions under

which they can be sanctioned are those
specified by the principle of obligation and its corollary 14
Under these conditions, such sacrifices are justified as
productive
.

of the gen-

eral happiness and are not incompatible with
intuition.

Once again, to sacrifice anyone's right(s) for the
purpose of satisiying others' desires for happiness
when those

desires are not directed toward universally necessary
conditions for happiness is to erroneously suppose that one's
duty
as a utilitarian is to make other people happy.

In situations

like the above, in which we are presumable obligated to make
some people happy at the expense of violating the rights of
others, it has previously been concluded that we are not

operating with utilitarianism but rather with some other
ethical theory.
It might be objected that this analysis of Reseller's

Illustration takes no account of degrees of happiness and
that not to do so is contrary to utilitarianism.

Thus,

in

adapting the illustration somewhat, one might argue as follows:

If we suppose that A, B, and

individuals in the world, Scheme
14

I

G

are the only three

can be taken to represent

For an example in which a violation of rights is justified by the principle of obligation, see the preceding footnote
.
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the situation in which all three are
equally happy; whereas

Scheme II can he taken to represent the
greater degree of
happiness lor A and B if they were to take
something of C's
against his will, thereby slightly diminishing
C's happiness.
Our criuic would contend, v/ith Rescher, that
surely the

utilitarian must justify the action of A and

B,

since it

would obviously maximize the total amount of
happiness (even
in the long run, we might suppose).
In reply, we must recall two prior conclusions:
We do not know what happiness is, in fact.

(a)

(b) We do not

have knowledge of the nature and/or extent of the conse-

quences of our actions.

This means that we cannot know,

for any particular action, whether it is metaphysically
right or obligatory, whether performing it will maximize
the general happiness (as defined for Objective Rightness-^.

Considering the fact that it makes sense to speak and make
judgments about degrees of happiness only if we have this
kind of knowledge, it must be concluded that we cannot make
this kind of judgment; to do so is to assume that we have

more knowledge about happiness than we really have.

must proceed on the basis of the evidence we do have

V/e

— that

which was used to formulate P^-and, consequently, can only
justify being concerned about the obligation of protecting

rights to the universally necessary conditions for happiness.
In short, any situation can be imagined from a meta-

physical perspective (such as Reseller's illustration); but
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as we have seen, this kind of speculation
is not the sort of

thing we can be concerned about as utilitarians
interested
in the non-metaphysical agent-oriented aspect
of the theory.

As we have previously noted, metaphysical rightness
(Objec-

tive Rightness-^) serves only to point out the possible
dis-

crepancy between what is metaphysically right and what a
finite moral agent judges to be right using P
9

.

If the objector turns instead to talk of "desires

satisfied," Reseller*
lows:

s

illustration might be adapted as fol-

If A and B took something from an unwilling C, even

though they harm him, more desires would be satisfied than
if they didn't.

That is, if we suppose that two desires

are satisfied for each of the three in Scheme

I,

we might

suppose in Scheme II that only one of C*s desires is satisfied, whereas three are satisfied for both A and B.

Our

critic would now argue that, even though there is a satis-

faction of illegitimate desires, the general happiness is

maximised by choosing. Scheme II over Scheme

I

because more

desires are satisfied by doing so.
However, to argue in this way is again to indulge in

metaphysical speculation.

For to imagine that we can equate

happiness with the number of satisfied desires is again to
suppose that we know much more about happiness than we do.

Scheme II may represent what is metaphysically right but,
as far as we know, the two satisfied desires gained by A

and B in Scheme II may not be sufficient to compensate for
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C’s loss of one satisfied desire, and so
not maximize the
long run general happiness (as defined for
Objective Right
ness-j^).

We cannot with assurance say that,

if Jones has

more desires satisfied than Smith, Jones is happier
than
Smith.

Equating numbers of desires satisfied with happiness

is a simplistic supposition and is something we
are in no

pooition to do.

Again, operating with Pp, which is formu-

lated on the basis of the evidence we have available with

respect to happiness, we can only justify protecting rights
to the necessary conditions for happiness; but we cannot

justify the assumption that the greater the number of de-

sires satisfied (legitimate or illegitimate) the greater
the degree of happiness produced; operating with Pp, it

makes no sense to speak about degrees of happiness.
have formulated Pp on the basis of what we know.

We

Op-

erating with it, the general happiness (as defined in accordance with Objective RightnesSp) is maximized and, as
finite moral agents, maximizing the general happiness in

this sense is all we can plausibly be concerned about.

From his illustration, Rescher concludes that "These
considerations suggest adding to the principle of utility
15

The really difficult problem arises for Rescher'
illustration if we suppose that A and B are able to take advantage of C without his knowledge. In this case, Scheme II
would represent C's happiness in the same amount as in Schem
I, while A's and B's is significantly increased.
This kind
of situation will be dealt with subsequently in Chapter IV.
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another qualifying clause, a ’principle of
catastrophe-prevention' stipulating a minimal utility floor for
all individuals below which no one should be pressed."
He thinks,

therefore, that we should add to the principle of
utility
the proviso,
lifan

For

"... provided that nobody rec eives less
of

'the

a certain (i.e., some -plausible) minimum amount

"
.

Clearly one of the most basic elements of our concept
justice is to minimize the number of oersons in a state

of genuine deprivation regarding their share in the avail-

able pool of utility."^
If ohe utilities referred to by Rescher are universally

necessary conditions for happiness, then we can agree that,
if at all possible, no one should be placed in a state of

deprivation, for everyone has an equal right to them.

In

this case, then, our utilitarian wholeheartedly agrees with
Rescher; but this proviso is, contrary to Rescher 's allegation, already part of his theory.

On the other hand, if the

utilities Rescher refers to are not universally necessary
conditions for happiness, then not everyone has a right to
them and no one without a right to them is treated unjustly
if he does not receive a share of them.

we can conclude that a

"

utility floor "

As utilitarians

makes sense if we

are speaking of necessary conditions for happiness, but is

senseless if taken to refer to anything else capable of being distributed.

^Rescher,

There is no problem here, however, for

p.

29.
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2

provides a "utility floor" in the former
sense. 17

Rescher does consider rights when, in another
major
section of his hook, he discusses legitimate
claims but,

again, he fails to note the fact that utilitarian
theory accounts for justice in terms of them. His whole
enterprise

here he conceives as a more explicit reiteration
of "...one
of the standard objections to utilitarianism on
the

part of

nineteen uA-c en oury critics."

He cites a passage from Herbert

Spencer's The Data of Ethics as representative of the position he is defending:
"Everyone to count for one, nobody for more than
one." Does this mean that, in respect of whatever
is proportioned out, each is to have the same share
whatever his character, whatever his conduct? Shall
he if passive have as much as if active? Shall he
if useless have as much as if useful? Shall he if
criminal have as much as if virtuous? If the distribution is to be made without reference to the
natures and deeds of the recipients, then it must
be shown that a system which equalizes, as far as
17

That Rescher, in his discussion of a " utility floor ,"
is referring to necessary conditions for happiness is evidenced in a footnote in which reference is made to a passage
from John Hospers' book, Human Conduct (pp. 29-30). The passage is concerned with the problem of having sufficient food
to prevent starvation and it is concluded that it would be
foolish to divide equally in a condition of scarcity when
the. resulting shares would not be sufficient to sustain life.
It is concluded by Hospers that this "...would really be running the equality principle into the ground." It should be
noted that the utilitarian theory that has been developed
does not condone strict egalitarianism, and that even where
everyone concerned has an equal right to the item in question,
situations like the one described by Hospers constitute exceptions.
This problem will be delved into in greater depth
later on, v/here it will become apparent that a wholly egalitarian principle of distribution is not only contrary to intuition but to the principle of utility (P2) as well.
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it can,

the treatment of good and bad,
will be
beneficial.
If the distribution is not to be
indiscriminate, then the formula disappears.
The
someS
1 )U ed mUSt be a
ortione d otherwise than
PP
^ ^
bv
efnet
ri^
b J e 0oal division.
There must be adjustment of
amounts to deserts; and we are left in
the dark as
to tne mode of ad justment--we have
to find other
guidance. lb

In light, of the theory that has been
developed, we will
only say, at this point, that it is absurd
to maintain that

utilitarianism entails that we must distribute equally
to
everyone under all conditions, meaning that there

is no such

thing in utilitarianism as the forfeiture of a
right to a
distribution, and that the principle of utility cannot
be

used to make any discriminations whatever on the basis
of
merit.

Rescher is right in an important sense when he con-

cludes that
decisive and fatal objection to any straightforward adoption of the classical principle of utility
as a rule of distribution is this:
it leaves wholly
out of account that essential reference to claims,
merit, and desert without which no theory of distributive justice fulfills the requisite for serious consideration. ... 19
•

•

•

.

That is, insofar as "the classical principle of utility" is
concerned, his judgment is probably correct.

His fatal over-

sight, however, is having failed to realize that there is a

utilitarian theory (the basic structure of which is found in
the work of J. S. Mill) which can successfully account for

intuitively acceptable principles of distributive justice,
1

o

Rescher, pp. 42-4-3

^Rescher,

p.

48.
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including those which take account of claims,
merit, and
desert.
We will proceed to consider these issues

in the

next section.

Section II
Frankena's Theory of Social Justice

Rather than continue with a detailed analysis of
Rescher

s

objections to utilitarianism concerning claims,

it is best at this point to take a more general, and what

will prove to be an ultimately more fruitful, approach to

resolution of these so-called difficulties.

I

wish to

turn attention to a theory of social justice propounded
by a non-utilitarian, William K. Frankena, which

I

think

can be demonstrated as capable of accounting for many

— if

not all-~of our intuitions regarding distributive justice
and which can be shown to be derivable from our utilitarian
theory.

Sub-section 1I-A will be concerned with a brief

account of Frankena’s theory, focusing specifically on a

comparison of Frankena's and Ch. Perelman’s views on equality
as the basic concept of justice.

Sub-section II-B will at-

tempt to show that, contrary to Frankena's assertion, his
basic theory is derivable from the utilitarian theory that
has been developed and attributed to Mill.

Sub-section Il-A:

Frankena and Perelman

the basic concept of justice

.

— equality

as

Frankena has concluded, after

some preliminary considerations on the topic of "Equality
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and Justice," that "The

modem concept

of social justice is

complex and includes a meritarian as well as
an egalitarian
element.
It recognizes the demand to respect
differences
between persons as well as the demand to respect
personality as such."

Strictly egalitarian theories of justice,

which maintain that no inequality is ever justified
and that
justice calls for a strict equality in the treatment
of all

individuals no matter who they are, regard "every departure
from complete equality ... as beyond the pale of justice, though
not beyond that of the morally right or obligatory."

Re-

garding such theories, Frank ena concludes that they
are possible and have an apparent simplicity, but
they limit the usual scope of justice. Not every
departure from equality is ordinarily regarded as
a departure from justice, let alone from morality.
For one thing, such departures are allowed on the
ground of differences in ability, merit, or desert.
Certain other departures from a direct or simule
equality, called for by differences in need, or
involved in carrying out agreements, covenants,
contracts, and promises, are also recognized as
just, and not merely as justified or right. 21
It is the purpose of the remainder of his essay to reconcile

these other principles of justice with the concept of equality.
In recognizing the importance of the concept of equality
in all other principles of justice, but in rejecting strictly

egalitarian theories as inadequate, Frankena is not alone.
20

.

.

William K. Frankena, "The Concept of Social Justice,"
Social Justice ed, Richard B. Brandt (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962 ), p. 127
,

^‘Frankena, pp. 12-13.
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Ch. Perelman sees the problem in a similar
fashion:
10 everyone the idea of justice inevitably
suggests
uhe notion of a certain equality.
From Plato and
i.nsmcle, through St. Thomas Aquinas, down to the

jurists moralists and philosophers of our own
day
runs a thread of universal agreement on this point,
ine notion of justice consists in a certain
application oj. the notion of equality. The whole problem
ij, to define this application in such fashion
that,
consti outing the element common to the various
conceptions of justice, it leaves scope for their
divergencies
j

In fact, it is Perelman'

s

contention that the egali-

tarian formula of justice--"To each the same thing"--is

merely another way of framing what he refers to as "formal"
or "abstract" justice.

He arrives at the latter by noting

that, despite all their differences, all formulas of justice

"have something in common in their attitude."

Those who

require merit to be taken into account want "the same treat-

ment for persons having equal merits."

The same is true for

those who want need or social rank or any other characteristic taken into account.

Whatever their disagreement re-

garding characteristics that should be taken account of,
"They are all agreed that to be just is to give the same

treatment to those who are equal from some particular point
of view, who possess one characteristic, the same, and the
22

Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of
Argument (London: P.outledge and Kegan Paul, 1963) p. 12.
Reseller's demand (noted on p. 209 of this text) that an adequate theory of distributive justice must account for "...
that essential reference to claims, merit, and desert..."
evidences his agreement that a wholly egalitarian theory of
justice is unsatisfactory.
,
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only one to
of .justice

yiich regard must be had in the
administrati on

Perelman refers to this characteristic
as

,

essential
the possession of any characteristic
whatever
makes impossible to group people in a
class
or category denned hy the fact that
its memhers
possess the characteristic in question,
people
having an essential characteristic in common
lorm part of one and the same category, the will
same
essential category.
I-l

He then defines formal or abstract justice as

"

a principle

ac 4i° n ia accor d ance v/ith which beings
of one and the

same essential

c ategory

must be treated in the same way

.

23

ihe egalitarian formula of justice is formulated
as an

equivalent second definition of formal justice as follows:
"All that is necessary is to specify that by ’each one’
is

meant the members of the same essential category.
ye

c

Thus we

the formula ’to each member of the same essential cate~

gory, the same thing,’ which is equivalent in every point
to the definition of formal justice...." 2 ^

Prankena accepts Perelman 's definition of formal justice but recognizes its limitations in that "This formula
as purely formal.

It says only that a society to be just

must have rules and act on them.

It does not say what the

rules should be, or how cases of any given sort should be
dealt with."

Therefore, although agreeing with Perelman’s

23

'"'Perelman,

24

Perelman,

p.

16.

p.

18.

214

rule o:

justice as "a requirement of reason," Frank
ena is
interested in "the content of social justice; " he
wants to

determine what

i>he

rules should

"be

and how we should go

about dealing with specific situations. 2 ^
As his own general position, Frankena asserts that

much more reasonable than a strictly egalitarian conception
of justice, and much closer to ordinary thinking,
...is the conception of social justice as the equal
treatment of all persons, except as inequality is required by relevant that is, just-making— considerations or principles. ... It takes equality of treatment to be a basic urima facie requirement of justice, but that it may on occasion be overruled by
other principles of justice (or by some other kind
of moral principle).

—

As he is careful to note, however, this view is not neces-

sarily very egalitarian.

"It does hold that all men are

to be treated equally and that inequalities must be justi-

But it also allows that inequalities may be justified,

fied.

and everything depends on the ease and the kinds of considera

tions by which they may be justified."
In Section VII of his essay,

p f.

"Basic Theory of Justice,"

Frankena develops his theory of social justice more precisely
After stating once again the need for "a plausible line of
thought

that will explain both the role of equality in the

concept of justice and those principles of justice which are
not derivable from the ideal of equality," he proposes to
argue that "The principles of the family of justice, insofar
2

3

^Frankena, pp. 8-9.

2o

Frankena,

p.

13
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as they go beyond the requirements
of equality, direct or
indirect, go beyond them only because they
express a cer-

tain limited concern for the good lives
of individual persons as such." ? He has thereby opposed
the classical

meritarian view of justice, and has accepted as
part of his
own view,
...the principle that all men are to be treated
as
equals, not because they are equal in any respect
but simply because they are human.
They are human
because they have emotions and desires, and are able
mo think, and hence are capable of enjoying
a good
a sen e
which other animals are^not.
?
By the good life is meant not so much the morally
good life as the happy or satisfactory life. As I
se« it, it is the fact that all men are similarly
capable of enjoying a good life in this sense that
justiiies the prima facie requirement that they be
treated as equals 2b
.

.

.

.

.

He describes the just society as one concerned, as

much as possible, with the equal treatment of everyone:
A just society, then, is one which respects the
good lives of its members and respects them equally.
A just society must therefore promote equality;
it may ignore certain differences and similarities"
but must consider others; and it must avoid unnecessary injury, interference, or impoverishment
all without reference to beneficience or general
utility.
The demand for equality is built into
the very concept of justice.
The just society,
then, must consider and protect the good life of
each man equally with that of any other, no matter
how different these men may be, and so it must
allow them equal consideration, equa.l opportunity,
and equality before the law.
The equal concern
for the good lives of its members also requires
society to treat them differently, for no matter
how. much one believes in a common human nature,
individual needs and capacities differ, and what
.

^Frankena, pp. 18-19
28 n

Frank ena,
i

p.

19.
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constitutes the good life fo one
individual may
not do so for another.
It is the society's very
concern for the good lives of its
^members that determines which differences and which
similarities
it must respect (and which are
relevant to justice),
A society need not respect those
differences which
have only an ad hoc bearing or none
at all, on the
good lives of their possessors--f or
example, color
of skin.
But it must respect differences like
preferring one religion to another, v/hich
do have
a bearing on the individual good
life, 2 9
S ub-section II-B:
^t

the derivabilitv of Frankena's basic

heory from utilitarianism

.

Frankena denies that the just

society he describes can be justified by
utilitarian theory. 30
Although this may be true for any of the classical
versions
ox

the theory,

it is this kind of a society which is sanction-

ed by the formulation of the theory we have
been arguing for.

frankena has argued that "The just society.

.

.must consider

and protect the good life of each man equally with that
of

any other, no matter how different these men may be,
and so
it must allow them equal consideration,
and

equality before the law."

equal opportunity,

We have argued that each mem-

ber of any society is to be treated equally on the grounds
that his conception of happiness (his view of the "good life"

Frankena speaks about) is to be regarded as intrinsically
good as any other, with the consequence that each individual
is to be provided,

so far as possible, with an equal oppor-

tunity to pursue his own conception of happiness.

Frankena

has argued that "A just society... is one which respects the
7

30

Frankena, up. 19-20,
Frankena, pp. 15-16,

21?

S ° 0Cl llv9S 01 1TS members and respects them
equally,
a just
society must therefore promote
equality.” We have argued thaonce we hold each legitimate
conception of happiness of equal
vaiue xhe only way to maximize the
general happiness is to
promote equality of opportunity by
assuring each of the members of society of equal rights to the
necessary conditions
-ior happiness.
Furthermore, we have argued that the closer
any society approximates the ideal of
placing everyone in the
,

position of having an equal opportunity for
the pursuit of
happiness, the more certain will be the possibility

that the

general happiness will be maximized.

It follows from this

bhat every deviation from the equal treatment
of everyone

must be justified on the grounds that it enhances
or at
least does not violate equality of opportunity, which
is precisely what Frankena has argued.

Although there is a striking similarity between our
theory ana the description Frankena provides of his, there
31r

his means ,. f or example, that although giving more
food to. ohe impoverished
than to the rich is unequal treatment, it is justified in that it serves to equalize the
opportunity ^to pursue happiness.
In addition, this would be
bne justification in a society for taking more tax
monev from
the rich than. the poor, a problem Mill dealt with in the
last
chapter. of Utilitarianism," In fact, Rescher seems to agree
with mhis way of justifying unequal treatment when speaking
about ohe nan on of heed," his second "Canon of Distributive
Justice:"
"...recognizing that as things stand, men come
oo the world with different possessions and
opportunities
as well as differences in natural endowments, the principle
professes to treat them, not equally, but so as to" make
them. as equal as. possible" (p. 75).
For a more detailed
utilitarian justification of unequal treatment, see po. 22233* especially pp. 228-29.
.

.

m
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is an important difference, and one
which constitutes an ad-

vantage

i

or utilitarianism.

Whereas both Frankena and Perel-

man have regarded the egalitatian element
in principles of
justice as purely formal or abstract as "simply

—

a require-

ment of reason"--this aspect of justice is
justified by utilitarianism because adherence to it as a nrima facie
right is

conducive to the maximization of the general happiness.

It

is no longer a formal principle but is justified
as a basic

right, deviations from which must be justified (as Frankena

agrees) only on the condition that they result in more

equality for everyone

— equality

of opportunity for the pur-

suit of happiness.

Considering Perelman for a moment, utilitarianism also
represents a signiiicant advantage over his position on
"essential categories."

Perelman regards their establishment

as based on an arbitrary selection of values:
If. we regard a rule as unjust because it accords preeminence to a different value, we can only note the
disagreement. No reasoning will be able to show that
either one of the opponents is in the wrong. Be it
noted that while such a state of affairs occurs most
often in discussions of the division of beings into
essential categories, it is possible for questions
of value to arise even when the subject under discussion is the treatment to be provided for the members
of certain categories 32
.

There is no objective basis, then, for determining when
a rule or law is just or unjust,

for,

according to Perelman,

any basis chosen for determining this could only rest on an
32

Perelman, p. 53.
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arbitrary selection of values.

Although Perelman's conclu-

sions are of no value to us for making
such judgments--as we
often mjo
according to utilitarianism, decisions
about the
justness of rules are possible, as they
are based on a con.

sideration of the consequences of adhering to
them.

That is,

if employing a rule results in a greater
equality of oppor-

tunity for the pursuit of happiness and
consequently results

m

a greater possibility that the general
happiness will be

maximized, it is just.
In short, utilitarianism means by equality, equality
of opportunity

equal acceso
one

oo

±

or the pursuit of happiness, which means
uhe conditions universally necessary for

pursuit ol nappiness.

•

Therefore, for utilitarianism,

inequalities in distributions are justified as long as they
result in equal access to the necessary conditions for happiness, at least in the long run.

And a just society is one

which will do what it can to provide everyone with these
necessary conditions; that is, it will acknowledge everyone’s equal right to the necessary conditions for happiness
and will do whatever possible to fulfill its obligations

respecting those rights.
Though Frankena does not speak directly of necessary
conditions for the pursuit of happiness, it is apparent he
agrees that providing for them is one of the primary obli-

gations of the just society.

First, he maintains:
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a just society must protect each
member from bein^
xroured or interfered with by others,
and
muK*
-.0.., by omission or commission,
itself inflict evil
an 0f hem de P'rive them of goods'
?
which they
ih
inighu otherwise
gam by their own efforts, or re-‘
uheir liberty— except so far as is
t
necessary
for ohmr protection or the achievement
of equality.

h

^°A

-

_

Having thereby sanctioned the protective function
we have
alremy seen is justified by utilitarianism, he states

the

following

^though we are speaking

of the just society, and not
society, iLs concern with the goodness of
tne lives of its members need not be considered
merely
negative and protective.
It seems reasonable to assign
to the. just society a more positive interest
(though
one which falls short oi beneficience) by saying that
it must, so far as possible, provide equally the
conditions under which its members can by their own efforts (alone or in voluntary associations) achieve
the best lives of which they are capable.
This means
that the society must at least maintain some minimum
standard of living, education, and security for all
its members. 33
0

.

bf

-~p

o

,

In conclusion, although Frankena claims that his theory
of social justice is non-utilitarian, this conclusion is

based on a short-sighted view of the theory.

When he argues

that differences in treatment based on considerations of

equality cannot be derived from the principle of utility
3Q

-tFrankena, p. 21.
It should also be noted that he is
in agreement with utilitarianism in maintaining that a society is not unjust which is not beneficient. In the same
paragraph he says that to think of a society as just "...
does not involve direct action on the part of society to
promote the good life of its members, whether this be conceived of as pleasure, happiness, self-realization, or some
indefinable quality. Such direct action is beneficience,
not justice." In conjunction with
therefore, beneficient
actions are right but not obligatory.
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(because "...the differences in treatment
involved are not
justified simply by arguing that they are
conducive to the
general good life.,. but by arguing that they
are required
for the good lives of the individuals
concerned."^),
he

has failed to take account of our theory
and, consequently,
to note that the general

good— "the general happiness" —

can only be maximized when the individuals
responsible for
making it up are treated in accordance with the
dictates
0“

justice; that this kind of consideration "for the
rood

lives of the individuals concerned" is the only way
to

maximize the general happiness and to accord thereby with
the principle of utility.

Finally, whereas Frankena says

that "Unless we depart from our ordinary understanding of
the term 'justice,' social justice cannot be defined merely
fry

saying that a society is just which acts, distributes,

and so on, in accordance with valid moral principles

,

we can now disagree by maintaining that "a society is just

which acts, distributes, and so on, in accordance with"
rights established by the valid moral principle which has

been argued

for— the principle

of utility.

Furthermore,

acting in accordance with this principle does not offend our
intuitions regarding justice.
34
J

Frankena,

p.

15.

Frankena, pp. 4-5.
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Section III
ihe Utilitarian Theory of Distributive
Justice

--Other Considerations

The utilitarian theory of distributive
justice will be

discussed in more detail in three sub-sections.

In Sub-

section III -A, it will be argued that Reseller’
s "Canon of
Claims" is consistent with utilitarian theory
and is made
far less abstract than Reseller’s conception of
it by doina
what we must as utilitarians--subordinating six
of Rescher's

seven "Canons of Distributive Justice" to the one which
cor-

responds to the principle of utility.

Sub-section III-B

will deal specifically with the problem of merit as a dis-

tributive principle of justice, concluding, with Narveson,
that there is no general obligation to distribute according to merit; and developing as an implication of the right
to liberty that people should have the freedom to distribute

things in accordance with any criterion of distribution they
wish, so long as doing so is right.

Finally, Sub-section

III-C will emphasize that justice can never give way to

other right-making considerations

,

and that Mill agrees.

Sub-section 1II-A: a utilitarian analysis of Rescuer’s
"Canons of Distributive Justice ."

The theory of distribu-

tive justice which utilitarianism is committed to can be

made more precise if we turn back, for a moment, to Rescher.
In Chapter IV of Distributive Justice, Rescher begins by

listing seven "Canons" of distributive justice:
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course 01 the long. history of discussions
he subjecx, distributive justice
has been held
a.
.0 consist, wholly or primarily,
in the treatment
oi all people:
‘

1

as equals (except possibly in the case
of cerxam negative" distributions such as punish.

ments)
2)
6)
3)

.

according to their needs.
according to their ability or merit or achievements
.

7)
4)

5)

according to their efforts and sacrifices.
according to their actual productive contribution.

according to the requirements of the common
good, or the public interest, or the welfare
of mankind, or the greater good of a greater
number.
according to a valuation of their socially useful services in terms of their scarcity in the
essentially economic terms of supply and demand.
Correspondingly, seven_ "canons" of distributive
justice result, depending upon which of these
factors is taken as the ultimate or primary determinant of individual claims, namely, the canons, of equality, need, ability, effort, produc-^
tivity, public utility, and supply and demand. 36

Upon concluding that neither of these canons is sufficient by itself to account for distributive justice
("These canons all suffer the aristocratic fault of hyper-

exclusiveness"), Rescher puts forward "...as representing
(in essentials) our own position on the issue of distribu-

tive justice, the CANON OF CLAIMS

:

Distributive justice

consists in the treatment of people according to their
legitimate claims, nositive and negative
^°Rescher,

p.

73.

•^Rescher,

p.

82.

.
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Although having previously admitted that
"The question of how
claims come about--how merit and desert
soring into exist-

ence— seems

to me among the most difficult and
complex issues
in ethical theory ," 88 it is apparent
that what he means gen-

erally by "legitimate claims" is those claims
which are members of uhe class of claims which accord with
intuition.

Bearing in mind Perelman's warning that "...each man
advocates a different system. No system is capable of
securing the adherence of all,"

^

it would be unrealistic to

expect that the utilitarian theory of distributive justice

developed below will be accepted by everyone.

Nevertheless,

it will be maintained that the theory of distributive
jus-

tice sanctioned by utilitarianism is largely

— if

--plausible from the perspective of intuition
88

not wholly

210
.

Rescher, p. 6 l.

39

^'Perelman, p. 15.
40
The question of the reliability of moral intuition
is, of course, highly controversial.
It is debatable how
reliable a guide it is in particular situations or to what
extent it should be appealed to for judging the acceptability of ethical theories. It is well to remind ourselves,
consequently of the caution with which we should proceed
when appealing to it. For example, Alan Donagan has said,
"It must be confessed that when, as with rule-utilitarianism, moral theory contradicts moral intuition only in a
few farfetched cases, moral intuition is far from a safe
guide." ("Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?"
Contemporary Utilitarianism ed. Michael D. Bayles /Garden^
City, New York:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., Anchor Books, I968/
Similarly, Rawls alludes to the difficulty of dep. 198.)
pending on the illusive nature of intuition in the last section of his essay, "Distributive Justice," Philosophy
Politics and Society /3 rd series/7 ed. Peter Laslett and
W. C. Rune iman /London
Billing & Sons, Ltd., 19677. pp.
,

,

7

,

(

,

:

? 9 - 82

.

)
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can make sense of Reseller's ’’Canon
of Claims" by
considering his "Canons of Distributive
Justice" in light
,/e

of our utilitarian theory.

It is only by doing so that his

notion of "the treatment of people according
to their legiti
mate daims " can be removed from the realm
of the uselessly
abstract and enabled concrete application
in particular situ
ations.
Of the seven canons listed by Rescher,
utilitarianism

must, of course, subscribe to the sixth canon,
the canon of

public utility.

Bearing in mind, however, that so far as

justice is concerned our principle of obligation is formu-

lated with reference to rights, a more precise way of stating v/hat tnis canon requires is to say that a distribution
is just if it consists in "the treatment of all people ac-

cording to their rights."
justice consists

m

That is, to say that distributive

tne treatment of all peoole "according

to the requirements of the common good"

(Canon six) is to

say that it is to treat them "according to the rights they

have to the items of distribution."

Moreover, since their

rights have previously been noted as being rights to the

universal conditions necessary for happiness, our reformulation of canon six is, in effect, a particular formulation of canon two, which requires "the treatment of all
_
people according to their needs." 4i Our utilitarian theory,
.

4l

.

,

To be somewhat more accurate, we might qualify these
as "essential needs," since they are needs for which it is

226
then,

sanctions, as just, those
distributions which are
distributions of items in accordance
with rights to them;
conversely, distributions of items
which violate rights to
them must be judged to be unjust.^ 2

Can now state more precisely
that a society is to
be characterized as 'socially
just' if, and only if,
it
does whatever possible to distribute
whatever is necessary
i0r P roviain g its members equally
with the necessary conditions for happiness (life and liberty)
in accordance with
the principle of obligation and its
corollary.
VlQ

‘

As pre _

viously noted in agreement with Frankena,
a just society is
obligated to do everything possible to
provide

for the equal

essential (i.e., necessary) to satisfy in order
to enable
anyone to pursue happiness.
4 2^

S

E

™

”

0n Ju ? tice and Injustice," Mind
discusses distributive justice in~tiFms
of Perelman s concept of "essential categories"
and regards
neea as the basic one, by means of which he
is able to give
an account of two others, "merit" and "worth." See
especially p. 212:
"I want to suggest, then, that essential categories are needs or contributions to the satisfaction of
needs;" also p, 213, where he discusses reasons why one
should regard distribution as just:
"Reasons of ascertain
sort are needed and I suggest that they are reasons to do
with essential categories, i.e., reasons to do with characteristics re3.ated to needs in the ways described." I am
obviously in agreement with Ewin's basic approach. In the
same paragraph, however, Ewin denies that utilitarianism can
account for distributive justice, as he interprets it.
43 Oi„
course, this is meant to include not only material
things like food and sufficient shelter but other necessary
conditions for the preservation of life and liberty, such as
equal treatment before the law, equal police protection, and
i

^P?
a

-nr-i1

1
i

.

'.,

so forth.

197 ?''

•

'-

118

’
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opportunity of all its members to pursue
happiness by assuring them, so far as possible, of the
necessary conditions
for happiness. This means that
inequalities of treatment
(e.g., giving more food to the
poor than to the
wealthy)

are sometimes necessary but can be said
to be just only insofar as the ultimate result is more actual
equality rela-

tive to the necessary conditions for
happiness.
noVl

What is

"being claimed is that acting in
accordance with the prin-

ciple of obligation and its corollary will
justify unequal
treatment of the members of society only under
these con-

ditions

.

That Doth individuals and societies can be just or

unjust means that everyone has rights against everyone else
and also against society.

Some of these rights overlap;

e.g., botn society and every individual, whenever capable

of doing so, are obligated to save lives and protect people
.irom

unprovoked bodily injury.

However, not all the rights

overlap; e.g., one may have a right against society to

"pro-

vide unemployment compensation in the event he is unemployed,
but does not have this right against every individual.

fact— though

it won't be argued for here in

In

detail— this

might serve to point out at. least part of what Mill had in
mind when he distinguished between perfect and imperfect
44
obligations.
That is, one might be said to have an im'

perfect obligation, as a member of society, to pay his taxes
44

.

Mill, "Utilitarianism," Chapter V, p. 247

.
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to make possible society's
fulfilling,

for example, its

obligation to provide its members with
unemployment compensation when they need it. This
would then, perhaps, constitute
part of what is meant by one's
imperfect obligation to
be

benef icient

;

something which, according to Mill,
one is not

obligated to do with reference to any
particular person or
obligated to ao on any particular occasion.
Thus, we might
plausibly say that some or all of society's
so-called
per-

fect obligations to its members may also be
its members’

imperfect obligations with respect to each other.
We can now deal effectively with Rescher's
other

canons of distribution.

They can be employed by a just so-

ciety as means for effecting distributions of necessities
in accordance with canon six (as amended and qualified

above).

For example, in a society that does not produce

enough subsistence items to assure everyone of life, it

would be just to stimulate their production by rewarding
producers "according to their actual productive contribution" (canon five) or in accordance with canon seven, three,

or four, or any combination thereof.

Similarly, if the

only way to assure adequate protection against crime were
to pay very large salaries to people with the ability to

become good policemen, this would also be justified.

Con-

sistent with our acceptance of Frankena's basic theory
above, as long as the eventual result is more overall

equality (or there is good reason to believe that this

v/ill
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be the result) in the society
for everyone, relative to the

necessary conditions for happiness,
inequalities of treatment
resulting from the other canons of
distribution are justified,

they are in accord with the principle
of utility.

Rescher also seems to advocate a justification
of unequal treatment in terms of its resulting
utility:
If we are willing--as I think we must be--to
mit considerations of justice in the narrower*oersense of fairness. to be overshadowed by
considerations of justice in a wider sense that takes
into
account the common good, then we have to be orepared to recognize the superiority of "unfair"
distributions whose unfairness "pays for itself" bv
bringing greater advantage to all. 4
Yet, he has claimed, when speaking of "true justice"
in

trie

paragraph preceding, that "its ultimate arbiter" is

not "the general good alone without reference to claims,

rights and desert:

its determination requires the appro-

priate conjoint coordination of these two at-times-divergent

factors."

'

And a few pages later, "Our thesis is that jus-

tice (in the narrow sense) and the general good of utilitari-

anism must be coordinated with one another, and that just
45

Compare with Rawls' second principle of justice:
"Inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's advantage and
unless the offices to which they attach, or from which they
may be gained, are open to all" ("Justice as Fairness," pp.
653“654),
Though it 'won’t be argued here, there is little
doubt that this principle is roughly equivalent to Frankena’s
position--the one we have been arguing is justified by the
principle of utility.
46

Rescher, p. 93-

47
'Reseller,

p.

92.
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this constitutes justice in the
wider sense
Su__ ice it to say that "claims,
rights and deserts"
are justified by our theory in
terms of their productiveness of "the general good" (what
we refer to as the -general happiness ).
Consequently, the coordination Rescher
speaks of between considerations of
"fairness" (justice in
the narrow sense) and "the common good"
(justice in the

wider sense) is not only uselessly abstract
but, for our
theory, completely unnecessary.
What is entailed by our
theory is that justice (or fairness) can never
give way to
a distinct principle— the principle of
utility— or viceversa; for what is just is determined to be so by
the

principle of utility.^
before concluding our analysis of Rescher, one other
ioSue deserves our attention,

in the section,

"Special

Problems of an Economy of Abundance," Rescher states:
In an economy of abundance it becomes not only
possible but plausible, and indeed at a certain
point imperative to elevate one's conception of
a minimally tolerable share of utility.
The fact
that as a utility economy rises from a condition
of scarcity to one of sufficiency to one of
aoundance the elevation of the minimal level inevitably becomes warranted, is of crucial importance for the theory of distributive justice.
The
.

,

Rescher, p. L02.
49

Rescher elaborates on this distinction in the section "Justice and Inequality" of Distributive Justice pp.
101-104, and especially on pp. 102-103. His position here,
however, is no less confusing and unsatisfactory. Most
seriously, how we are to "coordinate" principles is not at
all adequately accounted for.
,
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minimum is raised from bare survival +.n n + _ior o+.
Hoaestly-pleasant survival!^ a
inThe tood
scc iety--and the economy that
is its
productive sector becomes able to "afford"
more
and more in the passage from adequacy
to abundance,
an elevation in the level of exoectation
members becomes inevitable, and our levelsof its
of
to_erable minimality" are revised drasticaliy
upward.nd
J

—

In an economy of abundance, our utilitarian
theory may
also require that the members of such a society
be appor-

tioned larger shares of its wealth, on the general
utilitarian ground tnat, in such a society, assuring
everyone
of more than merely subsistence items is a necessary
con-

dition for assuring everyone, so far as possible, an equal

opportunity for the pursuit of happiness, and so is a nece

Soary condition ior maximizing the general happiness.

It

would be plausible to argue that, although distributing in
this manner is not a necessary condition for life, it is a

necessary condition in such a society for assuring that
everyone has equal liberty for the pursuit of happiness;
ior it is apparent that this would not be the case for

those who--compared with many others, or the majority--

were assured of only subsistence items.

A society,

then,

should be considered unjust according to utilitarianism

which does not do everything possible to eliminate such a

disparity of advantage whenever it is clearly possible to
do so and more overall equality of opportunity for the

pursuit of happiness will be produced in the long run.
50

Rescher, pp. 98-99.
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As has often occurred in societies
with an economy of
abundance
r
i e - srence
have undergone a
? +
n
qualitative
change, because the economists' cona
lr in g v/age " has undergone substantial
°I^
s^alation.
ror
example, their concept now inetudes not only the minimalities of
food, clothe,
"
and shelter--m respect of which there
has also
been escala tion--but also entirely new
means for
protections against illness and accidents.
The
living at. issue here is no longer to be
taken
as mere living, as bare survival, but
is to be
construed in terms of some measure of "the
good
111 e " bJ'

/

j'-,

•

•

.

.

.

.

In conclusion, the "Canon of Claims," as Rescher

elaborates on it, remains problematically abstract
throughout his book, and, consequently, does not provide
us with

an adequate means for discriminating between legitimate
and illegitimate claims or for adjudicating situations
in

which legitimate claims conflict.

On the other hand, the

theory of distributive justice sanctioned by our utili-

tarian theory not only accepts the "Canon of Claims," but
interprets it in such a way as to allow us to deal with
tnese problems in an intuitively unob jectionable manner.

For example, in one of his typically abstract passages,

Rescher says,
In espousing the Canon of Claims we may note that
the search for a canon of distributive justice is
carried back to the Roman jurist's view that the
definitive principle of justice is inherent in the
dictum suum cui aue tribuens --"giving each his own."
To the question " What is his own ?"
we have given
the answer " What he deserves ." That is, a share
31
J

Rescher, p. 101.
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—

ideally equal or at any rate
proportional--to his
legitimate claims. 52
In contrast, the principle of utility
provides substantive
concent to rhis passage by interpreting
legitimate claims
as rights to the necessities for
the pursuit of happiness
and by sanctioning, as just, inequalities
of treatment in-

sofar as they serve as the best means of
fulfilling the
obligations which are correlative to those
rights.

Finally, we find ourselves in the position of
affirming what Rescher has denied

— "that

considerations of justice

and fairness are of subordinate status to
considerations of
utili oy because they can be derived from the principle
of

utility."

As a result, it is not the case that utilitari-

an theory must be qualified by recognizing them as
s upplements

t ions

,

"

needed

drawn from an entirely different set of considera

and not as merely subordinate derivatives at all."-^

Sub-section III-B; the problem of merit
should be said specifically about merit.

I

.

Something

think, as utili-

tarians, we must agree with Narveson's observations:

Critics have also complained of the inability of
utilitarianism to account for the principle of distribution in accordance with "merit." Here, too,
confusion and muddle have obstructed progress. To
begin with, the objection is usually voiced in such
a way as to imply that there is some sort of general
quality called ."merit " assessable independently of
any considerations of special purposes or activities
...but the briefest inspection shows that such a
,

52
53

Rescher,

p.

83

.

Rescher, p. 116

,
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no

'-ion is nonsense.
There is no such
general human merit » There is moral thing as
merit, athpianistic merit, ditch-digging merit,
and the reasons for "rewarding"
-ach
~ acn n?
01 Th
the se tnings are specifically different
.

_

^

As an example, he supposes that a
group of people get to-

gether to form an athletic organization,
for the purpose of
holding contests to see who can run fastest,
jump highest
or farthest, etc.
The rules for each contest determine what
"merit" is for the particular case (in a foot
race, merit
io proportioned to speed,

etc.).

Narveson concludes:

lo classify these abilities as "merits" is
to say
that these are the activities which the participants and supporters of the activity are interested
inland which therefore they will he disposed to
praise or otherwise reward. The proposition that
meri u should De rewarded" is, in other words, simplv
"
analytic. 55

Agreement with Narveson'
for our theory.

s

remarks has two implications

First, distributing in accordance with merit

like any other form of distribution

— is

obligatory when

doing so will result in more equal access to the necessary

conditions ±or happiness.
54
55

Nam/ e son,

p.

Second, one of the liberties

216.

Narveson, pp. 216-217.
Prankena says something about
"virtue," one of the traditional concepts of "general human
merit," which is in agreement with the position that we are
under no general obligation to distribute in accordance with
merit.
"Social justice then does not, as Ross thinks, consist simply in the apportionment of happiness or good life
in accordance with the recipient's degree of moral goodness.
In fact, society must for the most part allow virtue to be
its own reward, else it is not virtue."
(Prankena, p. 21.)
^
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people should have--one which is compatible
with a like
liber oy 102- ail is devising contests and making
contracts
(agreements) which are not harmful to others; i.e.,
which
do not violate their rights.

Although a society may be

obligated, on occasion, to employ these as means for acting
in accordance with the rights of its citizens, societies

individuals should be allowed to do so whenever it is
not wrong to do so, whenever it is merely right.

In other

words, they should be allowed to distribute in accordance
v/ith

merit or any of the other canons of distributive jus-

tice whenever no one's rights are violated.

they shouldn't be allowed to do this would,

To say that
I

think, be

to maintain that everything should be distributed in ac-

cordance with some particular principle or principles of
distribution; which would be to suggest, either that every

distributable item is a universally necessary condition
for happiness or that, as utilitarians, we are obligated
to make other people happy.

To the contrary,

every dis-

tributable item is not a universally necessary condition
for happiness, and we have concluded that it is merely

right to make ourselves and others happy.
In conclusion, any contest in which a particular merit
is to be rewarded,

or any contract made between individuals

in a society or between society and individuals which is

other-regarding but non-harmful, is right, and societies
and individuals should both be granted the liberty to deal

236

wi oh each

o

oher in this way.

For in this way many of the

items which make people happy--which satisfy their legiti-

mate desires

are produced and, although no one is obligated

to participate for the purpose (direct or indirect) of satis-

fying their legitimate desires, clearly it is within the
bounds of rightness to do so.

In other words, this is

merely one of the opportunities for pursuing conceptions
of happiness which people should be allowed--in accordance

with the right to liberty--to take advantage of.

In a

society with liberties such as these, people have the
rights necessary for the pursuit of happiness, and actually
are enabled thereby to become happy.

With this in mind, we can agree with Narveson's con-

cluding remards about the above example:
/

^

The problem of breaking contracts (e.g., promises)
without good reason can perhaps be handled by suggesting
that this is not a liberty that would be compatible with a
like liberty for all. Simply, if people were allowed to
break contracts indiscriminately whenever they felt like
it or at the slightest provocation, the consequences for all
of society would be disastrous.
It would therefore be correct to say, as utilitarians, that people do not have a
right to this kind of liberty, but what their right to liberty does entail is that they have a prima facie right to
have the terms of their non-harmful contracts enforced;
i.e., this is an essential aspect of liberty--a liberty
compatible with a like liberty for all--and so is a necessary condition for maximizing the general happiness. In
other words, we can say that one has a orima facie right
against others to keep the promises (comply with the terms
of the contracts) made with them; consequently, breaking a
promise is the violation of a right and therefore a harm
which must be dealt v/ith by the principle of obligation
This problem will be dealt with in more
and its corollary.
detail in the next section, on "Fair Procedures."
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ex w lex us point out that people
who are uninterested in. athletics need not bother to
come, and
ti course will not cheer the winners,
nor narticipa^e
the other rewarding activities for"
these
particular endeavors. All of this is obviously
oanc tioned by utilitarianism!
The rewarders are
doing what th ey want to, the contestants are
doing
what they want to, and those who stay home for
lack of interest are doing what they want to
Where is the diff iculty?57
i^

^

m

Sub- section III-C
iiarly in his essay,

:

the preemptive status of .justice

.

"The Concept of Social Justice," Frankena

describes a position on .justice which he later rejects:

Just-making considerations are only one species
of right-maicing considerations.
And, theoretically,
at least
a consideration of one kind may over— rule
a consideration of the other.
In particular, a justmaking consideration may be over-ruled by a rightmaking one which is not included under justice. 58
,

hot only is this clearly not allowed by the theory we have

developed; it also could not have been accepted by Mill,

After a brief summary of the theory's position, we will
argue that Mill was in agreement with it.
The principle of utility of our theory allows us to

distinguish between acts which are merely right and those
which are obligatory, but the corollary to the latter

clearly disallows that a merely right action could ever take
precedence over a right action which is just (and so obligatory).

As has been emphasised throughout, to suppose

that this would ever be justified would be to presuppose
that our duty, as utilitarians, is at least sometimes to
37
38

Narveson, p. 217.
Frankena, p.

3.
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provide zor the happiness of others rather than only
to do
whatever possiole to assure them of the rights necessary
for the pursuit of happiness.

Accordingly, since justice

can never give way to other considerations, benef
icience
e uC

something we can he concerned about only if our

•

obligations stemming from justice are fulfilled; only if,
in being beneficient, no injustices are done.

Once amain,

this means that it would be right to make other people
iia PPy?

not

,

and the theory encourages us to do so, but we can-

as utilitarians,

ever regard it as our duty to do so.

Frankena's conclusions in this area state our posi-

tion quite well (bearing in mind, of course, that he regards principles of justice as independent of the principle
of utility--not derivable from it.)
...it will not do to say, as Brandt does, that justice consists in treating people equally except as
unequal treatment is justified by moral considerations of substantial weight in the circumstances.
If
I am right, this description should be revised:
justice is treating persons equally, except as unequal
treatment is required by just-making considerations
(i.e., by principles of justice not merely moral
principles) of substantial weight in the circumstances.
With this emendation, the description
seems to me to be correct, both in theory and as
a reflection of the ordinary notion of justice. 59
,

Frankena's position is mrely another way of stating
what has already been established by the corollary to the

principle of obligation.
It has been maintained that Mill regarded as rights
5o

Frankena, p. 10.
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whatever were universally necessary conditions for the pursuit oi happiness and thought of acts as just if, and only
il

,

they did not involve violations of those rights.

is not immediately apparent, however,

It

that he thought that

justice could never give way to other considerations of

social utility (what Frank ena has referred to above as

"right-making considerations").

For example, at first

glance, the second to the last paragraph of "Utilitarianism" appears to pose a problem:

It appears from what has been said, that justice
is a name for certain moral requirements, which,
regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale
of social utility, and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any others; though particular cases may occur in which some other social
duty is so important, as to overrule any one of
the general maxims of justice. Thus, to save a
life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty,
to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or
medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate,
the only qualified medical practitioner.
In such
cases, as we do not call anything justice which
is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice
must give way to some other moral principle, but
that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case. By this useful accommodation of
language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from
the necessity of maintaining that there can be
laudable injustice.

There are several reasons why this passage should not
be interpreted as sanctioning the overthrow of principles

of justice,

on occasion, by other (i.e., merely right-

making) considerations.
60

First, as he is speaking of only

Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 259.
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"general maxims of justice" being overruled, this
is not

incompatible witn interpreting this as meaning that
"general maxims of justice" may sometimes be overruled by
"par-

ticular maxims of justice."
erally De unjust

Thus, although it would gen-

to Steal or take by force" food or medi-

cine, and generally unjust "to kidnap the compel to offi-

ciate the only qualified medical practitioner," it would

sometimes constitute a particular act of justice to do so;
for example, when the preserving of a life requires such

actions.

Second, the example provided clearly falls into

the category of a "perfect obligation."

If there are any

rights that anyone has against every other individual,
surely the right to life is one, meaning that not to save
a life when one has the opportunity would constitute an

obvious case of injustice.

As Mill says regarding every

instance of injustice, "...in each case the supposition
implies two things:

a wrong done, and some assignable per-

son who is wronged."^

The example Mill provides clearly

satisfies both conditions.

Third, that part of the passage

which says, "...we usually say, not that justice must give
way tc some other moral principle, but that what is just in
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not
just in the particular case," is unfortunate in that it is

not precisely formulated.

Though it appears to refer to

"some other moral principle" than a principle of justice,
6l

Mill,

"Utilitarianism,

p.

247-
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I

think it would, more correctly be read as follows, and

would thereby be more closely in accord with what the rest
of Chapter V implies about Mill's intentions:

"...we usu-

ally say, nob ohat justice must give way to some other moral

principle than a principle of .justice, but that which is just
in ordinary cases is by reason of that other principle of

justice, not just in the particular case." Fourth, to in-

terpret Mill as maintaining that justice can sometimes be

overruled by other moral considerations is inconsistent

with that interpretation of Mill, previously expounded on,

which shown that Mill was concerned that one's only obligation should be providing people with equal access to the

necessary means for the pursuit of happiness and not with
sacrificing these, on occasion, to satisfy other desires.
Finally, in any ordinary account of the meaning of "inde-

feasibility," to call principles of justice "indefeasible"
is to say that they could not be overruled by other con-

siderations; i.e., no principle of justice could ever be

overruled by some other moral principle which was not
also a principle of justice.
In conclusion, if the passage does not, in a final

analysis, bear this interpretation, suffice it to say that

Mill was unfortunately inconsistent.

Having previously

maintained that justice has to do with rights, that rights
are established by utilitarianism as necessary conditions

for the pursuit of happiness, and that adhering to them

242

over other considerations is the

"best

way to maximize the

general happiness, perhaps he has here
lapsed into maintaining that the general happiness can
sometimes he maximized when they are subordinated to other
moral considera•

62

•

i° ns

*

However, that his example could not have been

concerned with conflicting rights (e.g., the
right to life)
and could not, thereby, have been regarded by
him as one

evidencing conflicting principles of justice, as
would
have to be the case with this interpretation, is
somewhat
incredible

Section IV
Fair Procedures
In Chapter V of Distributive Justice

.

Rescher deals

with some problems that are susceptible to solution through
an appeal to "fair procedures," a concept which David Lyons

discusses in the final chapter of his book, Forms and Limits
of

Utilitarianism '-

7

However, as Lyons maintains that "fair

i.e., that in cases like this the issue is not
whether justice or injustice is done.
"...what is just in
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not
just in the particular case." If we interpret "the other
principle" as one other than a principle of justice, the
interpretation that adhering to the other principle in this
case maximizes the general happiness (and has nothing to do
with justice) is the only plausible explanation of its intended meaning. However, as noted in the previous paragraph, that this is the correct interpretation of the passage is doubtful.
63

'(London:

Oxford University Press, 1965).
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procedures" are something that must he appealed to in addition

the principle of utility in order to accommodate

oo

jUo uice

,

^his section will he devoted to the demonstration

of two points in Sud— section IV— A and IV— B, respectively;
(a)

Lyons' concept of "fair procedures" is derivative from

our utilitarian theory.
of Distributive -Justice

(b) Reseller s problems in Chapter V
1

,

as well as some other problems

having to do with distributive justice, can be solved by
employing "fair procedures."

Sub-section IV-A; a utilitarian principle of dis tributive justice

.

Contrary to Lyons' claim that the most

significant result of his book is the establishment of the
"equivalence thesis,"
out,

64

Richard E. Flathman has pointed

in a review of Lyons' book, that it is actually his

final chapter which must be taken as containing his really

decisive arguments against utilitarianism.

D

Whereas the

"equivalence thesis" is meant to substantiate the claim

Lyons asserts the importance of the "equivalence
thesis" on p. xi of the preface to Forms and Limits of Utili tarianism "The thesis of extensional equivalence ... seems to
me the main result." On the page preceding, he has summarized briefly what he means by it: "...contrary to widespread
misapprehensions, two formally different kinds of utilitarianism, simple and general, and along with the latter one kind
of rule-utilitarianism, are extensionally equivalent; that is,
analogous principles of the various kinds necessarily yield
equivalent judgments in all cases; or, in other words, it
makes no difference in theory whether the simple or generalization test is applied to acts or--within limits--whether
an appeal is made to rules grounded in utility."
;

^ "Forms
(July,

1966 ),

and Limits of Utilitarianism," Ethics
pp. 311-312.

,

76
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made in the preface that "little is
gained by choosing one
-Lorm /oi

utilitarianism/rather than another," this conclusion is best regarded as subsidiary to
his more general
claim evidenced in the last chapter of the
book

— that

no

pure form of utilitarianism can provide an
adequate meta-

ethical or moral theory, because of not being
able to account for fairness and promise-keeping, the two
moral practices Lyons uses to make his point. If this latter
claim
is true, the "equivalence thesis" must be regarded
as of

only secondary importance, for its result is only to have

demonstrated that several presumed alternatives to act-

utilitarianism (itself, theoretically objectionable) are
either equivalent to or no better than it; so we are left,
in the final analysis, with what we had in the beginnings

a theoretically inadequate ethical theory.

Flat liman provides an adequate summary of Lyons' general argument about fairness:

Arguments from fairness are relevant when (1) there
is an existing cooperative practice (2) which actually achieves and distributes (3) total benefits that
could not be produced without the practice, (4) benefits that outweigh the total burdens imposed by participation in the practice, and (5) which could be
produced and distributed despite (partial?) non-cooperation by some v/ho benefit from the practice.
Parasitic non-cooperation, which the utilitarian
would sometimes have to approve on the grounds that
it maximized utility, is condemned by a non-utilitarian argument from fairness. "Under such circumstances /the argument from fairness/demands universal
cooperation by enjoyers."0 ^
Flathman, p. 312.
For the argument in the detail in
which Lyons presents it, see Forms and Limits of Utilitari anism pp. 164-16?
,
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rather than argue generally that judgments about fairness are derivative from utilitarian judgments,
consider

,

opecif ically

,

wish to

I

Lyons* notion of "fair orocedures

,

which he regards as part oi the solution to the problem as
to whether or not "we want fairness

(

just distribution) al-

ways to weigh more heavily than utility." 07

Although his

objective is to demonstrate that "fair procedures" are, in
an important sense, not reducible to utilitarian considerations, it is doubtful that he succeeds.

As an example of a fair procedure, he asks us to

imagine a college of one thousand students with a fifteen-

hundred capacity cafeteria which must operate at a capacity
in order to avoid services being cut or prices raised;

students must invite guests but it is obvious that if all
or no students invited guests, the situation would be less

than satisfactory.

Obviously, cautions Lyons, "It would

be absurd to say that no one should have guests (or that

everyone should have guests) because the results of no
one's (everyone's) having guests would not be as bad as the

results of everyone's (no one's) having guests.
this way is to miss the point."

To argue

And he concludes:

What is required instead is an arrangement whereby
What
the facilities could most efficiently be used.
is required is the establishment of a fair procedure
for determining which students at which times may
bring guests, a procedure designed to maximize utility without infringing upon the equal claim with

^Lyons,

p.

168

.
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which each student begins
The details are not
important here.
What is important is that the procedure be fair. 68
rirst, it is essential to note that the procedure
de-

vised in Lyons
grounds.

example is wholly defensible on utilitarian

Lyons agrees.

As he says about this situation,

Here one does not outweigh the other:
plied in order to maximize utility,

fairness is apAs we have seen in

other situations where everyone has an equal claim (right)
to something, the best way to maximize utility is to devise

some procedure which best acknowledges them as such,^
is difficult,

it

if not impossible, to imagine any other pro-

cedure for Lyons' example which would do more to maximize
utility.

Although the

’’fair

procedure” is established in this

case for the purpose of maximizing utility, Lyons asserts
that "...after the system has been established, the answer
to the individual student's question,

'Should

I

invite a

guest?' presupposes considerations of fairness and not just

those of utility."'

^Lyons,
(i

p,

169-70.

p.

1?0.

Q

''Lyons,

This is preposterous, however, since

70

In fact, if to argue for "fair procedures," is to
argue for the obligation to distribute items in accordance
with legitimate claims (rights) to them--and this seems to be
Lyons' position--this is precisely what our utilitarian theory
requires as essential to the maximisation of the general happiness
.

^Lyons,

p.

170
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it is odvious that anyone's deviating
from the fair procedure

Lyons describes would result in a decrease
in the amount of
resulting utility. One has perfectly good
utilitarian grounds
xor acting in accordance with the procedure
as it has been set
up.
If the argument is that one can also justify
not deviating irom the procedure on grounds of fairness,
this is

merely to say that this approach to justification
is equivalent to the utilitarian.
If this is the case, however,
clearly ei uher serves as a sufficient reason for not deviating from the procedure and an appeal to fairness is not an

additional necessary condition for justifying such a decision.

The distinction Lyons is trying to maintain exists

between fairness and utility is a distinction without a
significant difference, as an appeal to utility justifies
the procedure he describes as v/ell as any appeal to fairness.

Lyons' position here seems to stem from the fact that
he is dissatisfied that we think it sufficient in these

cases that utilitarian theory accord with our intuitions

regarding justice (and fairness).

He seems to think that,

irregardless of its accord with intuition, not sanctioning
a separate non-utilitarian criterion of fairness--although

this would be absurd in the circumstances (because unnecessary) --is a sufficient basis for judging the theory inade-

quate.

In fact, what seems to be held as a necessary con-

dition for the acceptability of any ethical theory, according to Lyons, is that it recognize and employ a distinct
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non-utilitarian criterion of fairness.

This somewhat in-

credible position is evidence in the following passage:
In general, it is necessary to distinguish between
our reasons for criticizing certain modes of behavior, on the one hand, and the consequences of
that behavior, on the other.
V/e need not suopose
that uncooperative (or unfair) behavior is not
harmful.
It can be disastrous in its long-range
effects.
But reasons based uoon utility are only
one relevant kind of reason. 72

In reply, we can only say that if we can accommodate

intuitions by a utilitarian consideration of consequences
alone (as we have above), Lyons' contention that "reasons

based upon utility are only one relevant kind of reason,"

can only sensibly be construed as meaning, in those situa-

tions in v/hich intuition can be appealed to, that an appeal
to intuitions about fairness v/ill yield the same conclu-

sions

a.s

an appeal to utilitarianism.

His thesis amounts to
•

saying only that the separate criteria are, in these cases,
equivalent.
told you so
^2

72

To this the utilitarian can only reply, "I
.

"

72
J

Lyons, p. 72.

...

Lyons again insists on the necessity of a separate
appeal to fairness in the second of two reasons for rejecting any attempt to "reduce" fairness to utility.
"...some
of our reactions presuppose considerations of fairness.
For example, one who violated the rules of a fair procedure
and thus failed to cooperate would be subject to criticism
for acting wrongly, not because his act was harmful (for it
Recogneed not be), but because it was unfair" (p. 172).
nizing that he insists on the appeal to fairness even when
the consequences are harmful (v/e might add, no matter how
harmful), v/e can say again that, regardless of the fact that
the basis of some of our reactions may be considerations of
fairness, this is not really significant if an appeal to
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Ljons

contention that "reasons based upon utility-

are only one relevant kind of reason"
results in his claim
that another basis for the evaluation
of acts is motives:
v'/e
must consider. .motives independently of the
utilities or disutilities connected with them.
It seems clear that in one use of the term
"fair,"
an unfair act is primarily one performed by
an
individual who tries to get (for himself) something
i or nothing, who tries to avoid
contributing while
he consumes, who tries to take advantage of the
efforts and restraints, sacrifices and burdens,
hardships and inconveniences of others. The question relevant to fairness is, then, not whether
one’s act produces good or bad effects, but
whether one acts in the kind of way I have lust
generally described. 74
.

Without elaborating,

I

think it is necessary to make

only two comments about this suggested approach to the
judgment of acts.

(a) To argue that an action is to be

judged right or wrong (fair or unfair) on the basis of the

motive of the agent is to beg the question against the

utilitarian and, consequently, to ignore the useful distinction he insists on between the appraisal of the action
and the agent.

That is, whereas the agent is deserving of

praise or blame on the basis of his intention (motive) prior
to the act,

the action is best considered independently

terms of its consequences.

(b)

,

in

It is not at all obvious

that categorizing a motive as good or bad is a process in-

dependent of accounting for its consequences.

For apart

utilitarianism will also result in intuitively acceptable
conclusions.
And this is what we are maintaining.
74

Lyons, p. 175*
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from regarding some motives as intrinsically
good or bad
(a° leasx a problematic and perhaps
an implausible
sug-

gestion),

judgments concerning motives are at least in
some

cases grounded in past experience with the
consequences of
acting upon them. Once again, it seems that one
is justi-

fied in suspecting that Lyons is not successful
in his at-

tempt to demonstrate the independence of factors in the
judgments about actions which are not derivative upon con-

siderations of utility; for the most forceful--if not the

only--reasons to be offered for motives being good or bad
are most probably in terms of their consequences.

As

Flathman concludes:
Lyons is right that motives, established procedures
and other formalistic considerations play a role in
morality; but he does not show that their development to a place of moral standing can be explained
independently of utilitarian considerations or that
the use we make of them could be defended v/ithout
recourse to utilitarian considerations 75
.

Setting up a "fair procedure," as in the cafeteria
example above, can be done on the basis of utilitarian con-

siderations alone, and acting in accordance with such a

procedure can also be justified in this way.

Perhaps, how-

ever, as Lyons suggests, the more interesting cases are

those in which there is an existing situation which satis-

fies the conditions for an argument from fairness but in

which there is no fair procedure to appeal to.
75

As Lyons

-p. 316.
Flathman develops some of the points made
in (b) on pp. 31^-316.

says about, the establishment of fair
procedures,

"
.

.

.

this

is only a partial answer to the
question originally raised,

about utility perhaps outweighing fairness ."'70

For, as he

says further on,
In any actual case an argument from fairness
will
most likely occur within a more or less inefficient,
more or less inhumane more or less unjust and
fairly administered set of rules. There is no unsimple,
readily definable set of calculations through which
we can run in order to determine whether we
should
cooperate, instead of doing something else.
(The
alternative to cooperation is not simply a failure
to cooperate; many sorts of actions are open in
either case
^

.

,

.

And he concludes in the next paragraph that,

Because of such factors, it might be best to say
that one's obligation to cooperate is not perfect
or absolute, but rather prima facie
For there may
be conditions--not just utilitarian considerations
now which justify a refusal to cooperate in a
practice which satisfies the conditions, outlined
above, for the application of an argument from
fairness 77
.

—

.

The crucial question with respect to such situations
is whether or not what utilitarian theory determines as to

when one should or should not cooperate in such practices
is consistent with intuitions about fairness.

If so, the

"conditions ... which justify a refusal to cooperate" can be

fully accounted for by utilitarian theory.

First of all,

from the perspective of the utilitarian theory being considered, if an existing situation, practice or procedure
is unfair,

76

this means that rights are being violated and

Lyons, p. 170.

"^Lyons,

p.

171.
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that what one should do in
this case is dependent on the
harms resulting from the
alternative actions available
(i.e., one should appeal to
the principle of obligation
and its corollary). In some
cases, it would be bestwould result in the least amount
of harm— not to cooperate
and to work, instead, for the
establishment of a better
(fairer) practice or procedure;
in others, it would be best
to continue cooperating (e.g.,
it might be best not to break
a bad law in a generally good
system).
In any
case, as

Lyons has noted above, "The alternative
to cooperation is
not simply a failure to cooperate;
many sorts of actions
are open in either case."
In snort, Lyons insists that there are
other con-

siderations than utilitarian ones which moral
agents must
appeal oo in order to determine whether they
should continue to cooperate in an unfair practice, refrain
from

cooperating, or do something else.

However, Lyons has not

oniy not made explicit whatever other criterion
(or criteria) one should employ for judging what we
ought
to do

in such a situation, he has not attempted to
show that em-

ployment of the utilitarian criterion is inconsistent
with
intuition.

We will only say that it has been shown that

establisning a fair procedure and complying

v/ith it

is

justified by utilitarianism, in addition to being compatible
with intuition; and it is not at all clear that what the

theory prescribes we do in these situations is not also in
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accora wi~h intuition.

Granted that the complexity of pos-

sible situations of this kind often
militates against simple
solutions, the utilitarian insists that one
must always do
his best to choose that action which will
result in the least
amount of harm; i.e., one must do his best to
act in accord-

ance with the principle of obligation and its
corollary.
to do so would be irrational,

tuition.

^

— —section

I

submit, contrary to in-

Iv- B: a solution to some problems of dis -

-

tributive Rustic

and,

Not

.

Now that it has been concluded that fair

procedures are justified by utilitarian theory, it is apparent tha b they can be appealed to for the purpose of solving many otner problems having to do with distributive justice.

For example, prior to his discussion of fair procedures,

Lyons has considered the familiar "lawn-crossing case" and
has concluded that to take advantage of others' cooperative-

ness (i.e., their not crossing the lawn) is to act unfairly,
and that utilitarian considerations play no part in condemning such actions.

It seems apparent, however, that fair

procedures can be successfully employed here as well.

Commenting on the cafeteria example above, Lyons has
said,

"...the appeal to utilitarian generalization to
no

See Lyons' example of an unfair tax law, p. 171. A
utilitarian v/ould be obligated to consider the questions
Lyons thinks are important. The major difference between
Lyons' theory and utilitarianism, however, is that the latter provides a plausible way for deciding what to do, whereas Lyons' theory does not.
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determine what an individual should do before
the fair procedure is established is inappropriate
The question is not
should I (or should I not) invite a guest?'
but rather 'How
can we set things straight ?"’ 79 Now we can
sensibly ask why
the same sort of consideration can't apply
in the lawn-crossing case (and others like it) as well; viz
the proper question is not "Should I (or should I not) cross the
lawn?"
.

.

.

but

rather "How can we set things straight?"

For, surely, if

utility is maximised by allowing some people to cross
the
lawn (the number depending upon what the lawn will bear

prior to the damage threshold), rather than asking that
everyone refrain, the sensible thing to do might be to es-

tablish a "fair procedure" to maximize utility.

Then, be-

cause a fair procedure is designed to maximize utility, the

reasons for acting in accordance with it are utilitarian
also; i.e., any violation of the procedure will damage the

lawn and so result in a loss of utility .® 9
9Q
-Lyons,
80

p.

170.

This situation reminds one of a familiar objection
to rule-utilitarian theories; that is, it is contrary to
the maximization of utility to insist that, because most
actions of a certain category (X) are bad, we should regard them all as governed by the general rule, "Do not do
actions of type X." Here, we see that, in some cases, an
appeal to "fair procedures" is open as an alternative and,
when it is, is more’ productive of utility than would be
everyone's adherence to a prohibitive rule. Narveson does
.

not employ the term "fair procedures," but evidences a
similar approach for dealing with problems like these on
p. 136 of Morality and Utility
.
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However, although a loss of utility
would result if
one violated what might be called a
paradigm example of a
fair procedure (one such that any single
violation would result in obvious utility loss), a more
interesting problem
arises ii we ask what utilitarian reasons
would compel one
to abide by a less-than-perf ect fair
procedure,

in which

•there might be several violations without
a noticeable loss

of utility.

For example,

it might be too much trouble (not

worth the effort) to set up a perfect fair procedure
for
lawn-crossing; and so the individuals concerned might all

promise to refrain irom lawn-crossing under normal conditions (e.g., in the absence of emergency situations), even

though the lawn would not be damaged, say, if several

crossed it every week.

In such a situation, it might be

argued that a utilitarian could justify crossing the lawn

when he was certain that no one would find out and when
there would consequently be no utility loss in the form of

after-effects, such as distrust among citizens, etc

.

In reply to this objection, if it is intended to

mean that we are obligated to increase our own hapuiness
in this case, and so increase, thereby, the general hapoiness, we must remind ourselves, first, that no utilitarian
is obligated to make himself or anyone else happy.
83

.

Though

Note that the kind of situation described in the
footnote on p,206 of this text can be considered as a variation of this and so can be regarded as being dealt with at
this time also.
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it is right to do so when no avoidable harm results,
the

best way to maximize the general happiness is to regard, as

one's only obligation, respecting others' rights to the

necessary conditions for happiness. Secondly, as there has
presumably been a promise made that one would not lawn-cross
in secret, and we have previously established that those to

whom the promise was made have a prima facie right to expect
compliance, to break the promise is to violate this right and
so to harm them.

82

That is, insofar as people can be harmed

without their knowing it (which is surely possible), and insofar as one has no special right to cross the lawn when no
one else will notice, etc,, appeal to the principle of ob-

ligation informs us that many rights are violated if one
crosses the lawn in secret, but no rights are violated if one
doesn't.
82

""

Thirdly, it might be argued that if one knows he

.

See footnote on p. 236 of this text. This takes care
of the utilitarian justification for keeping promises, and
so accounts for the other moral practice Lyons denies that
the theory can handle.
Again, it is most important to note
that under some conditions it would be right (also obligatory) for a utilitarian not to abide by a previous agreement, which accounts for it's being only a prima facie obligation. For example, he should not abide by its terms
if more harm would result from his doing so.
For a rather
detailed defense of promise-keeping as a prima facie obligation, see Narveson, Morality and Utility pp. 189-197.
,

go
-'Narveson hints that there are at least some circumstances in which we should regard satisfying the legitimate
desires of others--even when they can't know about it— as
"We sometimes
justified by utilitarian considerations.
have desires which can only be satisfied by the creation
of conditions we will never know about, e.g., for our manuscripts to be published posthumously, our roses to be
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vvill ne’v sr

oe found, out,

he should cross the lawn anyway—

oven ii rights are violated

— because

to do so will maximize

the amount of pleasure produced and, consequently,
the gen-

eral happiness.

In this case,

it must be objected that to

argue this way is to once again engage in a bit of meta-

physical speculation.

It might be the case that, metaphys-

ically speaking, more general happiness will ultimately be

produced (one can imagine anything he wishes from this perspective), but from the evidence we have about hanpiness, we
are not entitled to conclude that if more pleasure is produced, more overall happiness will result.

To do so is auto-

matically to presuppose that 'happiness' is identical with
’pleasure,' a presupposition we have already dispensed with
oh

as being beyond the realm of justification."^

Given the

tended, etc.
The satisfaction of these desires cannot, of
course, produce feelings of satisfaction in us; and this
might be a reason for thinking these desires unreasonable.
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that if you tend your
friend's roses /in the case where he has died after you have
promised to take care of them after his death/, you are doing it in order to satisfy his desires, and if you default,
you will have left this desire unsatisfied. Such 'satisfactions' come within the purview of utility as I have
specified it, but surely we all feel that these are pale
ghosts of satisfactions, and not to be counted for very
much." (p. 196.)
.

84

Of course, rejection of this specific presupposition
would also extend t.o other attempts to equate 'happiness'
with any particular 'intrinsic good(s).' Therefore, equating 'happiness' in this case, for example, with 'taking advantage of one's neighbors when one has good reason to believe they will not find out,' must be rejected on the same
grounds.
In addition, it should be recalled that we are
prevented from having knowledge of metaphysical rightness
and wrongness, not only because we are not allowed to
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evidence available with respect to the
question of happiness,
as utilitarians we can only
sanction the establishment of
rights to the necessary conditions for
happiness and not

violating them whenever possible.

Phrased somewhat differ-

ently, this means that the satisfaction
of illegitimate desires is precisely the kind of thing that

utilitarianism

cannot sanction, whenever it is possible not
to do so.

Returning to Rescher, problems that he deals with
in
Chapter V of Distributive Justice are also susceptible
to

solution via fair procedures.

One of these problems is

discussed in the section, "indivisible goods and 'Equality
of Opportunity,'" which Rescher outlines as follows:

An important facet of the role of distributing -procedures comes to the fore whenever in the nature' of
things. a straightforwardly equitable pattern of distribution is impossible of realization. This occurs
inter-alia whenever the object of the division is an
indivisible (or not a sufficiently divisible) good. 85
This happens, for example, if two individuals have perfectly
equal claims to an item which cannot be divided or shared
in any satisfactory

v/ay.

As Rescher says about circum-

stances like these:
The interests of "distributive justice" cannot here
--in the very nature of the case--be served by dividing the "expected utility," but only by resorting
to. a. stochastic method for dividing the "expected
utility," by equalizing the chances of the equally

presuppose that we know what happiness is, but also because
we do not know what the nature and/or extent of the consequences of our actions are.
O

cT

^Rescher, pp. 93-94-.
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matched claimants to carry off the whole
of the
indivisible prize.
in fact, Rescher claims that this
random-distribution

method is the standard procedure in everyday
life when such
problems arise.

Recalling the utilitarian justification for
providing
everyone, so par as possible, with an equal
opportunity for
happiness, it becomes immediately apparent that the
random
selection procedure urged by Rescher as the only fair
way to
solve the problem is exactly what our theory would
prescribe.
In any situation in which there are equal claims to
an in-

divisible or unsharable item, the right of each to an equal

opportunity for obtaining the item is respected by adopting
a decision procedure which assures an equal advantage to

each.

The only procedure that the theory could sanction is

some kind of random selection procedure, such as the tossing

of a coin.

When Rescher concludes about these situations that
"a

distribution that does not

g'ive all

equally deserving

claimants an equal share must, in the interests of justice,
at least preserve an ’equality of opportunity’

(and,

of

course, one of risk also)," we can reply that preserving an

equality of opportunity in these situations is also in the

interests of maximizing utility.
Rescher,
O
J

o.

We can conclude,

in

94.

ry

'Rescher, p. 94.

That is, we can draw this conclusion

260

other words

that utilitarian theory, through
the adoption

,

of lair procedures, is able to
handle another so-called

problem of distributive justice.®®
finally, exactly the same kind of
procedure can be employed for resolving the problems of
distribution in

Reseller's

next section, "Special Problems of an
Economy of Scarcity.
Thus, for example, where there is not
enough
food to eo

around to sustain life for everyone with an
equal claim,
some would have to be selected by a random
procedure to receive an amount sufficient to live.

It is obvious that this

represents a choice between harms, the least harm
resulting
from appealing to a fair procedure which acknowledges
everyone's equal claim to be spared; in other words, to do
so
if we interpret, as we have been, 'equal claims' with
'equal
righ us and regard 'rights' as 'necessary conditions for
th^
pursuit of happiness.'

88

Though it won't be argued for, there is good reason
xor supposing that all other problems of justice, which are
usually thought to be distinct from problems of distributive
justice, are really distributive in principle.
If so, success in dealing v/ith problems of distributive justice can
oe extended to deal successfully with these other
problems
of justice as well. However, as some of these problems have
already been dealt with (e.g., the right to life and associated problems), and as it is not difficult to imagine
how our utilitarian theory could be applied for the resolution^ of other problems of justice, without having to demonstrate that they are really instances of distribution, it
does not seem necessary to argue for the hypothesis that all
proolems of justice are derivative upon the concept of distribution.
For allusions to the plausibility of this hypothesis, see the followings
Reseller, p. 9; Narveson, p. 155;
Frankena, "The Concept of Social Justice," pp. 4 and 9; and
Ewin, p. 201.
39
Reseller, pp. 95-98.
.
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would be

1:0

C='

c

L

ln accordance with the principle
of oblira-

tion and its corollary.

ADDENDUM

Something needs to be said about whether the
theory
uhat has been discussed is an act- or
rule-utilitarian
theory. ^

David Braybrooke has maintained that acceptance

of rule-utilitarianism implies that "Circumstances
may ao-

pear in which particular moral rules ought to be
upheld,
even though the harm done by single violations, taking
them
as single instances,

independently of actions done inde-

pendently from them, would be outweighed by the good that
the violations achieve." 91
90

If this is true, it can safely

..

In fact, it should be noted that Frofessor Robert
Ackermann has voiced the suspicion that the utilitarian
theory which I have developed and attributed to Mill is so
radically different from what have traditionally been remaided as utilitarian theories that it may be misleading to
regard it as a utilitarian theory at all.
I'm not certainhow to reply to this, except to say that it does seem to be
a unique moral theory and that, whatever it is called, it
clearly seems to be a much better theory than so-called
traditional utilitarian theories (see the discussion of
"classical formulations" of utilitarianism in the first part
of Chapter l).
I do not find it problematic to refer to it
as a utilitarian theory, however, and suggest that the disagreement between us could only be resolved by determining
the necessary conditions which must be met by a moral theory
in order for it to be correctly categorized as utilitarian.
91
David Braybrooke, "The Choice Between Utilitarianisms," American Philosophical Quarterly 4, 1 (January, 1967 ),
Braybrooke* s assertion is typical of many who have
p. 28.
commented on the implications of accepting rule-utilitarianism.
For example, see Narveson, Morality and Utility p.
128; Jonathan Harrison, "Utilitarianism, Universalism and
Our Duty to be Just," Contemporary Utilitarianism ed.
,

,

,

,
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be said “hat our theory is not committed to such a position,

and consequently, is not a rule-utilitarian theory.

This

can be very simply demonstrated by pointing out that in any

particular moral situation, a moral agent employing the theory is not limited to an appeal to moral rules justified by
the principle of utility.

According to the theory, in any particular situation
in which a moral agent is trying to decide about the moral

status of particular actions, he is obligated to determine

whether they will result in harm (i.e,, the violation of
rights)

.

Any action which will result in no harm is mor-

ally right; any action which will result in harm, one is

obligated not to perform--unless it is the action which results in the least amount of harm in a situation where all
the alternatives involve harms.

Knowing what harms are

and that some are generally more serious than others (e.g.,
the taking of life as opposed to a deprivation of liberty)

no agent is restricted to a list of moral rules--though he

can use them as rules of thumb- -but can determine the moral

status of actions by referring only to the principle of
utility.

In no case must he resign himself to the produc-

tion of avoidable harm, as seems to be implied by any rule-

Doubleday & Co.,
Michael D. Bayles (Garden City, N. Y.
this same anfrom
and
Inc., Anchor Books, 1963), p. 32;
thology, -J. J. C. Smart, ’’Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism," p. 107; and H. J. McCloskey, "An Examination
of Restricted Utilitarianism," p. 117.
:
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utilitarian theory (if Braybrooke's claim is
correct).
This does not mean, however, that the theory
cannot or
should not be formulated and used as a rule-utilitarian
theory, that it cannot or should not be instituted
in a so-

ciety as a form of rule-utilitarianism.

That this might

be desirable in some societies has been suggested by
Bravbrooke.

Having described the paradigm community ("The

Community-In-Session") in which it would result in maximum
advantage (utility) to the community if everyone functioned
as an act-utilitarian, he turns to a more realistic ap-

praisal of communities.

In these communities, the form of

utilitarianism which is preferable is dependent on a number of factors.

Communities find themselves in distinctive historical environments.
In certain environments, given
certain courses of events, it is possible that a
policy. of giving agents full discretion to act as
act-utilitarians would give better results in the
long run than binding them not to use such discretion-even if common suspicions about the proportion of agents who would abuse discretion are
fully vindicated. For the aggregate gain in happiness from the cases in which discretion is properly used may outweigh the aggregate loss from the
cases in which it is not.
In this respect also
rule-utilitarianism so far as concerns the obvious reasons for preferring it... rests on empirical foundations that are by no means perfectly
settled for all times and places. 9,

After proceeding further to point out that rule-utiliatrianism does not imply the use of non-changing rules
(since rules originally selected may have defects or become

raybrooke,

p.

30

.
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obsolete) ana that in some communities it might
maximize
utility ,o have some who are act- and some who
are rule-

utilitarians, Braybrooke concludes at the end of his
article
that,

"Whatever its difficulties, rule-utilitarianism is
not

to oe surrendered to act-utilitarianism at all
times and all

places.

In some circumstances, depending on the state of

the world and on the state of information, act-utilitarian-

ism would displace rule-utilitarianism.

In other circum-

stances, a consistent utilitarian will have to stand by

rule-utilitarianism.
It seems to me that Braybrooke'

s

contention that

rule-utilitarianism would sometimes be more desirable than
act— utilitarianism is substantially correct.

However, what

is most significant to realize is that what all of this

means for the long debate between advocates of act- and

rule-utilitarianism is that, since the utilitarian theory
we have developed can function as an act-utilitarian theory

which is not subject to theoretical objection (at least from
the standpoint of justice), the decision to adopt one or
the other is not one that must be made on theoretical

grounds at all, but merely for reasons of expediency.
93
''Braybrooke,- p,
04
'

38

'

.

We thus avoid having to reject utilitarianism on
grounds of theoretical objections advanced, for example, by
Richard B, Brandt on pp. 109-110 of his article "Toward a
Credible Form of Utilitarianism," and Alan Do nag an on p.
188 of "Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?"

26 5

Depending on the community, one or the other (or
a combination) will work to best advantage.
In conclusion, then, without arguing the point
further,

thinr it can be safely claimed that utilitarianism
can be
employed in either an act or rule form, that the
decision as

I

to which is best can be made without having to
determine which

form is theoretically least objectionable, i.e., most
com-

pa oiole with intuition.

In the context of the concern of the

dissertation, either form of utilitarianism is able to account
for intuitively acceptable principles of distributive justice.
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